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ABSTRACT 
One of the most striking development in international system, since 
1945, is the proliferation of regional and sub-regional organizations. 
Precisely, a region is invariably an area embracing the territories of three or 
more states. And regionalisation can be defined as a collective action at 
regional level to secure national goals. Accordingly, sub-regionalism is 
viewed as 'regionalism within region'. From the conceptual point of view 
the operative principle in the evolution of growth in cooperative relationship 
at all levels are rooted in wider terms of 'peace', 'security' and 
'development'. 
International system has been a constantly changing phenomena and 
it got intensified with the end of World War II. This change can be seen is 
swiftly shifting of the system from bipolar rivalry to unipolar strength 
extending beyond economics, technology or military might to dominance of 
attitude, concepts and mode of life at different levels. The aspiration 
worldwide has been one of multilateralism against unilateralism, for 
balanced multipolarism against unipolarism, for cultural diversity against 
uniformity, for horizontal economic growth against vertical trade bloc 
system. 
The experiment and experience of regional and subregional 
cooperation in Southeast Asia and South Asia with the formation of 
Association of South East Asian nations (ASEAN) and South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) respectively, may be seen 
as a part of the same process of global change towards building a new 
modified structure of cooperation. 
by the late president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, on May 2, 1980. He 
seemed to have been working on the idea of an ASEAN-like organization in 
South Asia. 
Since 1985, SAARC has evolved slowly but continuously both in 
terms of institutions and programmes. However, it is true that most of the 
programmes and achievements of SAARC exist on paper. Prime factor for 
this lagging behind is that SAARC has unfortunately been a hostage to 
Pakistan-India relations and the relations have become hostage to the 
dynamics of internal politics in India and Pakistan. 
South Asia as a region, has several unique and peculiar 
characteristics. The most unique one is the overwhelming size, resource and 
power of India. It has also been battle ground for enormous conflicts and 
struggle of large mass of humanity. This region is one characterize by 
extraordinary geographical, political and socio-economic diversities. Its 
conflicts and cleavages are far deeper than those in several other third world 
arenas. The problem of maintaining political stability and institution 
building are compounded by massive strategic, economic and demographic 
postures. The problem of this region is that nations believe in conducting 
their relationship by exploiting regional discords rather than by 
underplaying them. The regional approach is always overshadowed and, 
therefore, sabotage by bilateral differences. Due to this tendency, the 
process of emergence of regional consciousness, though extremely 
desirable, is slow is South Asia, what W.H. Morris Jones called "fractured 
region of fractured states, an unexciting world of little cohesion". 
The methodology of inquiry and investigation has been primarily 
based on among others, the primary documents pertaining to the above 
mentioned regional economic blocs. A comparative perspective of evolution 
and growth of ASEAN and SAARC has been an important focus in this 
exploratory and analytical method of study using qualitative source of 
information. The approach to this study has been qualitative concerning 
subjective as well as objective assessment of the behavioural aspect of 
different variables in the regional cooperative system. 
The central theme of the thesis entitled "Regional Economic 
Cooperation in Asia: A Study of ASEAN and SAARC", describes and 
examines issues in regional economic cooperation and integration and their 
inter-relationship both in theory and practice, through a comparative study 
of ASEAN and SAARC regional organizations. Taking a comprehensive 
view of regional economic cooperation, it analyses and evaluates how 
ASEAN and SAARC have contributed to regional economic development in 
Southeast Asia and South Asia respectively. Intra-regional relationship 
among the member countries has been examined with the broader 
parameters of the changing international scenario. 
The whole thesis has been divided into five main chapters. Chapter 
One speaks about region, regionalism, new regionalism and various 
dimensions of economic integration. A region is something more than a 
country and less than a continent. It is an appropriate half way-house for a 
time when the viability of a single state is in doubt but the world is not yet 
ready for unity. In the literature, on the regional cooperation, the term 
regionalism, is used with different meanings including political unification. 
economic unification, economic and political integration and free trade. 
Here in this study all the aforementioned terms have been used 
interchangeably. This part dpals with an exhaustive introduction of region, 
regionalism and different facets of regional economic cooperation have been 
analysed empirically and conceptually. In tried to identify that regional 
cooperation is a multilateral efforts acknowledging the interdependence of 
members and this efforts succeed when member countries develop a 
common sense of well being both at the political and social level, thereby 
paving the way of cooperation and avoid conflicts. 
In Chapter Two and Three an effort has been made to identify the 
Southeast Asia and South Asia as a region and regional entity. Further, all 
the concerned countries of the regions are introduced in geographical, 
historical, political, economic and demographic respects. Moreover, from a 
strictly chronological point of view the evolution and growth of the ASEAN 
and SAARC as an regional organizations have been discussed in detail. It 
then proceeds to focus on the following aspects of ASEAN and SAARC as a 
regional bodies; the field of cooperation in the region; regional policies 
adopted by the Iwo organizations lo promote regional cooperation in 
economic and other developmental area; perceptions of individual member 
states towards regional organizations; the approach of the member states 
towards economic and other regional problems; and, influence of extra 
regional factors on regional economic development and cooperation. 
Despite cooperative endeavours, inter-state relations as much as 
intra-state relations in south Asia remain somewhat traumatic, with almost 
total absence of conflict-solving mechanism. The problem for South Asia 
was and continues to be how to get rid of "the baggage of history", to move 
away from asymmetry and geopolitics of the past and look for a future 
which is different from the past. The Chapter Four of the thesis concentrates 
the constraints facing South Asian regional cooperation at length and views 
the problems in the region as being of different order. It is an interpolative 
and comparative study of ASEAN and SAARC. It explains the domestic, 
political and economic dynamics of the two regions. The ASEAN states 
severally and collectively have remained absorbed in identifying their 
problems and looking for alternatives, however difficult they might be. The 
South Asian countries on the other hand, have been only adding to their load 
of problems, while dragging on or postponing resolution of the existing sets 
of problems. As a result, the age-old animosities along ethnic and religious 
lines, even political confrontation, hostility and internal (domestic) tension 
continue to vitiated relations. 
South Asian countries are still experiencing "vicious circle" of 
economic growth, mutual rigidity and political confrontation nationally, 
bilaterally and regionally. Furthermore, SAARC having an image of "high 
profile and low performance" due to lack of a serious political commitment, 
in turn, is due to several bilateral problems between states of the SAARC 
which bedevil the region. 
But, optimistically the idea of 'open-regionalism', 'growth zone' or 
'growth triangle' is as appealing to South Asia, as it was for Southeast Asian 
countries, as there are potential economic goal, both of a static and dynamic 
nature, to be captured by all participating countries. However, it is thought 
that in experimenting with such structure, the objective must be quite 
transparent and as a process, it is better to be practical and start small than 
conceive mega project and then fail. 
Thus, in this chapter special attention has been given on the 
strategies, factors and variables which make ASEAN an economic giant and 
a power to be reckoned in international fora, by dealing at length, the 
differences and commonalities of two organizations in bringing 
development and prosperity in respective regions. 
There is little doubt that the South Asian region does have immense 
potentials to develop into a dynamic growth zone, as a "borderless" 
economic territory. At the political and policy level, physical and cultural 
proximity should be fully exploited. To be specific, consistent with the more 
recent global trend, there should be a psychological proximity involving the 
concerned people, a mindset that will bring the souls together. One of the 
major practical concerns that should be addressed is related to hardware 
network and concurrently, efforts should be made towards the building of 
'software'. Thus, concluding chapter makes a modest attempt to provide an 
answer to the questions/problems raised in earlier chapter. Here, underlining 
the importance of the state and other entities in the growth of regional 
cooperation, it suggests some areas where policy cooperation among South 
Asian governments is possible in order to promote pragmatic regional 
economic interdependence. India as the region's asymmetrical power must 
provide leadership in shaping regionalism in South Asia. The ASEAN 
model of growth should be an eye opener: In the realm of business and 
economic diplomacy they strive to journey together, be it intra-ASEAN 
issue, or may involve external actors in the APEC, ARF or ASEM. 
Thus, in a world that is engulfed swiftly in schemes of 
regionalisation and globalisation, it would be foolish for any South Asian 
country to have a 'go alone' policy or to keep its door shut for movements 
of goods and/or people. A perspective into the changing nature of 
development cooperation in Europe and elsewhere in Asia in recent years 
would suggest that there has been a element of mutuality i.e. give and take 
in proportion to respective status and position. Further, the motivation for 
true regional cooperation can emerge only from a proper understanding of 
the advantages which the countries of the region would deserve from 
cooperation and the heavy penalties which they would have to pay for their 
intransigent no cooperation. South Asia would become a much happier place 
to live in if the idea of giving precedence to economics over politics 
fructifies. And to realize this goal the moving mantra must be 'prosperous 
by neighbours'. 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN ASIA 
A STUDY OF ASEAN AND SAARC 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Boctor of Pi)ilo^o|5})p 
iN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
BY 
NONAN HAIDER 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF 
Prof. Ms. iqbal Khanam 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
2006 
T6956 
Dedicated 
to 
My Parents 
(Md. Irfan & Azeema Khatoon) 
S)tep.a^tment of, OUditiccd S.ciettce 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH - 202 002 
TELEPHONES : 
Chairman : (0571) 701720 
AMU PABX : 700916/700920-21-22 
Chairman : 364/387 
Office : 365 
FAX : 0571-700528 
Da/fA^.^..\.X..-...3^CO^.. 
Mob.: 09837214241 
CERTIFICATE 
Certified that Mr. Noman Haider ha s prepared his Ph.D. 
thesis entitled "Regional Economic Cooperation in Asia : A Study 
of ASEAN and SAARC" under my supervision. 
To the best of my knowledge this is a bonafide work and is in 
my opinion suitable for consideration of the award of Ph.D. degree in 
Political Science. 
Prof. Ms. Iqbal Khanam 
(Supervisor) 
ACKNOWELDGEMENTS 
Many ideas and encouragement from several sources have gone into 
the making of the present work. I have gone through many ups and downs 
during this study, but have been provided motivation by my research guide, 
Prof. Ms. Iqbal Khanam, Department of Political Science, AMU, Aligarh. 
I wish to acknowledge my heartfelt gratitude and deep appreciation to her 
for the unprecedented efforts and encouragement. Without her intellectual 
assistance and mature judgement that she has bestowed upon mc in an 
unceasing sequence, the work could not have been completed. 
I find my pleasure to express my warmest thanks to Prof. Naheed 
Murtaza Khan, Chairperson, Department of Political Science, AMU, 
Aligarh, for her encouragement, cooperation and insightful suggestions. 
I would fail in my duty if I do not mention the names of Prof. 
Murtaza Khan, Prof. Arif Hameed, Prof. Mirza Asmer Beg, Dr. Nafees 
Ahmad Ansari (Reader) and all the teachers of the Department of Political 
Science, AMU, Aligarh with whose encouragement and appreciation this 
study could be possible. 
My parents and my siblings have been a great source of support and 
inspiration to me during all these years, specially my father who has shared 
his valuable ideas with me during the course of preparation of this work. I 
am deeply indebted to him for being extremely sympathetic and 
understanding. I am also beholden to a large number of friends, forgotten 
and remembered, for their direct or indirect support in writing this thesis. 
I would like to give my very warm and sincere thanks to Seminar 
Incharge, Department of Political Science, A.M.U. Aligarh and staff 
members of Maulana Azad Library, AMU, Aligarh; the Institute of Defence 
and Strategic Analysis, Library, New Delhi; the NASSDOC and ICSSR 
Library, New Delhi; the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade Library, New 
Delhi; the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi; the 
JNU Library, New Delhi; the South Asian Studies Centre, Jaipur; Maulana 
Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata; and, the Indian 
Institute of Higher Studies, Simla. 
No less are my thanks due to Mr. H.K. Sharma for his unfailing 
helpfulness in assiduously tying this thesis and that too in a short period of 
time. 
December 2006 NOMAN HAIDER 
Ill 
PREFACE 
The process of regional cooperation has assumed a new significance 
in today's interdependent world. The latest trend in the world is to link 
nations into regions and the regions with the rest of the world. This could be 
seen in the establishment of regional blocs and initiation of preferential 
trade policies. Be it the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
European Union(EU), North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) or South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), no country can 
afford limiting its economic activities. The emergence of regional blocs and 
efforts being made to make them successful has become the order of the 
day. Moreover, states today face many problems such as transnational 
organized crime, including terrorism and drug trafficking, environmental 
pollution, poverty, socio-economic deprivation that needs coordinated 
multinational effort if they have to be overcome. A regional approach will 
not only promote beneficial cooperation in diverse fields of activity but 
provide an institutional framework for peaceful resolution of conflicts 
among member states. 
The present work, therefore, describes and examines issues in 
regional economic cooperation and their inter-relationship both in theory 
and practice, through a comparative study of ASEAN and SAARC regional 
organisations. Taking a comprehensive view of regional economic 
cooperation, it analyses and evaluates how ASEAN and SAARC have 
conlribiilcd to regional economic development in Southeast and South Asia 
respectively. Intra-regional relationship among the member countries has 
IV 
been examined with the broader parameters of the changing international 
scenario. 
The study is primarily based on, among others, the primary 
documents pertaining to the above-mentioned regional economic blocs. The 
approach to this study is qualitative, historical, analytical and speculative. 
The whole work is divided into five main chapters. 
The plan of the work is as under: In Chapter One, an exhaustive 
introduction of region, regionalism and different facets of regional economic 
cooperation have been analysed empirically and conceptually. It identifies 
that regional cooperation is a multilateral efforts acknowledging the 
interdependence of members and this effort succeeds when member 
countries develop a common sense of well being both at the political and 
social level. 
Chapter fwo and fhree, delves into ihe details of the Southeast 
Asia and South Asia as a region and regional entity, and all the concerned 
countries are introduced in geographical, historical, political, economic and 
demographic respects. Moreover, from a strictly chronological point of 
view, the evolution of the ASEAN and SAARC has been discussed. It, then, 
focuses on the following aspects of ASEAN and SAARC as regional bodies: 
Regional policies adopted by the two organisations to promote regional 
economic cooperation; perceptions of individual member states towards 
regional organization; their approach to economic and other regional 
problems; and, influence of extra regional factors on regional economic 
development and cooperation. 
Chapter Four is an interpolative and comparative study of the 
ASEAN and the SAARC. It explains the domestic, political and economic 
dynamics of the two regions. The differences and commonalities of the two 
oragnisations have been dealt with at length. Special attention has been 
given on the strategies, factors and variables, which make the ASEAN being 
recognized as an economic giant. It further examines the current level of 
economic interaction among the South Asian countries, constraints facing 
liic reuiou in economic cooperation and higiilights the potential lor 
economic interdependence in the region. 
In the concluding chapter, a modest attempt has been made to 
suggest answers to the problems/questions raised above. Underlining the 
importance of the state and other entities in the growth of regional 
cooperation, it suggests some areas, where policy cooperation among the 
Soiitli Asian governments is possible, in order to promote relatively more 
pragmatic regional economic interdependence. 
At the end of the work, some important documents have been added 
which have been crucial in the formation and working of the ASEAN and 
the SAARC as a regional oragnisations. 
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CReglonallsm : Jin Qvoxviem 
CHAPTER: O N E 
REGIONALISM: A N OVERVIEW 
Everything in this world is subject to change. A change, which we 
see from one generation to another, from one era to another. The very end of 
World War II placed the mankind into another war, known as bi-polar 
politics of Cold War. Carrying forward the legacy of change, the world 
community again entered into another era after the demise of Soviet Union. 
The conlcmporary world is being defmed now as the world of post-Cold 
War politics. 
We are now in the post-Cold War era. One of the characteristics of 
international society is the strengthening of the moves to seek regional 
conflict solution through global forums such as the United Nations. 
Moreover, the United Nations is broadening its role in economic and social 
development. In trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been 
setting world-wide trade rules and attempting to solve trade conflicts. 
Another characteristic of current international society is the 
establishment and strengthening of regional cooperation. From EC 
(European Community) to the EU (European Union), from US-Canada Free 
Trade Area to NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the 
institutionalization of APEC (Asia pacific Economic Cooperation) and the 
establishment of MERCUSOR (Southern Cone Common Market) are some 
examples. There are also attempts to establish dialogue and cooperation 
between regions, ASEMs i.e. Asia Europe Meeting is one such case. 
Defining the term 'region' is an essential first step in any analysis of 
regionalism in international politics. There are many views regarding the 
most essential factors that must exist before a tract of territory can be called 
a region. 
CONCEPT OF REGION 
Though there is no standard academic definition of a "region", the 
term i.s most often used geographically because geography is more 
permanent factor than others. As defined in International Encyclopedia of 
Social Science a region is a homogeneous area with physical and cultural 
characteristics distinct from those of neighboring areas.' According to Bharti 
a 'region could be delimited on the basis of geographical proximity, 
common ethnic, linguistic, social, religious and similarity of threat 
perception.^ 
Region can be regarded as building block making up the structures 
of the larger socio-cultural area. As Werner Feld and Gavin Boynd write, 
states in a region "are in several respects interdependent, mainly because of 
their geographic relatedness; that is relatedness is a source of cultural and 
other affinities between those states'.^ To delineate a regional system a 
number of criteria were used. Bruce Russett attempted to delineate region 
based on five criteria.'' 
1. David L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 13, p. 377. 
2. Bharti Chhibber, Regional Security and Regional Cooperation: A Comparative Study 
of ASEAN and SAARC, New Delhi, New Century Publication, 2004, p. 4. 
3. Werner J, Feld and Gravin Boyd, "The Comparative Study of International Regions" 
in Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd (eds.), Comparative Regional System : West and 
East Europe, North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries, New York, 
Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 3. 
4. Bruce M. Russett, International Review and International Systems: A Study in 
Political Ecology, Chicago, Rand McNaliy, 1967, p. 182. 
• Socio-cultural homogeneity; 
• Similar political attitudes and behaviour, as reflected in voting pattern 
in the UN; 
• Common membership in international organizations; 
• Economic interdependence, measured by trade as a proportion to 
national income; and 
• Geographical contiguity. 
Russett revealed that each set of countries constituting a region 
fairly stable overtime. However, common membership in international 
organization alone can not be a basis for delimiting a region, and secondly, 
economic criteria by themselves cannot suffice either. 
In the similar way Toshiro Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi^ have 
delineated five essential degrees of a region which are as follow: 
1. Region as a geographical unit delimited by more or less natural 
physical barriers and marked by ecological characteristics: "Europe 
from the Atlantic to the Urals", "Africa South of Sahara", or "The 
Indian Subcontinent". 
2. Region as a social system implies transpolar relations between human 
groups. These relations constitute a security complex, in which the 
constituents units, as far as their own security is concerned are 
dependent on each other, as well as the overall stability of the regional 
system. 
5. Toshiro Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi, "Globalism and Regionalism", UNU Global 
Seminar' 96 "Shonar Session, 2-6 September 1996, Shohan International Village, 
Hayama, Japan. 
3. Region as organized cooperation in any of the cultural, economic, 
political or military fields. In this case, region is defined by the list of 
the countries which are the formal members of the regional 
organizations in question. 
4. Region as a civil society takes shape when the organizational from 
work facilitates and promotes social communication and convergence 
of values throughout the region. Of course the preexistence of a share 
cultural tradition in a particular region is of crucial importance. 
5. Region as acting subject with a distinct identity, actor capability, 
legitimacy and structure of decision making. Crucial areas for regional 
intervention are conflict resolution and creation of welfare. This 
process in similar to state for nation and national building and the 
ultimate outcome could be "region state". 
Another way to demarcate a region is to define a set of criteria 
which a subsystem must meet and then apply them to empirical cases. Luis 
and Steven described a region as consisting of "'two or more geographically 
proximate and interacting states which share in some degree common ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds and whose sense of identity is 
sometimes increased by the action and attitudes of states external to the 
system".'' 
Breeher'' described a region in terms of its members and location. 
Accordingly, a rough distinction can be made between structurally different 
Luis J. Cantori and Steven, L. Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative 
Approach to the Subordinate Systems", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, NO. 
4, 1969, pp. 361-380. 
Michael Breeher, "The Subordinate State System in South Asia", in James N. 
Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York, Free Press, 1969, 
pp. 153-66. 
types of regions: core regions, peripheral regions, and between tiiem, 
intermediate regions. 
The core regions are politically stable and economically dynamic. 
They organize for the sake of being better able to control the rest of the 
world, the world outside their own region. So far only one of three core 
regions namely Europe, aspires to build such an organization. The other two 
that is North America and East Asia, are both economically strong, but so 
far as they lack a regional political order. 
The intermediate regions are closely linked to the core regions. 
They will be incorporated as soon as the conform to the criterion of 
"coreness". That is economic development and political stability. They are: 
Central Europe, obediently waiting first in line for membership in European, 
obediently waiting first in line for membership in European Union, Latin 
America and Caribbean in the process of becoming "North Americanized". 
China, South East Asia and Oceana (Australia, New Zeland), all now being 
drawn by Japanese capital into the East Asia economic space. 
The peripheral regions, in contrast, are politically turbulent and 
economically stagnant. Their regional arrangements are at the same time 
fragile and ineffective. There are following five regions: the post-Soviet 
Area, the major part of it now in the process of being integrated in the from 
of Commonwealth of Independent States; the Balkans, where the countries 
have lost whatever little tradition of cooperation they once might have 
involved in; the Middle East, a region defined from outside and with a most 
unsettled regional structure; South Asia, with a very low level of 
"regioness", because of the "cold war" (Sometime getting hot) between the 
two major powers, India and Pakistan; and finally, Africa where in many 
countries the political structure called "states" are falling apart. 
Thus scholars and policy makers have used different criteria for 
defining a region. Consequently "region" has within itself a sense of 
boundary and pattern of interaction is more intense among certain nations 
which happen to form a region. Moreover, pattern of interaction are not 
sialic. They change according to political change as conditions and interests 
are defined. It depends on the perception of the elite and people. A Chilean 
Judge of the International Court of justice, Alejandro Alvarez opines "there 
is not rule to determined regions. Their existence must be shown by 
circumstances and in particular, by the agreements made by the states that 
constitute them".^ 
Thus, regions are basically zones of interaction, state interact with 
each other - be it in cooperative, conflictual or competitive ways. In the 
international sphere, "a region may consist of a group of national states 
possessing common cultural, common political interests and often a formal 
organization".^ Therefore, a region has a geographical as well as political 
connotation. A region is something more than a country and less than a 
continent. It is an appropriate half-way house for a time when the viability 
of a single state is in doubt but the world is not yet ready for unity".'^ 
8. Quoted in Norman Hill, International Organization, New York, Harper and Row, 
1952, p. 87. 
9. DavidL. Sills, no. l,p. 377 
10. Surjit Mansingh, "Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Imperatives and Obstacles" in 
Virender Grover (ed), UNO, NAM, NIEO, SAARC and India's Foreign Policy, New 
Delhi, Deep and Deep Publication, 1992, p. 664. 
CONCEPT O F REGIONALISM 
Though the concept of regionalism has been widely discussed in the 
social science, there is still little agreement about the meaning of the term. 
Adding to the complication of definition are a plethora of necessary 
conditions, different approach, and various levels of regional cooperation 
reached in different regions. 
In the literature on the regional cooperation, the term is used with 
different meanings including political unification, economic unification, 
economic and political interaction and free trade. Here in this study all the 
aforementioned terms would be used interchangeably. To understand the 
meaning and dimensions of the regionalism properly it would be viable to 
discuss some of the school of thoughts" regarding regionalism that emerged 
- federalism, functional ism, neo-funclionalism, transactional ism and 
consociationalism. All of these influence regional integration theory at one 
time or the other. 
Federalism 
The federalist'^ view envisages a supranational goal on the line of 
federated state unit. Institution building is one of the main tasks in the 
federalist approach. It stress the importance of constitution, calling for a 
division of power between supranational and national institutions in favour 
of the former. 
11. Bharti Chhibber, no 2, p. 34. 
12. For an understanding of the federalist approach See Hay, Federalism and 
Supranational Organisation, University of Illinois Press, 1966. 
Functionalism 
Functionalist'^ argue that with the globalization of technology, in a 
highly interdependent world society, certain social and economic problem 
overwhelm the capacity of individual states to deal with them and meet 
citizens needs. So functionalism attempts identify common international 
social and economic problems and create regional and global organizations 
to deal with them. Functionalists made a distinction between issues 
concerning 'high politics' and 'low polities'. However, functionalist too lost 
ground to other theoretical approach in explaining integration and 
cooperation. 
Neo-functionalist 
This approach'"* is closely associated with the work of Erust Hass 
and Joseph Nye. Neo-functionalists were often called 'federalist in 
disguise'. In 1964 Hass and Phillippe Schmitter'^ developed a conceptual 
framework which they suggested would highlight the process of regional 
integration. In this framework they construct there sets of observable 
variables: background conditions (dealing with size of units, rate of 
transactions among them. Degree pf pluralism and complementarity); 
conditions at the time of economic union (degree of shared agreement 
purpose and powers delegated to the union): and finally, the process 
13. See David Mitranyky, A Working Peace System, Chicago; Quadrangle, 1966. 
14. Erust B. Hass, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-
57, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958. 
15. Erust B. Haas and Phillippe Schwitter, "Economic and Differential Patterns of 
Political integration: Projections about Utility in Latin America", in International 
Political Communities, New York, Doubleday, 1996, pp. 259-299. 
conditions (decision making style, past integration rate of members' 
transactions and adaptability of government in case of crisis and conflict). 
Here, the European model is being imposed worldwide. 
Transactionalism 
Also known as the communication or pluralist approach, 
transactionalism is closely associated with the work of Karl Deutsch.^^ It 
suggests that an intensive pattern of communication between national units 
will results in a 'community'. Thus, the essential of integration was the 
development of a 'sense of community'. This sense of community requires 
some particular habits of political behaviour on the part of individual and 
social groups involved. 
Consociationalism 
The theory of consociationalism developed in the realm of 
comparative studies seeds to be much relevance to the study of regional 
integration. 
The theory argues that in some way international arrangements may 
challenge rather than reinforce the development of a transactional socio-
psychological community. The process if regional integration could be 
reconciled with the existing interests of the elites. They could look at it as a 
means of consolidating their powers. Moreover, the appearance of regional 
arrangement provides a forum for the leaders of the minorities to get 
increased specific returns and separate representation. 
16. See Karl W. Deutsch et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957. 
17. Se Paul Taylor, International Organisation in the Modern World: The Regional and 
Global Process, London, Winter, 1993. 
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Thus the different approaches to the study of regional cooperation 
lay stress on different aspects. However they are not mutually exclusive. 
Both functionalist and transactionalist seems to believe that stability in 
society is dependent upon consensus. On the other hand, neo-functionalist 
and federalists accept a pluralist model. Federalist and consociationalist both 
are concerned with the behaviour and interests of elites and a preparedness 
to find ways of reconciling their differences with a common system of 
government.'^ 
After assessing the above approaches one say that the term 
'regionalism' properly represents the regional idea in action as an ideology, 
as a regional movement or as the theoretical basis for regional planning.'^ In 
other words regionalism can broadly be defined as a tendency some form of 
preferential trade agreements between a numbers of countries usually belong 
to a particular region.^° Here, the word 'preferential' is key word, implying 
that countries not belonging to a particular regional arrangement are 
discriminated against. 
Thus regionalism is a term in international relation that refers to the 
expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the 
creation and implementation of institution that express that particular 
identity and shape collective action within a geographical region. The idea 
that lies behind this increased regional identity is that as a region becomes 
more economically integrated, it will necessarily become politically 
18. Bharti Chhibberno. 2, p. 40. 
19. David L. Sills, no 1, 
20. Sajal Lahin, Regionalism vs. Multilateralism, 
hUp://www.res.org/UK/socicty/mediabriefings/ pdfs/1998/July Lahin.pdf. 
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integrated as well. Free trade, economic integration, conflict management, 
co-operational the regional levels are all examples of regionalism. 
DIMENSIONS O F ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION 
Most of the early theoretical work conceived of integration and 
cooperation as a unidimensional phenomena which could be measured as a 
'single aggregate continuum.'^' However, integration can best be studied in 
multidimensional terms i.e. political integration, institutional integration, policy 
integration, attitudinal integration, social integration and economic integration. 
These are not mutually exclusive but are interrelated in several ways. 
But not to divert from the theme of the present study, dimensions and 
different kinds of economic cooperation under regional arrangement would be 
discussed. All opines, "International economic integration is concerned with 
the discriminatory removal of all trade impediments between the participating 
nations and with the establishment of certain elements of cooperation and co-
ordination between them. It is now widely known that there are six different 
kinds of economic grouping and entrepreneurial activity operating in the 
contemporary international system. They include: 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA): Whereby members such as those of 
S AARC, have agreed to reduce tariffs for its membership on a number of trade 
commodities. 
21. Bharti Chhibber, no.2, p. 41. 
22. Ail M.El Agraa, The Theory and Measurement of International Economic 
Integration, Basingstoke, Macmillan 1989, p. 1. 
23. Abul Kalam, Subregionalism in Asia: ASEAN and SAARC Experience, New Delhi, 
UPSPD,2001,p. 32. 
12 
Free Trade Area (FTA): Such as AFTA, in which tariffs are proposed to be 
aboHshed among the member states, which maintaining against other countries. 
Custom Unions: Such as the Central American Common Market, in which 
intra-group tariffs have been abolished but a common external tariffs is being 
maintained. 
Common Market: Such as the pre-Maastricht European Common Market 
arrangement, in which in addition to the abolition of intra-group tariffs, 
restriction on factor mobility such as labour and capital have also been 
abolished. 
Economic Union: It contemplates an integrated economic system, coupled 
with unification of monetary, fiscal and social policies overseen by a 
supranational authority. And finally, 
Economic and Political Union: It contemplates, such as the EU, a complete 
integrated regime. 
However actual agreements for regional economic cooperation seldom 
confomi exactly to such ideal types. One type often mixed up with another. 
However, studying the phenomena of economic cooperation by breaking down 
the concept is an interesting and usefiil approach. 
NEW REGIONALISM - A DEBATE 
The approaches developed in the post-cold war era of uncertainty may 
be related to the newly emerged concepts such as "cooperative security", 
"cooperative engagement", "constructive engagement", or "interdependent 
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development"'^ '' All these in different forms seeks to replace individual efforts 
or national striving for economic advancement. The very idea of cooperation 
rest on the assumption, that nation state actors do have diverse identities and 
interests, but they have the potential to cooperate on the basis of national self-
interests. 
The motivating force behind the renewed interest in regionalism^^ is 
emerging from several sources. First, globalization of the economy: 
International trade agreements like NAFTA and the development of the 
European Community all demonstrate reduced economic competitiveness on a 
country-by-country basis, and increased competitiveness on a region-by-region 
basis. A second challenge consists of achieving sustainable development. Now 
we are trying to balance economic growth, with environmental preservation 
and social equity. In short, we are seeing the rapid emergence of a global 
system of regions. Several scholars have begun to use the phrase "the new 
regionalism". They mean to contrast current experiments with the old 
regionalism, which generally refers to a varied body of theory and practice 
spanning the period from the 1880s to the 1980s. Allan Walis^^ has presented a 
set of six characteristics to define and distinguish it from the old one. 
Governance vs. Government: The old regionalism was basically about 
government, about how to erect new strata of hierarchy in state-local relation. 
By contrast, the new regionalism is about governance; that is, establishing 
vision and goal, and setting policy to achieve them. 
24. Ibid. p. 134. 
25. Allan Wallis, The New Regionalism, http;//www.munii'nall.net/eos/2002/ 
walisregionalism.nc/k. 
26. Ibid. 
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Process vs. Structure: The new regionalism focuses on process rather than on 
structure. The old regionalism spent a great deal of time looking at structural 
alternatives. The old regionalism used procedures as the pathway through 
structure. The new regionalism uses process as an alternative structure. 
Open vs. Closed: The old regionalism was concerned with defining boundaries 
and jurisdiction. You were either in it, or outside of it. The new regionalism 
accepts that boundaries are open, fuzzy or elastic. 
Collaboration vs. Co-ordination: The old regionalism focused on 
coordination, including land use, infrastructure development, services, and the 
like Coordination typically implied hierarchy. The new regionalism focuses on 
collaboration and voluntary agreement among equals. 
Trust vs. Accountability: The old regionalism's emphasis on coordination 
was often accompanied by demand for accountability which results in 
inflexibility. The new Regionalism are more inclining towards building the 
relations on trust and mutual benefits to get regional interests fulfilled. 
Empowerment vs. Power: In old regionalism power was viewed as a zero 
sum game, so the power to govern had to be taken from somewhere. 
Empowerment is based on the assumption that new interests bring new energy, 
authority and credibility. 
These combined characteristics describe two different types of 
systems. It is important to note here that new regionalism does not require 
dismantling the old one. The old regionalism continued to offer important 
solution to significant problems. Rather than the new regionalism is most 
15 
centrally a response to a new set of problems that the old regionalism was 
either not aware, or was not designed to address. 
The new regionalism has been further defined and distinguished by 
97 
Toshiro in different way. He also presented five differences between the old 
regionalism and the new regionalism, which are as follows: 
1. Whereas the old regionalism was formed in the bipolar Cold War context. 
The new is taking place in multipolar world order. The new regionalism 
and multipolarity are in fact, two sides of the same coin 
2. Whereas the old regionalism was created "from the above" (often through 
superpower interventions), the new is more spontaneous process from 
within the regions, where the constituent states now experience the need 
for cooperation in order to tackle new global challenges.. 
3. Whereas the old regionalism was inward oriented and protectionist in 
economic terms, the new is often described as "open" and thus compatible 
with an interdependent world economy. However, the idea of a certain 
degree of preferential treatment of countries within the region is implied 
in the idea of open regionalism. 
4. Whereas the old regionalism was specific with regard to its objectives 
(some organizations being security oriented, others economically 
oriented), the new is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process. 
This process includes not only trades and economic development, but also 
environment, social policy and security, etc. 
27. Toshiro Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi, no. 5 
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5. Whereas the old regionalism was concerned only with relation between 
nation states, the new forms part of a global structural transformation in 
which non-state actors are also active and operating at several levels of 
global system. 
In sum, the new regionalism includes economic, political, social and 
cultural aspects, and goes far beyond from free trade. Rather, the political 
ambition of establishing regional coherence and regional identity seems to be 
of primary importance. Because in a world of economic interdependence, 
national policies could be longer be adopted and implemented quite 
independently, as there is no such thing 'national' economic policy''^ ^ The new 
regionalism is linked to globalization and can therefore not be understood 
merely from the point of view of the single region. In short, we are seeing the 
rapid emergence of a global system of regions. 
REGIONALISM AND UNIVERSALIM 
The past decade has witnessed the emergence of new regional 
economic groupings and the revitalization of existing ones. This development 
raises question about whether such groupings are 'building blocs or stumbling 
blocs,^^ towards the effort to create a global multilateral trading system and a 
unified global economy. Thus a cleavage has developed between certain 
advocates of universalism and some advocates of regionalism. Extreme 
universalist and regionalists each see their own approach to order and stability 
as the only feasible alternative to the deficiencies of the present system. 
28. AbulKalam, no. 23. 
29. Hema Garg, WTO and Regionalism in World Trade, New Delhi, New Century 
Publication, 2004, p. 194. 
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The regionalists often include the following claims for the superiority 
of regionalism over universalism^*^ 
1. There is a natural tendency towards regionalism based on the 
homogeneity of interests, traditions and values within small groups of 
neighbouring states. 
2. Political, economic and social integration is more easily attained among 
a lesser number of states within a limited geographic area than on a 
global basis. 
3. Regional economic cooperation provides more efficient economic units 
than the smaller states, and these larger units can compete successfully 
in world markets. 
4. Local threats to the peace are more willingly and promptly dealt with by 
the governments of that area than by disinterested states at greater 
distance from the scene of conflict. 
5. By combining states into regional groupings, a global balance of power 
will be maintained and world peace and security will be promoted. 
6. The world is not ready to establish global authority sufficient to 
maintain world peace and promote world welfare. 
7. Universalists fail to take into account the heterogeneity of political, 
economic, social and geographical factors throughout the world that 
militate against global unity. The difference can be more easily 
accommodated within a regional framework. 
30 A.L. Bennett, International Organisations: Principles and Issues, New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall, 1995, p. 230. 
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On the other hand, the universaUsts frequently argue that the following 
reasons substantiate their preference for universalism over regionalism'^' : 
1. World interdependence has created an increasing number of problems 
that require global solution. Political, economic and social problems 
reach across regional boundaries. 
2. Regional resources are often inadequate to resolve the problems of 
states within the region. 
3. Since peace is indivisible only a world organization can deal 
effectively within threats to the peace that may, if unchecked, spread 
beyond local or regional limits. 
4. Only a universal organization can provide an adequate check on the 
power of a large state that can often dominate the other members of a 
regional arrangement. 
5. Sanctions against an aggressor are usually ineffective if applied on a 
regional basis because of sources of aid to the aggressor from outside 
the region. 
6. Regions are imprecise and impermanent. No agreement can be reached 
on a system of regions into which the globe can be conveniently 
divided. 
7. Regional alliances provide the basis for rivalries and competition for 
military supremacy among regions leading to great possibilities for 
major wars. 
Ibid. p. 231. 
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There is an intricate relationship between regionaiisation and 
universalisation. Compared to "regionalism" with an impressive theoretical 
tradition behind it, "universalism" in a more recent concept in social science, 
whether its consequences are seen as catastrophic or as the ultimate unification 
of the world, the concept universalism if often used in a rather loose and 
ideological sense?^ 
In The Majority of One, Etzioni discussed the concept of compatibility 
and incompatibility between regional and universal organizations. 
Compatibility is defined as the relationship between two organizations by 
which "the activities of one do not undermine those of the other and vice 
versa"''^ Thus antagonism and confrontation between regionalism and 
universalism occurs only when the jurisdiction and functions of organization at 
the two levels are incompatible. Moreover, it is the nature of problems which 
device whether it require universal or regional treatment. Both regional and 
global agencies can contribute to the promotion of general welfare of humanity, 
and thus no incompatibility need exist between regional and universal 
organization. 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS 
At the time of formulation of the character of the United Nations, an 
accommodation for regional organization was given due to the forces favouring 
regionalism. It was Winston Churchill, the British P.M., who favoured the 
regionalist approach over the universalist approach to world order. However, at 
32. Toshiro Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi, no.5. 
33. Minerva M. Etzioni, The Majority of One: Towards a Theory of Regional 
Compatibility, Beverly Hills, Sage Publication, 1970, p. 18. 
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the San Francisco Conference a proposal to provide specific arrangement for 
regional agencies in the economic and social functions of the UN was defeated. 
Consequently, all the charter provision for regional arrangements are limited to 
the role of regional organization in the maintenance of international peace and 
security.^'' 
However, in practice, regional agencies are extensively utilized in the 
economic and social spheres. Those regional economic and social agencies that 
are the part of the United Nations official structure are created under the broad 
authority of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. 
The primary provisions of the charter concerning regional arrangement 
are found in chapter VIII containing only three articles (Articles 52-54).''^ The 
most important principles of chapter VIII are the following : (i) regional 
agencies may exist for dealing \yith such issues of international peace and 
security as are appropriate for regional action as long as their activities are 
consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN; (ii) states are 
encouraged to settle local disputes through regional agencies before referring 
them to the Security Council; (iii) security council may, in turn, utilize such 
agencies for the settlement of local disputes; (iv) with the exception of action 
against states resulting from World War II, no enforcement action shall be 
taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council; 
and (v) the Security Council shall be kept fully informed of activities 
34. A.L. Bennett, no.30, p. 233. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Charter of the United Nations 
37. A.L. Bennett, no. 30, p. 233. 
21 
undertaken or contemplated by regional agencies for the maintenance of peace 
and security. 
The five regional economic commissions of the UN system established 
under the aegis of Economic and Social Council represents a middle path and 
approach between the global goals for which the organization was created and 
the many fold projects and agencies that carry decentralization of the work. It 
would be better to have brief discussion to conceptualize the idea behind the 
formation of the regional economic commissions of the UN. 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE): The ECE was established in 
1947. It provides regional forum for governments from European countries, the 
USA, Canada, Israel and Central Asian Republics to study the economic, 
environmental and technological problems of the region and to recommended 
courses of action. The guiding principle of ECE activities is the promotion of 
sustainable development. 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): The 
Commission was founded in 1947 to encourage the economic and social 
development of Asia and Far East. ESCAP acts as a UN regional center 
executing a wide range of developments programmes through technical 
assistance, advisory service to governments, research, training and information. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): 
The commission was founded in 1948 to coordinate policies for the promotion 
of economic development in Latin American region. The current name of the 
commission was adopted in 1984. ECLAC collaborates with regional 
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governments in the investigation and analysis of regional and national 
economic problems. 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA): The commission was founded in 
1958 by resolution of the UN Economic and Social Council to facilitate 
Africa's economic development. The commission's activities are designed to 
encourage sustainable socio-economic development in Africa and to increase 
economic cooperation among African countries and between Africa and other 
parts of the world. 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) : The 
commission was established in 1974 by a resolution of the UN Economic and 
Social Council for proposing policies and actions to support development and 
to further economic cooperation and integration in western Asia. 
These five regional commissions continued to provide technical 
cooperation, including advisory services, to their member states, promote 
programmes and projects, and provide training to enhance national capacity 
building in various sectors. However, 'because of their limited resources and 
influences, and because of their dependence upon the cooperation of the 
governments and numerous agencies, they have never attained a central role in 
the process of economic development.^^ But efforts continued to improve 
cooperation, including advisory services, to their member states, promote 
programmes and projects, and provide training to enhance national capacity 
building in various sectors. However, 'because of their limited resources and 
influences, and because of their dependence upon the cooperation of the 
38. Ibid. p. 263. 
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governments and numerous agencies, they have never attained a central role in 
on 
the process of economic development. Thus this declaration of the UN 
Economic and Social Council has substantiated the Brandt Commission Report 
on International Development issues entitled "A programme for survival" 
suggest that regional and sub-regional cooperation should be made a prime 
instrument for economic development in the developing countries.'*'' 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER GATTAVTO 
Regional Trade Agreement can be trade creating or trade-diverting and 
can lead to welfare improvement or deterioration.'*' Agreement exist in theory 
on both sides on whether unilateral tariff reductions are superior or inferior to 
granting regional preferential treatment. Some observers believe that the 
proliferation of regional arrangements in recent years threaten or even 
undermine the multilateral system while others hold the view that regional 
trade agreements provide a necessary spur to global liberalization in the present 
era. 
The eighth round of multilateral trade negotiation held under GATT 
(General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) and lasting far seven years (1986-
93), name Uruguay Round, resulted in new legal agreements for trade and 
strengthening of settlement system. Following this there was a Ministerial 
Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco, in April 1994 which was attended by 175 
government representatives from across the world to sign for the establishment 
39. Yearbook of the United Nations, Department of Public Information, United Nations, 
New York, 2001, Vol. 55, p. 897. 
40. Willy Brandt, North South, A Programme for Survival: The Independent Commission 
on International Development Issues, London, Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 285. 
41. Bharti Chhibber, no. 2, Preface. 
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of a new successor institution of GATT, namely the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) which entered into the force on January 1, 1995. 
The establishment of WTO was a significant event. As a principal 
institution with responsibility for the multilateral trading system, the WTO has 
the same status as other institutions such as World Bank and the IMF. The 
WTO has legal personality and has been accorded privileges and immunities 
similar to those accorded to the specialized UN agencies."*^ 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations are not only means of tilting the 
political balance to favour trade liberalization. Growing number of industrial 
and developing countries are signing Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) 
with neighbouring countries. Regional agreements has proliferated since 1990, 
covering not only trade in goods but trade in services also. This regionally 
based liberalization has increased intra-regional trade and investment flows."* 
To have some sort of idea and understanding of the regional arrangement under 
GATT/WTO, it is necessary to go through some of the provisions'*"* which 
facilitate the regional trading system in this global economy. 
Article 1 of the GATT establishes the central requirement that 
signatory government shall extend unconditionally to all other members any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity affecting customs duties, charges. 
42. Bernard M. Kockman and Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of The World 
Trading System - from GATT to WTO, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 37. 
43. John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay 
Round, World Trade Organisation, 1995. 
44. For detail study see The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, The Legal Tax, Published by The GATT Secretariat, Geneva, 1994. 
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rules and procedures that they give to product originating in or destined for any 
other country. 
Under Article 24 customs union and free trade area agreements are a 
permitted exception to the cardinal principle of non-discrimination. It is so 
because it is recognized that agreements have the potential for further 
economic integration. However, the requirement to eliminate duties and other 
restrictions on mutual trade is not absolute. 
Under paragraph 5 of Article 24 is the requirement that the common 
external tariff and other restrictive regulation imposed at the time of the 
formation of the customs union not be more restrictive than those imposed by 
the constituent territories before the formation. 
Part 4 of the GATT (Articles 36, 37 and 38) establishes the principle 
of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations between developed and developing 
countries, and provides for developed countries to adopt special measure to 
promote the expansion of import from developing countries. 
The Enabling clause agreed in November 1997 include? a number of 
provisions permitting GATT contracting parties to grant differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries. Thus the provisions under 
GATT/WTO and consequent growing popularity of Regional Trade 
Arrangement (RTAs) has ignited concerns that these agreements may 
undermine the global trading system by discriminating against imports and 
investments from non-members. 
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Critics of regional arrangements argue that this practiced would violate 
a core principle of WTO: that all imports from member states should face the 
same barriers to trade. Furthermore, eliminating tariffs on imported goods from 
some countries can be counter productive.''^ 
Supporters of RTAs maintain that these agreements have enabled 
countries to liberalise trade and investment barriers to a far greater degree than 
Multilateral trades Negotiations. Exponents also argue that regional agreement 
have gone beyond trade liberalization, taking important steps towards 
harmonizing regulation, adopting minimum standards for regulation and 
recognizing other countries standards and practices.''^ Thus RTAs help nations 
gradually work towards global free trade by allowing countries to increase the 
level of competition slowly and give domestic industries time to adjust. In 
addition, RTAs can be valuable arena for tacking volatile trade issues such as 
agricultural subsidies and trade in services. 
EUROPOEAN UNION: THE ROLE MODEL 
EUROPEAN union (EU) is a unique example of deep integrati ^- l! is 
also the oldest and arguably most effective functioning case of economic 
integration. Form the outset, the construction of the EU can be linked to the 
growing awareness of a dual challenge, internal and external. The internal 
challenge came from the need of the continent to first overcome its own 
division; the external one came from the competition from new sources - the 
United States of America and Japan.'*^ 
45. See Jagdish Bliagwati, The World Trading System Risk, Princeton University Press, 
1991. 
46. Hema Garg, no. 29, p. 10. 
47. Eric Bussiere, "Economic Actors and European Construction" in H.S. Chopra et al. 
(ed.), National Identity and Regional Cooperation, New Delhi, Manohar, 1999, p. 
101. 
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In 1948, the Hague Conference demanded that Council of Europe be 
set up. This was the moment when the European movement was bom.''^  The 
first step toward an economic union was the formation of a custom union 
(Benelux), which came into operation January 1, 1948, among Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxemburg. In 1950, inspired by Jean Monnet, French 
Foreign Minister Robert Schumann proposed a coal and steel community, and 
in 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), composed of the 
Benelux countries and France, West Germany and Italy. The parties to the 
ECSC agreed in 1957 to establish the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), with the term 
European Communities (EC) referring to all three together. The purpose of the 
EC according to the preamble of the Treaty of Rome was to establish "the 
foundation of an ever-close union among the Europeans." 
However, it was not until 1968, that the six original member of the 
European Economic Community achieved the treaty's goal of eliminating all 
tariffs and quotes within the region and introduced a common external tariff. 
Regional free trade was also extended to agriculture. In addition, labour 
mobility was opened up to a large extent. However, sectoral harmonization was 
limited to the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and the Coal and Steel 
Community supranational bodies such as the Council of Ministers and the 
European Court of Justice were also created."*^ 
48. See, Werner Weidenfield, Europe from A to Z: Guide to European Integration, 
Walfyang Wessels, European Documentation, 1997. 
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Seventies and eighties saw a widening of the community membership 
with UK, Ireland and Denmark joining the EEC in 1973, Greece in 1981 and 
Portugal and Spain in 1986. The accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland in 
1995 has brought membership to 15. The successive enlargement not only 
increased the political diversity of the EEC but inevitably diluted its cohesion 
also. The original six members favored deep integration, both economically 
and politically, wile the first batch of newcomers, particularly the UK, and 
Denmark preferred shallow integration at an economic level.^ *^  Thus the 
acceptance of the poor economies of Greece, Spain and Portugal was motivated 
largely by the desire to help the restored democracy remain democratic by 
bolstering them politically and economically. 
In addition to widening of the community, nineties have witnessed the 
two landmark - European Market Programme and the Treaty of European 
Union, also known as Maastricht Treaty (since then the EC has generally been 
referred as the EU). Introduced in January 1993, the single Market has led to 
the free movement of capital, goods and services as well as people through the 
removal of non-tariff barriers. This implies that prior to this, free trade not been 
achieved within the common market owing several barriers.^' 
The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in November 1993, 
aimed at taking the establishment of Monetary Union leading to a single 
European currency by January 1999. On the political front the Treaty aimed at 
50. R.E. Boldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, London Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, 1994. 
51. R.W. Cline, International Economic Policy in the 1990s, Cambridge, Mass, MIT 
Press, 1994. 
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a common foreign, security and defence policy, common citizenship and 
cooperation in justice and social affairs. Common EU standards in public 
health, environment, labour legislation, education, consumer protection and 
culture were also being developed. This was unique to the European Union. 
On January 1, 1999, the EU launched one of the most ambitions 
political and economic undertakings of the twenty first century: Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). A new currency, the Euro replaced the national 
currency of twelve^'' countries, and a new institution, the European Central 
Bank (ECB), took over the responsibility for monetary policy for the Euro area. 
EMU means a single monetary policy within a single economic market, and is, 
therefore, expected to be the logical complement to the single market. 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia joined the EC on 1 May 
2004. After successfully growing from 6 to 25 members, the EU is now 
preparing for next enlargement. As regards the 3 remaining candidate 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania hope to join by 2007, while Turkey is not 
currently negotiating its membership. 
In order to join the Union, they need to ftilfiU the economic and 
political conditions known as the 'Copenhagen criteria', according to which a 
prospective member must: 
• be a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law and the 
protection of minorities; 
52. M.J. Artis and N. Lee, The economics of the European Union - Policy and Analysis, 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
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• have a functioning market economy; and 
• adopt the common rules, standards and policies that make up the body EU 
law. 
Thus the European Union is unique among regional arrangements. It 
represents the greatest advance towards supranationalism. Within the 
economic sphere, broad national decision-making authority has been 
voluntarily surrendered to collective agencies. The EU is also such an 
unprecedented success story that it has served as a model for other similar 
experiments and as the most tangible hope of the functionalists to prove that 
economic integration will lead to eventual political integration.^'' 
REGIONALISM: AN ASSESSMENT 
Post-Cold war international relation have witnessed remarkable 
systematic change in both political and economic arena. With the dissipation 
of the old patterns of politico-military bloc system, a transitional phase has 
ensued, leading to an emergence of new economic and trade blocs that 
strengthened state-to-state relationship at the regional level.^ ^ 
Moreover, the international system in recent years has been swiftly 
shifting from bipolar rivalry to a total "hyper power" dominance, marked by 
a breadth of unipolar strength, extending beyond economic, technology or 
military might to dominance of attitude, concepts and modes of life at all 
different levels.^ ^ 
54. A.L. Bennett, no. 30, p. 255. 
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However, there are as many views, as many theorists who dealt with 
regionalism, some are enthusiastic, and some are alarmist. For the critics, 
the proliferation of regional organization within a period of forty years could 
lead to the mistaken conclusion that regionalism is the wave of the future in 
the redistribution of the world political and economic power.^^ Thus the 
regionalist trend constitutes a threat to the multilateral system. 
For the enthusiasts, on the other hand, the regionalism could form 
the basis for an improved multilateral system. Vedrine opines the aspiration 
worldwide has been one of "counterbalancing" through a combination of 
multilateralism against unilateralism, for balance multipolarism against 
unipolarism, for cultural diversity against uniformity, for horizontal 
economic growth against vertical trade bloc system.^^ Thus the experience in 
regional cooperation in all over the world may be seen as part of the same 
process of global change towards building a new modified structure of 
cooperation. 
According to Elias, there are basic points which are politically 
relevant to the dynamic process of regional cooperation. They are amongst 
others: 
regional cooperation helps in containing conflicts and in peace 
making; 
regional cooperation accelerates economic development through its 
higher synergetic effects; 
• 
• 
57. A.L. Bennett, No. 30, p. 263. 
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• regional cooperation is effective to the extent that is succeeds in 
identifying and bringing together common economic issues; and 
• regional cooperation requires the courage of nations and a policy of 
'one step at a time'.^^ 
To summarize, regional cooperation helps in containing conflicts, 
peace making and economic development. 
Thus, wc come to the conclusion that regionalism is one of the most 
interesting aspects of international relations since the end of World War II. 
Moreover, today with the end of Cold-War and rising interdependence, 
regional cooperation efforts seem to have more chances of success. Western 
Europe has already made a lot of progress in this direction, and other 
regions like Southeast Asia, South Asia, Latin America and North America 
are following suit. 
It has been stated, ' Theories of regional integration have a lot 
to teach us still about non-violent method for collectively solving 
international problems.^ *^ But we have to keep in mind that world regions are 
neither absolutely identical, nor absolutely unique. Yet they do have 
characteristics of their own like their relative stage of development and their 
needs and resources. So, the concept of underdevelopment, dependence and 
regional inequalities as well as the importance of external influences need to 
59. Jurgen Elias, Deputy Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany, Inaugural and 
Valedictory Address in an International Seminar held at New Delhi in December, 
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be included as important variables in understanding the politics of 
cooperation.^' 
Therefore, regional cooperation is a dynamic concept. It calls for an 
institutional framework mean for accomplishing some specific tasks not 
necessarily creating a supranational authority, with an inherent objective of 
peace and welfare, in the process giving a distinct, identity to the member 
countries. Furthermore, regional cooperation is a multilateral effort 
acknowledging the interdependence of member and this effort succeeds 
when member countries develop a common sense of well being both at the 
political and social level, thereby paving the way of cooperation and avoid 
conflicts.^^ 
61. Bharti Chibber, no. 2, p. 53. 
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CHAPTER: TWO 
FORMATION A N D EVOLUTION O F A S E A N 
The geographical spread of Asia is indicative of its importance in 
world affairs. It is populated by more than half of world's human being. The 
continent has with it a diverse variety of political and economic structures. 
The resource endowment of Asia is indeed extraordinarily rich. More 
significantly, a very large area of Asia falls within the vast landmass of 
Eurasia, and is thus closely connected with Eurasian strategic environment. 
However, how do we perceive and define the larger political, cultural, 
economic identity of Asia. It is worthwhile to recall Nehru's prophetic 
words in his inaugural address in the first Asian Relations conference held 
in Delhi in March 1947: 
We stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period 
of history.... we can look back on our long part, and look forward to 
the future that is taking shape before our eyes.... The time has come 
for us, people of Asia, to meet together, to hold together and to 
advance together. It was not only a vague desire, but a 
compulsion....' 
Nehru desired that "the coordination of various countries in Middle 
East, India and the South East Asia is not only possible, but undoubtedly 
certain in future". In spite of several problems, modern Asia is changing. 
Asia is undoubtedly, far more developed that any other stages of its 
development. Over and above, there is a greater regional economic 
integration. Thus, the new transformation is indeed significant. It is the 
The Annual Indian Register (JAR), Vol. 1, New Delhi, Jan-June, 1947, p. 273. 
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countries of South East Asia, which started the pioneering work of regional 
economic cooperation in Asian continent with the establishment of ASEAN 
in 1967. This organization proved a role-model for other Asian countries 
and they started replicating the experience of ASEAN working. Because, 
"despite the constraints of global politics, multilateralism in South East Asia 
has grown and picked up remarkable speed through regional and extra-
regional cooperation." 
A G L I M P S O F T H E SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS 
It is not the purpose of this study to address the regional picture of 
Southeast Asia as such. But as they become larger, economically stronger and 
more confident, their relations with each other and with the rest of the world 
will be increasingly important. The Southeast Asians are likely to play a big 
role in the world in coming decades than they have in the past. Their 
cooperation with each other and their growing awareness will be central to that 
process. 
Southeast Asia is a "term now in general use to describe the territories 
situated between India and China and comprising at present time Burma, North 
and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, the Federation of Malaya, 
Singapore, British Borneo, Indonesia and the Philippines"^. Furthermore, 
'Southeast Asia is, indeed, a loose and unsatisfactory term for a region which 
is a distinct geographical and cultural entity. According to Dobby "Southeast 
2. R.R. Sharma, "Stabilizing Asia: Regional and Global Challenges", in Mahavir Singh 
(ed.), Building a New Asia, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies: 
Kolkata, 2005, p. 80. 
3. Victor Purcell, The Revolution in Southeast Asia, London, Thames and Hudson, 1962, 
p. 17. 
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Asia is a term which became popular during the Far Eastern War 1941-45, to 
describe those territories of Eastern Asia which lies south of the Tropic of 
cancer and nearly island spreading eastward from the Asiatic continent towards 
New Guinea."'' Though we fmd reference to Southeast Asia in the writings of 
scholars and travelers as early as 14 century the term "Southeast Asia 
obtained a fixed meaning in political and military sense during the second 
World War when Admiral Louis Mountbatten of the Allied Forces established 
his Southeast Asia Command/' 
Thus, apart from geographical ones, there are other grounds for 
regarding Southeast Asia as a unity. According to Sir Richard Winsledt, as 
cited by Purcell, these are (a) homogeneity of race modified by the different 
admixtures of Negrito, Indonesians, and Mongol blood, (b) one language 
family, modified by the same conditions; (c) one identical body of primitive 
beliefs; and (d) one material culture (bronze, textiles, etc.)^ 
The post-Cold War world is seeing in some areas resurgence of 
nationalism and in others a greater emphasis on regionalism. But what is new 
in Southeast Asia is the development of voluntary cooperation on a subregional 
or regional level. Most recently there is the assertion of an Asian identity, 
shared by Southeast Asians. The very important differences between and 
indeed even within the Southeast Asian countries induce some skepticism in 
4. E.H.G. Dobby, Southeast Asia, London, University of London Press Ltd., 1958, p. 17. 
5 . Sec, Russell H. Field, "The Concept of Southeast Asia Origins, Development and 
Evaluation", South East Asian Spectrum, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 1975. 
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academic circles about the existence of "Asian values". The nature of Asia 
however remains ambiguous, "because there is no consensus as to what Asia 
stand for... most people in Asian countries seldom se themselves as 
Asian"**But there is no doubt that there is a perception in the region of some 
essential shared values or priorities, and a rejection of western individualistic 
and libertarian values. 
A sense of shared values and interests transcending ethnic or national 
groups emerged in colonial times between independent movements, student 
movements and various Marxist inspired or communist movements in the 
region. But until after the Pacific War there was little connection across the 
region. "What are now the independent nations of Southeast Asia also had little 
contact with each other during the European colonial period....Right up to the 
Pacific war there was little or no communication between, for example what 
are now Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines".^ 
It was remarkably the Japanese campaign, which began at the end of 
1941 which precipated and accelerated a radical change in the region. The 
sheer speed and valour of Japanese militia against the powerftil Allied Forces 
made a strong impression in the erstwhile colonies of Southeast Asia. Though 
Japan lost the war, the war proved death nail to the moribund European 
colonial era, and accelerated the creation of independent states in the region. 
Looking at the recent evolution of the Southeast Asia perhaps the most 
significant thing has been the collapse of communism and a commitment to the 
8. R.R. Sharma, no. 2, p. 69. 
9 . Peter Church, History of South East Asia, See at, 
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38 
market economy though with more governmental political control. There is 
virtual unanimity about the commitment to economic development based on 
relatively open markets, private ownership and competition. The following 
countrywide discussion should therefore be read with the sense that they are 
building blocks in an overall picture. They are essential elements in an 
understanding of Southeast Asia. 
BRUNEI 
Background - Brunei Darussalam (Brunei) is a small state located on the 
north-west coast of the island of Kalimantan or 'Borneo'. The Sultan of 
Brunei's influence peaked between the 15"^  and 17'*^  century. Brunei 
subsequently entered a period of decline brought by internal strife over royal 
succession, colonial expansion of European powers and piracy. In 1888, 
Brunei became a British protectorate and independence was achieved in 
1984.'" 
Economy - This small, well to do economy encompasses a mixture of foreign 
and domestic entrepreneurship, government regulation, welfare measures and 
village tradition. Crude oil and natural gas production account far nearly half 
of GDP and more than 90% of government revenues. Plan far future include 
upgrading the labour force, reducing unemployment, strengthening the banking 
and tourist sector, and, in general further widening the economic base beyond 
oil and gas" 
10 . World Factbook, See at, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publication/factbookyprint/uk,html 
11. Ibid. 
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Disputes - In 2003 Brunei and Malaysia ceased oil and gas exploration in their 
disputed offshore and deepwater seabed and looking for international legal 
adjudication. Land boundary around Limbang is in dispute between them. 
Though Brunei has already establishes an exclusive economic fishing zone 
around Louisa Reef in Southern Spratly Island in 1984 but still it awaits a 
public territorial claim.'^ 
CAMBODIA 
Background - Ravaged by war and revolution in the 1970s it remained a 
victim of cold war rivalries in the 1980 . Most Cambodians consider 
themselves to be Khmers, descendants of the Angkor Empire, which 
reached its zenith between lO"^  and 13"^  centuries. Attack by the Thai and 
Cham weakened the empire. The King placed the country under French 
protection in 1863 and became a part of French Indochina in 1887. 
Following Japanese occupation in World War II, Cambodia gained full 
independence from France in 1953. In 197§ Communist Khmer Rouge 
forces capture Phnom Penh under Pol Pot. In 1978 Vietnamese invasion 
drove Khmer Rouge and Cambodia engulfed into a civil war which lasted at 
least 13 years. In 1991 Paris Peace Accords brought peace and a UN-
sponsored election held in 1993.''* 
Economy - In 1999, the first full year of peace in 30 years the government 
made progress on economic reforms. From 2001-2004, the economy grew at 
an average rate of 6.4%, driven largely by an expansion in the garment 
12. Ibid. 
13. Peter Church, no. 9. 
14. Ibid. 
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sector and tourism. With the January 2005 expiration of a WTO Agreement 
on Textile and Clothing, Cambodia based textile producers were forced to 
compete directly with lower price producing countries. The tourism industry 
continues to grow rapidly. In 2005, oil and natural gas deposits were found 
beneath Cambodia's territorial waters. The major economic challenge for 
Cambodia over the next decade will be fashioning an economic environment 
in which the private sector can create enough jobs. 
Disputes - Cambodia accused Thailand of obstructing access to Preah Vihar 
temple ruins awarded to Cambodia by ICJ decision in 1962. Cambodia and 
Thailand disputes a section of boundary with missing boundary markers. 
Maritime boundary with Vietnam is hampered by unresolved dispute over 
offshore^islands.'^ 
INDONESIA 
Background - Indonesia's geography is an integral part of its history. 
Indonesia is the world largest archipelagic state having near 17,508 islands, 
over 300 socio-linguistic groups and over 224 million population. Indonesia 
is a tropical country with a volcanic spine running through its island. The 
Dutch began to colonise Indonesia in the early 17 century and the islands 
were occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1945. Indonesia declared its 
independence after Japan's surrender but it required four years before the 
Netherlands agreed to relinquish its colony.'^ 
15. WorldFactbook, no. 10. 
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Economic - Indonesia has struggled to overcome the Asian financial crisis, 
and still grapples with high unemployment, a fragile banking system, 
endemic corruption inadequate infrastructure, a poor investment climate. 
Indonesia became a net oil importer in 2004. In December 2004, the Indian 
Ocean tsunami took 1, 31,000 live, 37000 missing and left some 570,000 
displaced person. 
Dispute - Several section of boundary remain unresolved between 
Indonesia and East Timor. Indonesia and East Timor contest the sovereignty 
of coral island of Pulau Batck. There is also a maritime boundary dispute 
1 7 
between Indonesia and Australia. 
LAOS 
Background - The Lao People's Democratic Republic or Lao FDR is about 
236800 sq.km. in land area but has a relatively small population of about 6.3 
million in June 2006. It is a landlocked country. Much of it is mountainous 
and only about 4.02 percent of the land is under continuous cultivation.'^ 
Modern day Laos has its roots in the ancient Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang, 
established in the 14"^  century. After centuries of graded decline, Laos came 
under the control of Siam (Thailand) from the late 18"^  century until the late 
19"^  century when it became part of French Indochina. In 1975, the 
communist Fathet Lao took control of the government ending six-century-
old monarchy. 
17. WorldFactbook, 110. 10. 
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Economy - The government of Laos began decentralizing control and 
encouraging private enterprise in 1986. The results, starting from an 
extremely low base, were striking growth average 6% in 1988-2004. 
Subsistence agriculture accounts for about half of GDP and provide 80% of 
total employment. In late 2004, Laos gained Normal Trade Relations status 
with the US. In addition, the EU has agreed to provide $ 1 million for 
technical assistance in preparation for WTO membership. 
Disputes - There is on going discussion with Thailand to demarcation but 
there still has some disputes over several areas along Mekong River and 
Thai squatters. Chinas construction of dam over Mekong River also 
concerns Laos, which will affect water level. 
MALAYSIA 
Background - During the late 18'*^  and 19"^  centuries. Great Britain 
established colonies and protectorates in the area of current Malaysia, which 
were occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1945. In 1948, British ruled territories 
on the Malayan Peninsula formed the federation of Malaya, which became 
independent in 1957. Malaysia was formed in 1963 when the former British 
colonies of Singapore and East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak 
joined the Federation. The first several years were marred by Indonesian 
effort to control Malaysia, Philippines' claim to Sabah, and Singapore's 
succession from the Federation in 1965.'^ 
Economy - Malaysia, a middle income country, transformer itself from 
1971 through the late 1990s, from a producer of raw material into an 
19. Ibid. 
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emerging multi-sector economy. Growth was almost exclusively driven by 
exports - particularly of electronics. GDP growth rate topped 7% in 2004 
and 5% 2005. Malaysia has profited from higher world energy prices. 
Healthy foreign exchange reserves, low inflation and small external debt are 
all strengths of Malaysian economy. 
Disputes - Malaysia has asserted sovereignty over the Spratlay Island 
together with China, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam; Philippine retains a now 
dormant claim to Malaysia's Sabah state. Malaysia's land boundary with 
Brunei around Liusbang is in dispute. 
MAYANMAR 
Background - Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is a unique country in 
Southeast Asia. Britain conquered Myanmar over a period of 62 years 
(1824-1886) and incorporated it into its Indian Empire. Myanmar was 
administered as a province of India until 1937 when it became a separate 
self-governing colony; independence from the commonwealth was attained 
in 1948. Gen. Ne Win dominated the government from 1962 to 1988, first as 
military ruler, then as self-appointed president and later as political kingpin. 
Economy - Myanmar, a resource rich country, suffers from pervasive 
government control, inefficient economic policy and rural poverty. 
Myanmar does not have monetary or fiscal stability. Most overseas 
development assistance ceased after the junta began to suppress the 
democratic movement and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. A 
major banking crisis in 2003 shuttered the country's 20 private banks and 
disrupted economy. 
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Disputes - Despite continuing border committee talks, significant 
differences remain with Thailand over boundary alignment and handling of 
ethnic rebels, refugees and illegal cross-border activities. Environmentalist 
continues to voice concern over China's construction of hydroelectric dams 
upstream on the Salween River in Yunnan province. 
THE PHILIPPINES 
Background - The Philippines Island became a Spanish colony during the 
16"^  century and was ceded to the US in 1898 following the Spanish-
American war. In 1935 the Philippines became a self-governing 
commonwealth. In 1942 the island fell under Japanese occupation. On July 
4, 1946 the Philippines attained her independence. In 1992, the US closed 
its last military base on the island. 
Economy - The Philippines was less affected by the Asian financial crisis 
of 1998 than its neighbours. From a 0.6% decline in 1998, GDP expanded 
by 2.4% in 1999, and 4.4% in 2000. GDP growth accelerated to about 5% 
between 2002 and 2005. Nonetheless, it will take a higher, sustained growth 
path to make appreciable progress. The Philippines faces higher oil price, 
higher interest rate on its dollar borrowings and higher inflation. The 
implementation of the expanded Value Added Tax in Nov. 2005 boosted 
confidence in the governments fiscal policy and strengthen the peso, making 
it East Asia's best performing currency in 2005. 
Disputes - Philippines claims sovereignty over certain of the Spratly Island, 
also claimed by the China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam. Philippines also 
have dormant claim over Sabah Island of Malaysia. 
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SINGAPORE 
Background - Singapore was founded as a British trading colony in 1819. It 
joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963 but separated two years later and 
became independent. Located at the foot of the Malaya Peninsula, separated 
from the mainland by a narrow stretch of shallow water, Singapore is a 
Chinese city-stale and one of the world's most prosperous state. 
Economy: Singapore, a highly developed and successful frcc-markcl 
economy, enjoys a remarkably open and corruption-free environment, stable 
prices. The economy depends on exports, particular in electronics and 
manufacturing. Fiscal stimulus, low interest rates, a surge in export and 
internal flexibility led to vigorous growth in 2004, with real GDP rising by 
8% but it slowed down to 5.7% in 2005. 
Disputes - Disputes persist with Malaysia over deliveries of fresh water to 
Singapore, Singapore's extensive land reclamation work, and bridge 
construction maritime boundaries. 
THAILAND 
th 
Background - A unified Thai Kingdom was established in the mid 14 
century known as Siam until 1939, Thailand is the only Southeast Asia 
country never to have been taken over by a European power. A bloodless 
revolution in 1932 led to a constitutional monarchy. In alliance with Japan 
during World War II, Thailand became a US ally following the conflict. 
Economy - With a well-developed infrastructure, a free enterprise 
economy, and pro-investment policy the country was on of East Asia's best 
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performer in 2002-04. Bangkok had pursued preferential trade agreements 
with a variety of partners in a effort to boost exports and to maintain high 
growth. The Thai economy grew 6.9% in 2003, 6.1% in 2004 but it slowed 
to 4.4% in 2005. 
Disputes - Separatist violence in Thailand's southern provinces prompt 
border closures and control with Malaysia. Significant differences remain 
with Myanmar over boundary alignment and handling of ethnic rebels. 
VIETNAM 
Background - The Vietnamese were ruled by the Chinese for over a 
thousand years, from the 2"'^  century B.C. until the lO"' century A.D. The 
conquest of Vietnam by France began in 1858 and was completed by 1884. 
Vietnam declared independence after World War II, but France continued to 
rule until its 1954 defeat by Communist Forces under Flochi Minh. Under 
the Geneva Accord of 1954, Vietnam was divided into communist North 
and anti-communist South. In 1975 after the defeat of US armed force, 
North Vietnamese forces overrun the South reuniting the country under 
Communist rule. The country continues to experience protest from various 
groups. 
Economy: Vietnam is a densely populated, developing country. However, 
since the enactment of Vietnam's "doi moi" (renovation) policy in 1986, 
Vietnamese authorities have committed to increase economic liberalization 
and enacted structural reforms. Growth averaged around 9% per year from 
1993 to 1997. G&P growth averaged 6.8% per year from 1997 to 2004 and 
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it hit 8% in 2005. However, high level of inflation has prompted 
Vietnamese authorities to tighten monetary and fiscal policies. 
Disputes: Cambodia and Laos protest Vietnamese squatters and armed 
encroachments along border. Establishment of a maritime boundary with 
Cambodia is hampered by unresolved dispute over offshore islands. China 
occupies Paracel Island also claimed by Vietnam. 
Thus, the countries of ASEAN located between the two great 
culture worlds of India and China have historically seen a swirl of 
converging migrant communities. The blinkers of colonialism ensured that 
for centuries the Indo-China countries looked to France, Indonesia to 
Holland, Malaya and Singapore to Britain, the Philippines to Spain and later 
to America.^° Religion has not been a unifying force between the ASEAN 
countries as it has in western societies. Besides religions and racial 
diversity, there are regional differences between the people of individual 
ASEAN countries. Across countries, the linguistic gulf is even wide. One of 
the striking features of the demographic patterns of ASEAN is the 
patchiness of its distribution. Despite a long tradition of urbatn life, dating 
back to pre-colonial trading centers, the ASEAN countries except Singapore 
- have been essentially rural societies.^' 
IMPERATIVES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION 
On 8 August 1967, five leaders - the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - set down together in 
20 Ho Kwon Ping, "ASEAN : The Five Countries" in Alison Brinowski, Understanding 
ASEAN, London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 197. 
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the main hall of the Department of Foreign Affairs building in Bangkok, 
Thailand and signed a document. By virtue of that document, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born. It was short, 
simply worded document containing just five articles. It proclaimed 
ASEAN as representing "the collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia 
to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint 
efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for prosperity the blessing 
ol peace, Irccdom and prosperity". 
ASEAN was not of course the first regional arrangement in which 
the countries of Southeast Asia engaged themselves. Previous attempt at 
regional cooperation can be dated from the beginning of the post Second 
World War. "But for the most part these attempts also included countries 
outside Southeast Asia... usually depended heavily on support form major 
Western countries."'^'' Particularly important in this respect was the Afro-
Asian conference hosted by Indonesia in Bandung in April 1955. Generally, 
however, Southeast Asian attempts at regional cooperation prior to the 
1960s were "hindered by the preoccupation of most countries with the 
pressing post-independence task of adapting to the severance of colonial 
links, establishing indigenous political and economic institutions and 
achieving nafional integration".^^ 
22. See The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) in Appendix No. 1 
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The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed in 
1961 by the US and its allies and included Thailand and the Philippines as 
its members. It was largely politico-military in nature. The Five Power 
Defence Arrangement (ANZUS) was another experiment in the same 
direction with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the US as 
its members. As we have discussed previously, functionalists held the view 
that desire for inter-state cooperation emanates from the socio-economic 
and technological compulsion in Ihc countries concerned but in these case 
the impetus was provided by extra-regional powers and was political. 
The early 1960s saw the emergence of two regional groupings that, 
for the first time, were confined to Southeast Asian states and that were 
created at regional initiatives. The first of these was the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA), formed at Bangkok on 31 July 1961, and comprising 
Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand. ASA was handicapped by its limited 
membership and by "accusation that it was a pro-Western, anti-Communist 
group whose motivation was primarily political"."^^ However, in fact, ASA's 
objective emphasized cooperation in economic, social, cultural, scientific 
and administrative fields. ASA's activities got interruption and a death blow 
in late 1963 due to deteriorative relationship between Malaya and the 
Philippines over latter's claim to North Borneo, which renamed Sabah -
became part of the Malaysian Federation in September 1963. 
Coincidentally, when ASA's obituary was written, the Philippines 
was developing proposal for a 'Greater Malaya Confederation', lated 
26. Ibid. 
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dubbed by Indonesia's Foreign Minister 'Maphilindo', comprised Malaya, 
the Philippines and Indonesia, in July 1963. Neither the ASA nor 
Maphilindo met with success. The ASA was thought to be too much under 
the thumb of the USA^'' and the UK.^ ^ "Maphilindo was considered a kind 
of club headed by an autocratic big brother, Sukarno".^^ At the same time 
emphasis on the common Malaya origins of its members limited its appeal 
to other Southeast Asian countries. 
The formation of Malaysia in 1963 and thereby rejection of 
Maphilindo was received by Sukarno with disapprobation and ire. In 
September 1963, Sukarno declared a state of 'confrontation' against 
Malaysia and war became distinct possibility. 
It was only after the resumption of relations between Indonesia and 
Malaysia and after Suharto had succeeded Sukarno as President of 
Indonesia that support was solicited from the other leaders in the 
region for the establishment of Asian "togetherness". As it turned 
out, it was the countries of the stillborn ASA and Maphilindo which 
rose like a phoenix from the ashes of Sukarno's fiery "ganjang" or 
"confrontation" against Malaysia and united in ASEAN, an 
acronym coined by Adam Malik. 
ASEAN was conceived as an organization for economic, social and 
cultural cooperation but it was clear from the very beginning that the real 
objectives were regional and national security. "This inter-state dimension 
to regional security was merged with the intra-state dimension of economic 
27 . Since the Philippines and Thailand were members of SEATO. 
28 . The U.K. was also associated with SEATO and with whom Malaya had a special 
Defence arrangement. 
29. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, "Statement on Experience of ASEAN and Prospect of ASEAN-
SAARC Cooperation", in K.K. Bhargava, et al. (ed.). Shaping South Asia's Future: 
Role of Regional Cooperation, Delhi, Vikas, 1995, p. 98. 
30 . Ibid., p. 99. 
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development of individual members". All these states experienced 
common threats of internal subversion and insurgency fuelled by lack of 
economic development. Keeping in mind the past experiences "behind the 
scene consultation reached the consensus that ASEAN should be presented 
publicly as an economic association in order to avoid public debate on 
political issues".^^ However, its foremost mechanism, the annual meeting of 
foreign ministers, was glaring political, and its standing committee is both 
diplomatic and political in nature. 
At the time of the inception of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore were just recovering from bitter conflicts with one another. 
Malaysia and Thailand continued to have strained relations due to border 
problems and domestic armed dissent. "Common security concern arose as 
the original five ASEAN states become more and more vulnerable to the 
externally supported threat of internal subversion by communism".^^ In this 
scene, formation of ASEAN can be seen as the effort to reduce vulnerability 
of fragile domestic political system as well as reduce the meddling of 
external powers in internal affairs. 
Thus, ASEAN was formed to pave the way for internal security via 
regional security. As President Suharto's exegesis indicates, 'National 
resilience' means internally: the ability to face the necessary social change 
while keeping ones own identity, and externally, it is the ability to face all 
external threats regardless of their manifestation. National resilience, 
31. Bharti Chhibber, no. 6, p. 101. 
32. Roger Irvine, no. 24, p. 99. 
33 . Bharti Chhibber, no. 6, p. 101. 
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therefore, covers the strengthening of all - ideological, political, economic, 
social, cultural and military fields. "If each member country develops its 
own 'national resilience', gradually a 'regional resilience' may emerge, i.e. 
the ability of member countries to settle jointly their common problems and 
look after their future and well being together".^'* 
Despite these common concern, different motivations brought the 
five founder members of ASEAN together. Indonesia in the late 1960s 
needed to shift away from the People's Republic of China alignment 
resuhing from Sukarno's policies. Malaysia wanted to stabilize its relations 
with Indonesia and the Philippines. The Philippines wanted more freedom 
of action than its sole reliance on United State could provide. While 
Singapore newly separated from Malaysia needed to improve its relations 
with Malaysia and Indonesia as well as enhance its status as an independent 
nation. Sheldon Simon writes: 
For Indonesia, ASEAN provided an opportunity to legitimize its 
regional leadership aspiration. For Thailand, it was a mechanism for 
redressing the imbalance in a foreign policy that had become over-
regional... Similarly, the Philippines could diversify its foreign 
alignment links on ASEAN provided on alternaitive to what 
appeared to be a declining American interest in Southeast Asia... 
For Malaysia, ASEAN signified the end of its conflict with 
Indonesia... The least enthusiastic member was probably Singapore 
- a globally oriented city state that joined the Association because 
political survival dictated the necessity of a modus operandi with its 
neighbours.^^ 
34. Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Jakarta, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
1975, p. 8. 
35. Sheldon Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security, Standford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1982, p. 38. 
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Addressing a student group in Jakarta in December 1966 Adam 
Malik, in explaining why he had initiated moves towards a new regional 
grouping, reportedly stressed the need for 
A strong bulwark against imperialist manipulations as well as a 
decisive stabilizing factor in this part of the world... ending one 
and for all foreign influence, domination, and intervention... 
Stemming the 'yellow' as well as 'white' imperialism in South East 
Asia.^^ 
INCEPTION, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF ASEAN 
By the time ASEAN came into being in 1967, Southeast Asia 
clearly reflected the large divide in the world as a whole between 
communist and anti-communist powers with the Indo-China states on the 
one hand and anti-communist ASEAN on the other side. "Thus the shared 
perception of a common threat among the anti-communist Southeast Asian 
states worked in favour of regional cooperation". 
As far as the inception of the ASEAN is concerned an informal 
meting was held at Bangkok, which was attended by the original five 
members of ASEAN to formulate the principle of regional cooperation 
before the actual signing of ASEAN Joint Declaration. A set of points on 
stability and security and on foreign military base put forward by Indonesia 
in a draft to the members were taken up for discussion. Finally, ASEAN was 
established on 8 August 1967 between Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand by means of the ASEAN Declaration or, as it is 
more commonly known, 'the Bangkok Declaration. Brunei Darussalam 
36. Antara News Bulletin, 125 December 1966, as no. 21. 
37. Bharti Chhibber, no. 6, p. 106. 
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joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 
23 July 1997 and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. 
The most difficult initial task facing prospective members of 
ASEAN was to decide just what these aims, principles and purposes were to 
be. The aims and purposes of ASEAN, as stated in that Declaration, are: 
(1) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region; 
(2) to promote regional peace and stability, 
(3) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the 
economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative 
fields; 
(4) to provide assistance in training and research in the educational, 
professional, technical and administrative spheres; 
(5) to collaborate in agriculture and industries, trade, transportation, 
communication and the raising of living standards; 
(6) to promote Southeast Asian Studies; and 
(7) to maintain cooperation with international and organization with 
similar aims and purposes.^^ 
The main purpose of the Bangkok Declaration was to declare that 
the countries of the Southeast Asia are coming together to form a regional 
organization with a view to achieving certain objectives and goals realizing 
that the interests of the people lies in working together. The Declaration 
38. The Bangkok Declaration, no. 23. 
further makes it clear that the association is an inter-goveriii 
supranational one. It stresses national development along with regional 
peace and stability with the spirit of equality. It specifies "... establish a 
firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in 
Southeast Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby 
contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity, in the region"''^ 
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, signed at 
the First ASEAN summit on 24 February 1976, declared that in their 
relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties should be guided by 
the following fundamental principles: 
(1) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations; 
(2) the right of every state to lead its national existence free from 
external interference, subversion or coercion; 
(3) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
(4) settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 
(5) renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
(6) effective cooperation among themselves.'*^ 
Thus, these aims, purposes and principles were about cooperation in 
the economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields, and in 
the promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for 
39. Ibid. 
40. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, 1976, Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
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justice and rule of law and adherence to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. It stipulated and proclaims that ASEAN is representing the 
collective will of the nations of the Southeast Asia to bind themselves 
together in friendship and cooperation and through joint efforts and 
sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessing of peace, 
freedom and prosperity. 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE O F ASEAN 
We will now look at the institutional arrangements, structures and 
mechanism set out by the ASEAN at their inception and changes which 
occurred with the time to carry out its aims and objectives. 
The highest decision making organ of ASEAN is the Meeting of the 
ASEAN Head of States and Government. Bangkok Declaration species that 
the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN states will meet annually and this 
meeting will be referred as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). 
Ministerial meetings on several other sector are also held: agriculture and 
forestry, economy, energy, environment, financial, information, investment, 
labour, law, regional haze, rural development and poverty alleviation, 
science and technology, social welfare, transnational crime, tourism, 
transportation, youth. Supporting these ministerial bodies there are 29 
committees of senior officials and 122 technical working groups.'*' 
As and when required special meetings of Foreign Ministers can 
also be convened to carry out the work of Association in between AMMs.*^ 
41. Overview, Association of Soutiieast Asian Nations, See at, http;//www.aseansec.org. 
42. Bharti Ciihibber, no. 6, p. 113. 
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ASEAN specifies standing committee under the chairmanship of the foreign 
Ministers of the host country or his representative and having its members 
the accredited Ambassador of the other member states/^ To support the 
conduct of ASEAN's external relations, ASEAN has established committees 
composed of diplomatic missions in the following capitals: Brussels, 
London, Paris, Washington DC, Tokyo, Canberra, Ottawa, Wellington, 
Geneva, Seol, New Delhi, New York, Beijing, Moscow and Islamabad/'* 
ASEAN Secretariat was established in 1977 at Jakarta. The 
secretary-General of ASEAN is appointed on merit and accorded ministerial 
status. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, who has a five years term, is 
mandated to initiate, advise, coordinate and implement ASEAN activities. 
The members of professional staff of the ASEAN Secretariat are appointed 
on the principles of open recruitment and region wide competition.''^ The 
ASEAN Bangkok Declaration also establishes a National Secretariat in each 
country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country 
and to service AMM and the standing committee meetings. 
ASEAN also has several specialized bodies and arrangements 
promoting inter-governmental cooperation in various fields: ASEAN 
University Network, ASEAN-EC Management Centre, ASEAN Centre for 
Energy, ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning Centre, ASEAN 
Earthquake Information Centre, ASEAN Poultry Research and Training 
Centre, ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation, ASEAN 
43 . Ibid. 
44 . Overview, no. 41. 
45 . Ibid. 
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Rural Youth Development Centre, ASEAN Specialized Meteorological 
Centre, ASEAN Tourism Information Centre, and ASEAN Timber 
Technology Centre.'*^ 
In addition, ASEAN promotes cooperative activities with 
organizations with related aims and purposes: ASEAN Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, ASEAN Business Forum, ASEAN Tourism 
Association, ASEAN Council on Petroleum, ASEAN Ports Association, 
ASEAN Vegetable Oils Club, and the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and 
International studies. Further more, there are 35 Non Governmental 
Organization's (NGOs) which have formal affiliation with ASEAN'* .^ 
EVOLUTION O F ASEAN 
ASEAN's initial progress was not auspicious. Just a little over one 
year form ASEAN's establishment the organisation's activities were 
suspended for a period of nearly eight months due to the deterioration of 
relations between Malaysia and the Philippines over the 'Corregidor 
affair''*^ and the revival of the Sabah dispute. Another major incident in 
inter-ASEAN relations was sparken in October 1968 by the hanging in 
Singapore of two Indonesian marines who were found guilty of acts of 
sabotage and murder. The Indonesian Government, however, expressed its 
desire to maintain good relations with Singapore.'*^ The effect of this 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Malaysian Government blamed the Philippines that a special military force of Muslim 
recruits that was being trained on corregidor Island, near Manila, allegedly with a view 
to bring infiltrated into Sabah. 
49. Roger Irvine, no. 24, p. 20. 
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development at the initial stage of ASEAN must have been depressing. But 
it is of some significant that members of the organisation did not appear at 
any stage to consider that the experiment should be abandoned. Instead, the 
view seemed to be upheld that regional cooperation was an imperative that 
could be discarded only at peril. 
Showing the great value by Southeast Asian nation as they placed 
on ASEAN, Malaysian Prime Minister announced the normalization of 
diplomatic relations with the Philippines, which led to the full fledged Third 
Ministerial Meeting in December 1969. In this meting ninety-eight 
recommendations proposing cooperation between ASEAN countries in 
various fields were approved. The ministers also signed an agreement on the 
establishment of an ASEAN Fund to finance joint project.^" 
In the period between the second and third Ministerial Meetings 
there had been only two meetings of the Standing Committee and only one 
meeting of the Secretaries-General of the five ASEAN National 
Secretariats. In the period between the Third and Fourth Ministerial 
Meetings there were six meetings of Standing Committee and four meetings 
of the Secretaries-General. These meetings resulted in the presentation of 
121 recommendations to the Fourth Ministerial Meeting held in Manila in 
March 1971.^' 
Vietnam war provided impetus for ASEAN's Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPEAN) concept, which was endorsed in 
50. Ibid. 
5 1 . Ibid., p. 21. 
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ASEAN's 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration. The idea was for the external 
power to minimize their involvement in the region so that Southeast Asian 
states could work out their own differences and cooperate in economic and 
security fields. Further it emphasized that the neutralization of southeast 
Asia is a desirable objective and that they should explore the ways and 
means of bringing about its realization. 
ASEAN spokesmen acknowledged that in concrete terms these 
achievements were modest. Except for AMM, other structures were not used 
very often during the first decade of ASEAN. But this was in tune with what 
Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam said at the Fourth Ministerial 
Meeting, "ASEAN has quite correctly chosen to move forward through a 
series of small steps''.^'' 
In the Fifth Ministerial Meeting in April 1972 an effort was made to 
initiate a reappraisal of ASEAN's programmes and performance, 
particularly in regard to economic cooperation. It was urged that 
international circumstances imposed on urgent necessity to undertake a 
review of ASEAN's accomplishment and shortcomings. In this meeting a 
joint communique agreed to establish a central secretariat and establishment 
of a Special Co-ordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations (SCCAN) whose 
first task would be to prepare for a dialogue between ASEAN and EEC.^ '* 
Further steps to enhance ASEAN's role as a vehicle for collective 
negotiation on international economic issues were decided upon at the Sixth 
52. Bharti Chhibber, no. 6, p. 117. 
53 . The ASEAN Declaration, no. 22, p. 21. 
54. Roger Irvine, no. 24, p. 34. 
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Ministerial Meeting held in Thailand in April 1973. A collective approach 
to the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations was agreed upon. Moves 
also initiated that led to discussion with Japan concerning the rapid 
expansion of Japan's synthetic rubber industry, which was considered to 
pose a threat to the natural rubber exports of ASEAN countries.^^ 
The main development in the joint communique of the Seventh 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta in 1974, noted being the 
reaching of agreement that the central secretariat should be sited in 
Indonesia rather than the Philippines. The Eighth ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting reflected the view that the time had come for ASEAN to show that 
it was capable of achieving tangible results. The joint communique recorded 
agreement to give a mandate to the permanent committees to give high 
priority to projects such as those in the field of trade liberalization and 
industrial complementation.^* 
The withdrawal of US armed forces from Vietnam in 1975 and the 
subsequent reunification of North and South Vietnam somewhere generated 
a feeling among ASEAN states that they were left on their./own to face 
future expansions from the communist bloc. The balance of power in the 
region was now unquestionably altered. China the traditional bogey-man, 
was adopting a more amenable attitude towards the Western world and 
towards the countries of ASEAN.^' Here, one can recall the 'Domino 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid., p. 35. 
57. "A New Era of Regional Cooperation', address to the Foreign Correspondents' Club, 
Johore Bahru, 23 June 1966. 
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Theory', which predicted that after the fall of South Vietnam other countries 
in Southeast Asia would one by one succumb to communist aggression. 
Thus, the Indo-China scene had a sort of consolidating effect on ASEAN.^^ 
This provided the backdrop to the first historic ASEAN Head of the 
State Summit Meeting in Bali on 23-4 February 1976 marked the formal 
commencement of ASEAN's Second phase. It led to the institutionalization 
of the already existing norms and procedures of political cooperation among 
the ASEAN members, "sending unmistakable signal to the world that 
ASEAN in togetherness could no longer be ignored".^' This summit 
produced three major documents which led the foundations for a more 
active ASEAN future: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with a view 
towards accommodating the countries of Indo-China region at a time when 
"Vietnam revealed in the glory and arrogant euphoria of victory over the US 
armed intervention"^*'; The Declaration of ASEAN Concord; and, a Joint 
Communique that broke new ground for weight of content in ASEAN 
statements. 
The Bali summit was a turning point in ASEAN development. The 
leaders of the Southeast Asian Nations had asserted that the solution to 
regional problems lay within the region. They had given substance to the 
aspiration for economic cooperation. "The significance of the Bali Summit 
is not, however, to be found only in the documents it produced. An equal, if 
58. Bharti Chhibber, no. 6, p. 117. 
59. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, no. 29, p. 99. 
60. Ibid. 
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more subtle achievement was, psychological".^' That the five Heads of the 
Government had met together for the first time, to give their imparimature 
to ASEAN's second phase, was in itself important. 
The momentum engendered by the Bali Summit has been sustained, 
although somewhat patchily. The Summit was followed by a rush of 
meetings at official and ministerial level that gradually developed the multi-
faceted character of the ASEAN as we know it today. While economic 
cooperation continued to develop during 1979 and 1980, political 
cooperation suddenly took over center stage at the beginning of 1979, as the 
ASEAN countries were forced to formulate joint responses to events in 
Indo-China. 
ASEAN entered the 1980s with the concept of co-operative 
regionalism, embodying the principles of mutual self-help and freedom 
from great power interference in regional affairs.^^ By 1980, major Western 
industrial powers had recognized that ASEAN was a viable regional entity. 
The communist countries, too, seemed grudgingly to have accepted the fact 
of ASEAN, even if they still refused to deal with it as a group./ 
In 1981, the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme (AIC) 
was signed. This was to give an opening to the private sectors in the 
ASEAN countries through vertical industrial integration. ASEAN Industrial 
Joint Ventures (AIJV) was also signed in 1983. These two schemes did 
61. David Irvine, "Making Haste Less Slowly : ASEAN from 1975", in Alison Broinowski 
(ed.), Understanding ASEAN, London, Macmilian, 1982, p. 50. 
62. Ibid., p. 67. 
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make some progress but did not have much impact on international trade.^^ 
In 1984, the Foreign Ministers considered the report of the ASEAN Task 
Force set up in 1982. As the report drew its inspiration from the institutional 
experience of the European community, it was rejected by the member 
states. 
In the early 1990s, Vietnam also started taking ASEAN more 
seriously. Vietnam (which had earlier called ASEAN, a 'SEATO' in 
disguise) and Laos asked for observer status in ASEAN in 1990 and signed 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1992. In the same year, the ASEAN 
Heads of the state and Government declared that ASEAN should intensify 
its external dialogue in political and security matters as a means to building 
cooperative ties with the states in Asia-Pacific region. Two years later, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARP) was established.^'* 
The Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation 
was adopted at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992, which 
included the launching of a scheme toward an ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), to increase the ASEAN region's competitive advantage as a single 
production unit. The Fifth ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok in 1995 
adopted the agenda for Greater Economic Integration and concluded Treaty 
on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. This included the 
acceleration of timetable for the realization of AFTA from the original 15-
year timeframe to 10 years.^^ 
63. Bharti Chhibber, no. 6, p. 129. 
64 . Overview, no. 41. 
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In 1997, the ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020, 
which called for ASEAN partnership in Dynamic Development aimed at 
forging close economic integration within the region. A joint statement^ ^ 
between ASEAN and each of them was signed in 1998 providing for 
framework for cooperation towards the 21^' century. In November 1999, the 
leaders of ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea issued a joint 
statement on East Asia Cooperation outlying the area of cooperation among 
them.^ ^ 
On 7"' October 2003, ASEAN announced Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord II (Bali Concord II), reaffirming that ASEAN is a concert of 
Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic 
development and communities of carving societies, committed to upholding 
/TO 
cultural diversity and social harmony. Furthermore they adopted the 
framework to achieve a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN 
Community. ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, 
and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.^ ^ The Fifth ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on Social Welfare and Development (AMMSWD) was held in 
December 2004, under the theme, "Enhancing a Community of Caring 
Societies". The Ministers reviewed the progress made on implementing the 
ASEAN Work programme for social welfare, Family and Population, and 
set priorities for future cooperation in several area including capacity 
66. Hanoi Plan of Action 
67. Overview, no. 41. 
68. Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord 11) Bali, 2003, Jakarta, ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
69. Ibid. 
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building in the social sector and strengthening the family. The Ministers of 
Defence of the Member countries of ASEAN held their inaugural meeting in 
Kuala Lumpur, on 9"^  May 2006. The Ministers exchanged views on the 
current regional and international security situation. The Ministers adopted 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) concept paper and 
agreed that the ADMM should be an integral part of ASEAN. And further 
endorsed to contribute to the establishment of an ASEAN Security 
Community as stipulated in Bali concord II. The minister also agreed to 
establish an ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM) to 
support the activities of ADMM.^° 
After nearly 39 years of ASEAN's existence, it is now apparent that 
ASEAN has transformed itself to become a key regional organisation in 
development. ASEAN has a strong political clout while at the same time 
enjoys the recognition form its communities, two necessary pre-requisites 
for becoming an effective agent for regional development. It is indisputable 
that there has been a 'meeting of minds' within ASEAN on important 
political, economic, and other related questions. Thus ASEAN's inclusive 
outlook has paved the way for community building not only in Southeast 
Asia, but also in the broader Asia Pacific region where several other inter-
governmental organizations now co-exist. 
ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF ASEAN 
Whatever the political motivation behind the 1967 Bangkok 
Declaration, the stated aims, principles and purpose of ASEAN were 
70. Joint Press Release o the Inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, Kuala 
Lumpur, 2006, Jakarta, ASEAN Secretariat. 
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primarily economic in character. In fact, however, economic cooperation 
really only began in earnest in 1967. It has been sustained since then as a 
result of a conscious political commitment on the part of ASEAN 
leadership, who see economic cooperation as a principle element in their 
concept of regionalism. 
With the exception of small island state of Singapore, the 
constituent economies of ASEAN have many characteristics common to 
developing countries in other parts of the world: growing population, 
relatively low per capita GNP rate and traditional foreign trade patterns of 
exporting food or raw materials based on natural resources in return for 
imports of capital goods, manufacturer and technology. The region is rich in 
natural resources and unskilled labour. It supplies over 80 per cent of 
world's natural rubber and abaca fiber, 70 per cent of its tin, 60 per cent of 
its palm oil and 50 per cent of its copra. The region is well supplied with 
tropical hardwood and mineral and energy resources.^' 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the five ASEAN countries experienced 
relatively high rates of economic growth and generally managed to assert 
some control over inflation. Between 1970 and 1978, average, annual GDP 
rose by 7.8 per cent in both Indonesia and Malaysia, 6.3 per cent in 
Philippines, 8.5 per cent in Singapore and 7.6 per cent in Thailand.^^ 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION BEFORE BALI SUMMIT 
Though the ASEAN members decided to cooperate for "... greater 
utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade. 
71. Amado Castro, "ASEAN Economic Cooperation", in Alison Broinowski (ed.) 
Understanding ASEAN, London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 71. 
72. Ibid. 
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including the study of the problems of international community trade, the 
improvement of their transportation and communication facilities".^'' But till 
the 1976 Bali summit, ASEAN did not collaborate much in the economic 
sphere. 
ASEAN in the second standing committee meeting held in 1968 
decided to review the entire cooperation project of ASA for implementation. 
The implemented projects were not very successful. Singapore's 
geographical location, lack of natural resources forced her to actively seek 
foreign investment. Although like Indonesia, Singapore too was concerned 
about influence of external economic forces, yet it was also confident of its 
own ability to deal with them. Indonesia preferred import substitution as 
part of its economic development, whereas Singapore went in for export 
oriented industrial development.^'' This trend has led to tension within 
ASEAN. These different economic developmental approaches of member 
state led to slow growth of economic cooperation in ASEAN. 
In 1968, at a meting on commerce and industry the Philippines 
suggested formation of a free trade area and even a common market, which 
was opposed by other members. Another reason why few complementarities 
exist among ASEAN economies is the fact that except Thailand all ASEAN 
states are former colonies whose economies were fashioned in such a way 
as to meet the requirements of colonial powers till independence.''^ 
73. The ASEAN Declaration, no. 22. 
74. Arntinn Jorgensen-Dahi, Regional Organisation and Order in South Asia, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1982. 
75. Bharti Chhibber, no. 6, p. 143. 
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Thus ASEAN faced criticism for being a slow mover at least in the 
initial years. Because the level of interaction between the ASEAN states 
prior to 1967 was very low except between Malaysia and Singapore. But the 
formation of ASEAN was in one sense, therefore, like a great leap 
forward. ^ ^ 
In 1968 ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting accepted an offer from 
Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) to conduct a survey 
of the potential for economic cooperation within the ASEAN region. The 
UN team submitted its report in 1972. It suggested selective and limited 
trade liberalization, industrial complementarities agreement and 'package 
deal' arrangements in the form of joint industrial projects. In 1973, ASEAN 
started working on UN report with meeting of planning agencies, working 
groups on ASEAN trade statistics and trade liberalization. This shows "... 
the ASEAN leaders wanted ASEAN to be taken more seriously, they 
seemed to be taking it more seriously themselves".^^ And economic crisis 
created by the 1973 oil shock seems to have reinforced the view that 
economic cooperation offered greater chances of increasing the countries 
political influence. 
By 1972 ASEAN had permanent committees on Food and 
Agriculture, Shipping, Civil Air Transportation, Communication, Finance, 
Commerce and industry, Transport and Telecommunication, Tourism, 
Science and Technology, Socio-cultural Activities and Mass Media. 
76. Arntinn Jorgensen-Dahl, no. 74, p. 143. 
77. Ronald D. Palmer and Thomas J. Reckford, Building ASEAN : 20 years of Southeast 
Asian Cooperation, New York, Praeger, 1987, p. 44. 
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However economic cooperation within ASEAN countries would not be 
credited smooth in this period because : 
Ministers responsible for economic affairs were rarely directly 
involved in ASEAN discussion, nor did they have any mandate to 
deal directly with each other. They therefore, know little about... to 
promote economic cooperation... Economic cooperation was 
treated as foreign relations and not as a question of internal affairs 
within an economic framework.^^ 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION SINCE BALI SUMMIT 
The unexpectedly swift of communist countries in Indo-China in 
1975 proved to be a turning point for ASEAN and convinced of the need to 
stand closer together. In order to make the first ever ASEAN Summit of 
Heads of Government or State a success, a number of preparatory meetings 
were held. However, "this is not to say that differences did not exist among 
the ASEAN members regarding economic cooperation".^^ Singapore was 
engaged in campaigning for ASEAN Free Trade Zone as a major agenda 
item for the Summit. The Philippines along with Thailand was also 
campaigning for the same, but Indonesia was not to keen have a free trade 
zone in Southeast Asia. 
First Summit meeting of ASEAN Heads of States was held in Bali, 
Indonesia in February 1976. The agenda was "resolutely regionalist, heavily 
economic and inward looking".^° In the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, the Heads'of the Government agreed that they should 
intensify economic cooperation and adopt appropriate strategies for 
78. Amado Castro, no. 71, pp. 74-75. 
79. Bhartt Chhibber, no. 6, p. 146. 
80. Ronald D. Palmer and Thomas J. Reckford, no. 77, p. 48. 
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economic development and mutual assistance. In the Declaration of 
ASEAN concord, they formally accepted recommendations form the UN 
Report: they agreed they should cooperate to establish large scale industrial 
plants, to work towards the establishment of preferential trading 
arrangements, and to cooperate in the field of trade in order to promote 
development and growth of new production and trade. They also agreed to 
assist each other in basic commodities, particularly with regard to food and 
energy, and to make joint efforts to improve their access to market outside 
ASEAN by seeking reduction of tariff barriers and by developing joint 
approach to international commodity problems.^^ 
ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) 
In the meeting of March 1976 the economic ministers set up an 
expert group to study feasibility of establishing large-scale industrial plants. 
They further asked the expert group to "investigate the technical and 
economic feasibility of establishing additional manufacturing capacity... 
and to consult with one another on national programmes for development. 
Even after agreement had been reached, implementation of project faced 
many problems. Inadequate financial and technical support was one reason. 
ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) 
The other scheme, AIC concentrated on already established small 
industries in the private sector. Its main task was to facilitate and promote 
81. The Bangkok Declaration, no. 23. 
82. Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, 1976, Jakarta, ASEA"N Secretariat. 
83. Antonia Hussey, "Regional Development and Cooperation through ASEAN", The 
Geographical Review, Vol. 8, 1991, pp. 87-98. 
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intra-industrial linkage and trade. But like AIP this scheme too failed 
mainly due to the cumbersome selection and approval process. 
ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures 
In 1981 ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures was launched. Private 
sectors actively participated in this scheme. It encouraged the setting up of 
industrial joint ventures through pooling of capital and technological 
resources. 
ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreement (APIA) 
Agreement on APTA was signed in Manila in February 1977. In 
Article 3 of the agreement a number of instruments of preferential trading 
were listed. These include long-term quantity contracts, purchase financial 
support at preferential interest rates, extension of tariff preferences and the 
liberalization of non-tariff barriers on a preferential basis. Article 4 
mentions initial products of ASEAN industrial projects.^ "* 
Singapore and the Philippines favoured an across the board 
reduction in tariffs. But differences again arose with Indonesia opposing the 
idea. Finally an item-by-item approach was adopted in the next step, an 
Indonesian proposal that each member should offer fifty items for 
preferential trading was accepted. However, PTA was not very successful as 
products included were not traded among ASEAN states. 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
During the fourth ASEAN Summit Meeting in Singapore in 1992, 
AFTA was signed. There were several reasons behind the formation of 
84. ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreement, Manila, 1977, ASEAN Law Series, Jakarta, 
Indonesia. 
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AFT A, which include: the change in the international political economy 
during the 1980s, rise in influence of business interest throughout the 
ASEAN region and desire of ASEAN to continue with its position of an 
O f 
important organization in the face of rising new regional organization. 
AFTA included abolition of high tariffs or taxes on traded goods 
and scrapping of quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers. In 
1994, Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) was launched to assist 
the implementation of AFTA. As of 1 January 2005, tariffs on 98.98% of 
the products in CEPT Inclusion List of the ASEAN-6 have been reduced 
to 0.5% tariff range. For the CLMV, 86.91% of the products traded in the 
region have been moved into Inclusion List, up from 80% in 2003-04. 
Currently, 64.12% of products of the inclusion List of the ASEAN-6 have 
zero tariffs. The average tariff for ASEAN-6 under the CEPT scheme is now 
down to 1.93% from 12.76% in 1993.^^ ASEAN's robust performance over 
the past years was driven primarily by ASEAN's trade with traditional 
industrial partner. In 2004, the share of intra-ASEAN export vis-^-vis total 
ASEAN export was 21.70%, compared to total 21.14% in 1993 when 
CEPT-AFTA scheme was launched. Intra-ASEAN exports in 2004 grew by 
19.50%.^^ 
85. P. Bowles and B. Maclean, "Understanding Trade Bloc Formula: The Case of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area", Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
1996, p. 327. 
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Industrial Cooperation and Enterprise Development (AICO) 
Introduced in 1996, the AICO scheme has been established to 
promote greater industrialization, expand trade and investment, and promote 
resource sharing among ASEAN member countries in order to foster close 
ASEAN economic integration. As of 21 April 2005, the approved AICO 
arrangements generated US $ 1,560 million of trade transaction per year.^^ 
Southeast Asian Economic Crisis 
In 1995 the Southeast Asian economies grew at an average of 6.71 
per cent compared to the global average of 2.8 per cent. Even Myanmar 
economy recorded a growth rate of 4.2 per cent, Laos 8.4 per cent, 
Cambodia 5.2 per cent and Vietnam 8.8 per cent.^ *^  
Things changed fast with the Southeast Asian economic crisis in 
1997. The sharp slide in the exchange rate of the Thai bath vis-a-vis the US 
dollar in mid 1997 set off a chain reaction, which primarily affected 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. In fact, this financial 
crisis clearly highlighted how inter-depehdent these states are. In July 1998 
endorsed the decision made by ASEAN Finance Ministers to establish an 
ASEAN surveillance mechanism to closely monitor regional macro-
economic and financial indicators and to serve as an early warning system. 
Though the currency crises revealed that ASEAN economies are not 
flawless with the East Asian export growth dropping by 75%, but these 
89. "Industrial Cooperation and Enterprise Development", ASEAN Annual Report 2004-
2005, See at, http://www.asean_sec.org/ar05.htm. 
90. Mohammed Jawahar bin Hasan, "The security Environment in Southeast Asia", 
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 1, April 1996, pp. 39-50. 
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problems are more cyclical than structural.^' However, politically and 
economically, ASEAN is still a regional grouping of top rank, 
notwithstanding its problems. 
Intra-regional Cooperation in Financial Matters 
ASEAN Economic Ministers in Manila, in 1997 decided in favour 
of decentralization whereby each ASEAN members would host one 
committee. The committee on Finance and Banking was handled by 
Thailand. In addition to this, there is a Committee on Budget, which deals 
with the management and distribution of ASEAN Fund. ASEAN also has 
special coordinate committee of ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary 
Authorities. The ASEAN Finance Corporation was established in Singapore 
with a capital of $ 100 million dollar with equal stakes by public or private 
commercial banks in each member states. 
Food Security 
The ASEAN Food Security Agreement became operational in June 
1980. At their first meeting in Bangkok, AFSR Board settled the terms and 
condition for the holding of the ASEAN Rice Reserve. To strengthen food 
security and adverse poverty alleviation in the East Asian region, a three-
year pilot project to establish the East Asian Emergency Rice Reserve is 
being implemented. ASEAN continued to make progress in developing the 
ASEAN Food Security Information System to support the implementation 
ofEAERR.^^ 
91. Bharti Chhibber, no. 6, p. 163. 
92. "Food, Agriculture and Forestry", ASEAN Annual Report 2004-2005, See at, 
http.7/www.aseansec.org/ar05.htm. 
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Agriculture Sector 
ASEAN Member conntries adopted a common agricultural policy in 
1979. It led to the establishment of an ASEAN Common Quarantine Ring 
for Plant and Animal Protection, an ASEAN Plant Quarantine Training 
Institute and an ASEAN Animal Protection programme Group. 
The 1997 ASEAN Hanoi Plan of Action specifically calls for 
enhancing food security and global competitiveness of ASEAN's food, 
agriculture and forestry products. An ASEAN Technical Working Group on 
Agricultural Research and Development has been established and met for 
the first time in December 2004.^ ^ 
Cooperation in Transport and Communication Sector 
The Bangkok Declaration 1967 calls for the improvement of 
transportation and communication facilities among members countries. 
ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting adopted in 1982 the Integrated Work 
Programme in shipping for 1982-1986. ASEAN also undertook several 
projects and studies in different fields to promote better transport and 
/ 
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communication system. 
The Hanoi Plan of Action, 1998 asks member states to develop the 
trans-ASEAN transportation network by the year 2000. ASEAN Transport 
Ministers adopted the ASEAN Transport Action Plan 2005-2010 at their 
93. Ibid. 
94. Atiur Rahman, "The Economy of Inter-Regional Cooperation: The SAARC and 
ASEAN Experience" in Bhabani Sen Gupta (ed.) SAARC, ASEAN: Prospect and 
Problems of Inter-Regional Cooperation, New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 1988, pp. 
107-139. 
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lO"^  Meeting in November 2004 in Phnom Penh. This new plan consist of 48 
strategic actions and builds on the major strides made from the previous 
plan of Actions to strengthen the transport infrastructure. 
ASEAN and Extra-Regional Associations 
One of the aims and objectives of ASEAN as enshrined in the 
Bangkok. Declaration, 1967 is, "to maintain close and beneficial cooperation 
with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and 
purposes..."^^ In 1971 ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting started 
addressing the issue of joint view before international forums. The Special 
Coordinating Committee of ASEAN Nation (SCCAN) was formed in 1972 
to adopt common policies. 
ASEAN-Dialogue partners meeting with Australia, Canada, EEC, 
Japan, New Zealand, and United States led to the formation of ASEAN-EEC 
Trade and Development Forum; ASEAN-EEC Development Fund; ASEAN-
Australia Economic and Technical Cooperation Projects on Food Handling; 
the ASEAN-Japan Promotion Centre on Trade Investment and Tourism; the 
ASEAN-New Zealand Afforestation Project; and ASEAN-US Business 
Council. 
ASEAN-US, ASEAN-Japan relations form the core of ASEAN 
economy. However, at the same time ASEAN states were also engaging 
China for an economic balance in the region. Thus the European Union, the 
US, Japan, China (including Hong Kong) and Republic of Korea continued 
to be ASEAN's largest exporter market. These five countries are also 
95. The Bangkok Declaration, no. 23. 
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ASEAN's biggest source of imports. The share of ASEAN's total trade with 
these five countries is as follows: 14.08% (US), 13.72% (Japan); 11.50% 
(EU); 7.00% (China); and 4.06% (Korea). The region supplied 4.2 per cent 
of world export in 1990, 6.4 per cent in 1995, 6.8 per cent in 2000 and 6.3 
per cent in 2005. 
Thus, as intra-ASEAN and inter-regional economic activities 
expand, the confidence of government and business in regional cooperation 
will grow. Of course, many obstacles to ASEAN economic cooperation and 
possible future integration remain. The ASEAN countries recognize that 
slow but steady forward movement based on consensus is the only way. 
Time and effort are required to hammer out cooperative agreements. 
Because, there are major historical, cultural, legal and ethnic differences 
between the members, never before have they had much of a history of 
exchange and close inter-relationship. 
Chapter - Three 
{formation and Evolution 
of SJiJA^C 
CHAPTER: T H R E E 
FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF SAARC 
THE REGION: 
The strategic location of South Asia makes it an area of importance 
in the world system. But "South Asian history has no one beginning, no one 
chronology, no single plot or narrative".' It may be more appropriate to 
characterize South Asia and its people as presenting a picture of diversity in 
unity. Thus the very first problem in analyzing South Asia as a region in 
international relations is to delineate its geographical perimeter. In certain 
areas the problem is relatively simple because "geographically it is distinct 
even as the cultural, ideological and, most importantly, the foreign policy 
orientation of these areas are clearly distinguishable from the neighbouring 
areas''.^ The area of South Asia, however, is not quite so clear cut; not only 
are the systemic and foreign policy orientations of its constituents 
asymmetrical but even its geography leads to debate its calling it a region. 
Geographically speaking, there is a tendency to divide Asia 
somewhat latitudinally and treat all countries belonging to the so-called 
South and Southeast Asian areas as belonging to one region. But even if we 
accept these criteria of dividing Asia, then too, problem remains. The 
bordering countries have always confused the definition. Among these 
mention may be made of Myanmar and Afghanistan. These countries have 
often been considered as part of South Asia or as a part of Southwest and 
1. David Ludden, India and South Asia: A Short History, Oxford, One world, 2006, p. 5. 
2 . Partha, S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi, Manohar, 1989, 
p. 4. 
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Southeast Asia respectively. The question of Myanmar is not of great 
concern to scholars of international relations partly on account of its 
voluntarily chosen low profile foreign policy and its membership of 
ASEAN. The case of Afghanistan, however, still disturbing scholars as to 
which region it falls. 
Thus if we exclude these two countries what essentially remains of 
South Asia is the Indian subcontinent - which today encompasses seven 
very diverse sovereign states of very different sizes: India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives. 
South Asia is strategically a vital part of the world, which has 
significant implications for the international order at the beginning of the 
new millennium. The geographical boundaries drawn by the highest 
mountain range in the world and encircling seas and oceans set the whole of 
the continent apart from the rest of the world. People inhabiting such a 
clearly defined, yet diverse, region have evolved a shared cultural ambience, 
but at the same time are deeply attached to distinctive cultural beliefs and 
practices.^ 
The people of South Asia speak at least twenty major languages. It 
has major accomplishment in the arts and maintains distinguished musical 
traditions. Adherents to every major world religion are to be found in the 
subcontinent. Over the millennium South Asia developed rich and complex 
layers of culture, which, during recent centuries, had a dramatic historical 
encounter with the West.'' 
3 . Sugate Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political 
Economy, New York, Rutledge, 2004, p. 4. 
4 . Ibid. p. 5. 
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Thus, South Asia, comprising seven states - India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives, has been one of the 
greatest cradles of human civilization and a birth place of two great religions 
like Buddhism and Hinduism and later a great center of Islamic activities. 
The region has left an indelible impact upon the culture of Asian mainland. 
But, the post-independent political history of South Asia has been 
full of vicissitudes that have ranged from problems relating to demarcation 
of boundaries, disputed land and waters, illegal immigrations to persistent 
fear of hegemony by the core nation toward the peripheral states. Political 
and security factors such as Pak entry into western sponsored military 
alliance system, Indo-Soviet alignment, Indo-China and Sino-Pak relations 
have to a large extent influence the foreign policy perceptions of the South 
Asian states. 
The region is full of diversities in terms of size, ethnicity, 
governance, resources, etc. South Asia consists of unequal partners, India 
being by far the largest and the strongest, and on the other hand, the 
Maldives, Bhutan and Nepal are much smaller and politically weaker. The 
natural and human resources are skewedly distributed among these 
countries. 
T H E NATIONS 
BANGLADESH 
Background: Bangladesh came into existence in 1971 when Bengali East 
Pakistan seceded from its union with West Pakistan. Bangladesh joined the 
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Commonwealth of Nations in 1972 and was admitted to the United Nations 
in 1974.^ 
Economy: Despite sustained domestic and international efforts to improve 
economic prospects, Bangladesh remains a poor, overpopulated and 
inefficiently governed nation. Major impediments to growth include 
frequent cyclone and floods, inefficient state-owned enterprises, inadequate 
port facilities, a rapidly growing labour force, delays in exploiting energy 
resources, insufficient power supplies, and low implementation of economic 
reforms.*' One encouraging note is that growth has been a steady 5% for the 
past several years. 
Disputes : There are disputes between India and Bangladesh over to delimit 
a small section of river boundary, exchange of 162 miniscale enclaves in 
both countries, and stop illegal cross-border trade, migration, violence, and 
transit of terrorist. Bangladesh resists India's attempts to fence its boundary 
along Bangladesh. Dispute over New Moore/South Talpatty/Purbasha Island 
in the Bay of Bengal deters maritime boundary delimitation.^ 
BHUTAN 
Background: In 1865, Britain and Bhutan signed the Treaty of Sinchulu, 
under which Bhutan would receive an annual subsidy in exchange of ceiling 
some borderland to British India. In 1910 a treaty was signed whereby the 
British agreed not to interfere in Bhutanese internal affairs and Bhutan 
allowed Britain to direct its foreign affairs. This role was assumed by 
5. DavidUddin, no. l,p. 272. 
6 . The World Factbook, See at, http://www.cia.gov/ciapublication/factbook/print/iik.htinl. 
7 . Ibid. 
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independent India after 1947. In 1949, a formal Indo-Bhutanese accord 
returned the areas of Bhutan annexed by the British, formulized the annual 
subsidies the country received, and defined India's responsibilities in 
defense and foreign relations.^ 
Economy: The economy, one of the world's smallest and least developed, 
is based on agriculture and forestry. Agriculture consists largely of 
subsistence farming and animal husbandry. The economy is closely aligned 
with India's through strong trade and monetary links and dependence on 
India's financial assistance. Bhutan's hydropower potential and its attraction 
for tourist are key resources.^ 
Dispute: A refugee issue of some 105,000 Bhutanese in Nepal remains 
unresolved. 90% of the refugees are housed in seven United Nations Office 
of the High Commissioner for Refuges (UNHCR) camps. Bhutan cooperates 
with India to expel Indian separatists.'° 
INDIA 
Background: The Indus valley civilization, one of the oldest in the world, 
dates back at least 5,000 years. Aryan tribes from the northwest infiltrated 
onto Indian lands about 1500 B.C., and their merger with the earlier 
Dravidian inhabitants created the classical Indian culture. Arab incursions 
starting in the 8* century and Turkish in the 12"^  century were followed by 
those of European traders, beginning in the late 15"^  century. By the 19"^  
century, Britain had assumed political control of virtually all-Indian lands. 
8 . RamRahul,A/oc/er«j5/7Mto«, Delhi, Vikas Publication, 1971, p. 51. 
9 . The Columbia Encyclopedia, See at, http://www.bartleby.com/65/. 
10 . The World Factbook, no. 6. 
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Non-violent resistance to British colonialism led by Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru brought independence in 1947. The subcontinent was 
divided into the state of India and Pakistan. A third war between the two 
countries in 1971 resulted in East Pakistan becoming the separate nation of 
Bangladesh." 
Economy: India's diverse' economy encompasses traditional village 
farming, modern agriculture, handicrafts, a wide range of modern industries, 
and a multitude of services. Government controls on foreign trade and 
investment have been reduced in some areas. The Government in 2005 
liberalized investment in the civil aviation, telecom, and construction 
sectors. The economy has posted an average growth rate of more than 7% in 
the decade since 1994. India achieved 7.6% GDP growth in 2005, 
significantly expanding manufacturing. The huge and growing population is 
the fundamental social, economic and environmental problems.'^ 
Disputes: Kashmir the site of the world's largest and most militarized 
territorial dispute with portions under the de facto administration of China 
(Aksai Chin), India (Jammu and Kashmir), and Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and 
Northern Areas). Pakistan has taken its dispute on the impacts and benefits 
of India's building the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River in Jammu and 
Kashmir to the World Bank for arbitration. Dispute persists with Pakistan 
over Indus River water sharing. Pakistani maps continue to show its 
Junagadh claim in Indian Gujrat state. A consolidated discussion related to 
the dispute over most of their rugged, militarized boundary between India 
11. Ibid. 
12. India 2006:A Reference Annual, Research, Reference and Training Division, 
Publication Division, Ministry of I&B Government of India, Patiala House, New Delhi. 
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and China continues. Disputes with Bangladesh continue over river 
boundary, illegal cross-border trade, fencing the border. There is also a 
boundary dispute between India and Nepal and infiltration of Maoists from 
Nepal.'^ 
MALDIVES 
Background: The Maldives was long a Sultanate, first under Dutch and 
then under British protection. It became a republic in 1968, three years after 
independent.'"* Since 1978, President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom - currently 
in his sixth term in office has dominated the islands' political scene. 
Economy: Tourism, Maldives largest industry, account for 20% of GDP and 
more than 60% of the Maldives foreign exchange receipts. Over 90% of 
government tax revenue comes from import duties and tourism related taxes. 
Fishing is a second leading sector. The Maldivian Government began an 
economic reform programme in 1989 initially by lifting import quotas and 
opening some exports to the private sectors. Agriculture and manufacturing 
continues to play a lesser role in the economy. Most staple foods must be 
imported. Industry which consist mainly of garment production, boat 
building and handicrafts account for about 13% of GDP. Over the past 
decade, real GDP growth averaged over 7.5% per year.'^ 
NEPAL 
Background: The Himalayan kingdom of Nepal is a small country, the size 
of the state of the Illinois. Nepal achieved its territorial consolidation in the 
13 . The World Factbook, no. 6. 
14 . Craig Baxter, et a!.. Government and Politics in South Asia, Lahore, Vanguard Books, 
1988, p. 367. 
15 . The Columbia Encyclopedia, no. 9. 
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eighteenth century under a dynamic Gorham king, Pith Raja Aryan Shah. He 
also promulgated a new uniform legal and administrative system. In 1814 
war with British ruler of India, Nepal lost considerable territory to British 
India, although it gained British recognition of its sovereignty in return. 
After 1947, when Britishers left Indian subcontinent, Nepal emerged from 
its seclusion and became active in regional politics.'^ In 1951, the Nepalese 
monarch ended the century-old system of rule by hereditary premiers and 
instituted a cabinet system of government. Reforms in 1990 established a 
multiparty democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. 
Economy: Nepal is among the poorest and least developed countries in the 
world with almost one-third of its population living below the poverty line. 
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy accounting for 38% of GDP. 
Industrial activity mainly involves the processing of agricultural produce 
including jute, sugarcane, tobacco, and grain. Security concerns relating to 
the Maoist conflict have led to a decrease in tourism, a key source of foreign 
exchange. Nepal has considerable scope for exploiting its potential in 
hydropower and tourism.'^ 
Disputes: There is small dispute over a section of boundary with India and a 
joint border commission continues to work. India has also instituted a 
stricter border regime to restrict transit of Maoist insurgent and illegal cross-
border activities. 
16 . Craig Baxter e/o/., no. 14, p. 355. 
17 . The World Faclbook, no. 6. 
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PAKISTAN 
Background: The separation in 1947 of British India into the state of 
Pakistan (with two sections West and East) and India has been the subject of 
fierce but lively historical debate.'" This was never satisfactorily resolved, 
and India and Pakistan fought two wars in 1947-48 and 1965 over the 
disputed Kashmir territory. A third war between these countries in 1971 
resulted in East Pakistan becoming the separate nation of Bangladesh. Since 
its inception Pakistan has been suffering from unstable political situation in 
home - a fight between civil and military elites to capture the power. 
Economy: Pakistan, an impoverished and underdeveloped country, has 
suffered from decades of internal political disputes, low level of foreign 
investment. However, IMF approved government policies, generous foreign 
assistance and renewed access to global markets since 2001, have generated 
solid macro-economic recovery. While the long term prospects to remain 
uncertain, given Pakistan's low level of development, medium term 
prospects for job creation and poverty, reduction are the best in more than a 
decade. Islamabad has raised development spending from about 2% of GDP 
in the 1990s to 4% in 2003. Inflation remains the biggest threat to the 
economy, jumping to more than 9% in 2005. GDP growth has become less 
dependent on agriculture, and remained above 7% in 2004 and 2005.'^ 
Disputes: Kashmir remains the bone of contention between India and 
Pakistan since 1948. A UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
has maintained a small group of peacekeepers since 1949. India dCes not 
18 . Sugate Bose and Ayesha Jalal, no. 3, p. 135. 
19 . The World Factbook, no. 6. 
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recognize Pakistan's ceding historic Kashmir land to China in 1964. There is 
also a dispute over Baglihar Dam project in J & K. Negotiations are going 
on over the Sir Creek area in Rann of Kutch. There are also some 
differences with Afghanistan over boundary of the two nations. 
SRI LANKA 
Background: The island's inhabitants claim that their heritage can be traced 
back more than 2000 years.• '^ The Sinhalese arrived in Sri Lanka late in the 
6'*^  century B.C., probably from northern India. Buddhism was introduced 
beginning in about the mid-third century B.C. In the 14"" century, a south 
Indian dynasty seized power in the north and established a Tamil Kingdom 
occupied by the Portuguese in the 16"^  century and by Dutch in the 17 '^' 
century, the island was ceded to the British in 1796, became a crown colony 
in 1802, and was united under British rule by 1815. As Ceylon, it became 
independent in 1948 and its name was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972.^ ^ 
Tension between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil separatists erupted into 
war in 1983. 
Economy: Sri Lanka's most dynamic sectors are food processing, textiles 
and apparel, food and beverages, telecommunication, and insurance and 
banking. In 2003, plantation crops made up only 15% of exports 
(compared with 93% in 1970), while textile and garments accounted for 
63%, GDP grew at an average annual rate of about 5.5%) in the 1990s. About 
20 . David Ludden, no. 1. 
21 . See K.M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, Berkley University of California, 1981, 
Chapter 2. 
22. Ibid., Chapter 10-14. 
23 . The Columbia Encyclopedia, no. 9. 
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800,000 Sri Lankans work abroad, 90% in the Middle East. The struggle by 
the Tamil Tigers of the north and east for a large independent homeland 
continues to cast a shadow over the economy. In late December 2004, a 
major tsunami destroyed an estimated $ 1.5 billion worth of property.'^ '* 
Thus, almost all the South Asian states are ascriptive in character 
owing to low level of socio-cultural and economic conditions. Furthermore, 
their regional policies have been naturally influenced by their religious and 
linguistic traditions. The majority-minority character based on religion, 
language, race and ethnic configuration is a major variable that has a 
profound impact upon the intra-regional relations in South Asia. This is a 
dangerous issue against which the region should be on guard. 
IMPERATIVE FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION 
Compared to the rest of the world, the South Asian countries remain 
in unacceptable levels of poverty, human deprivations, population pressure 
and environmental degradation. The increased pace of "economic 
globalization has presented to the South Asian countries new opportunities 
and exposed them to new challenges". Thus, there was compelling logic 
underlying the process of constructive regionalism. It enhances the member 
countries capacity to cope with the common challenges of globalization. In 
the context of the segmentation of the world trading system, "regionalism 
has emerged as the last resort to escape marginalization and develop 
collective leverages in global negotiation". 
24. The World Factbook, no. 6. 
25 . Sonu Trivedi, Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration, New Delhi, New 
Century Publication, 2005, p. 239. 
26. Ibid. 
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As we know, regional and sub-regional bodies have been generally 
motivated by the desire to attain some common development objectives as 
well as to reap the economic benefits that would accrue from better 
utilization of complementarities and economies of scale from an enhanced 
market across a wider geographical area. So, South Asian countries have a 
number of inherent advantages in regional cooperation. They command a 
huge potential market with their combined population of more than 1.6 
billion people. What was needed was to enlarge, integrate and unify this 
market by removing barriers to trade and take other measures for regional 
cooperation. By working together, the countries of South Asia may propel 
their ongoing trade reforms in a coordinated fashion. 
South Asia was eventually divided in the Cold War rivalries. 
Tension between India and its neighbours were exploited to serve extra-
regional interests. During the cold war period "regional politics in South 
Asia emerged primarily to support and sustain military alliances and to 
rebuild, coordinate and integrate market and economies of allies". 
Therefore, the major concern of rulers in these countries has been to 
consolidate their powers. For this they formed even alliances with other 
countries. But they could not serve the purpose adequately and were winded 
up in due course of time. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 resulted in 
the direct involvement of the superpowers on the border of South Asia. This 
caused inconvenience to local regimes as a stooge of neo-colonialism. 
Furthermore, the American involvement either was not welcomed by 
27. Ibid., p. 240. 
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Muslims in Paicistan. Because "liberation of Bangladesh, fall of Shah of Iran 
and victory of communism in Vietnam questioned the viability of American 
protective umbrella". Hence, the only alternative left was to collaborate 
with like minded countries in the region aspiring many benefits. 
Thus, formation of regional bloc is considered a useful step for 
accelerating regional economic development. Political conflicts often work 
as hurdles to regional cooperation. And economic regionalism creates a 
propitious climate for political cooperation. Political cooperation and 
understanding, in turn, are necessary for meaningful economic cooperation. 
INCEPTION, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF SAARC 
Looking at the post World War II period. South Asian region did 
not have any prior experience of regional association. Some political 
conferences can be mentioned here which took place in 1940s and 1950s but 
did not lead to the establishment of permanent institutions - the Asian 
Relations Conference, New Delhi 1947 and the Conference of Asian 
Australian Middle Eastern Nations on the Indonesian Questions, New Delhi, 
1949. One can also mention 'Colombo Powers' which originated in a 
conference of five Asian Prime Ministers in 1954. India, Pakistan, (then) 
Ceylon, (then) Burma and Indonesia were its members. They believe, "... in 
settling Asian problems, the interests of the Asian as perceived by Asian, 
not the interest of the global strategy or conflicting ideologies should play 
the decisive part". These attempts were mainly dominated by the politico-
strategic consideration of decolonisation and Asian resurgence. 
28 . Indra Mohan Jhan, SAARC :The Road Ahead : A Case for Constructive Diplomacy, 
New Delhi, National Book Organisation, 2004, p. 39. 
29 . S.L. Poplai, "The Colombo Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers", Foreign 
Affairs Report, Vol. 3, NO. 7, July 1954,. 84. 
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So, the perspective for regional cooperation in South Asia and the 
evolving framework to work it out have been a long and arduous process. 
Though many leaders in the region expressed ideas to form a regional 
association but none of them were commonly agreed till the emergence of 
President Zia-ur Rahman of Bangladesh against the backdrop of the 1980s 
Afghan crisis. An ardent advocate of regional grouping and cooperation in 
an area afflicting by internecine conflict and tension, he suggested that the 
seven countries of South Asia should explore the possibility of establishing 
some institutional arrangement for regional cooperation. 
He fully realized the need for cooperation in preserving peace and 
stability, which in turn is important for economic and social development of 
the regional states. As he wrote in his initial letters: 
Recent events and developments in and around South Asia and 
Middle East represent considerable threat to global peace and 
stability. The situation in Afghanistan continues to undermine the 
tension and conflict that characterise the present day world has to 
be viewed with concern. Under these circumstances we believe 
there is urgent need for cooperating among the countries of this 
area for preserving peace and stability, which is so essential for 
sustaining the process of economic and social development.'^^ 
The initial response of other countries vis-a-vis the proposals were 
slow and cautious, but this did not deter President Zia to pursue the matter. 
Bangladesh prepared and circulated a working paper on the "proposal for 
regional cooperation" in South Asia on 25 November 1980, elaborating the 
concept and identifying the possible areas of cooperation. Explaining the 
rationale for regional cooperation the paper argues: 
30. President Zia-ur-Rahman's letter addressed to the King of Nepal proposing a 
Framework for Regional Cooperation in South Asia, 2 May 1980, Dhaka. 
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(T)he only region which did not have any such arrangements 
for regional cooperation was South Asia. Shared perception 
and values are important factor for the success of any venture 
for regional cooperation. Economic and technical cooperation 
on a regional basis is now accepted by all developing countries 
as a desirable and necessary strategy. It is only through 
regional cohesion that South Asian can hope to have an 
effective voice in international forums - Even where bilateral 
disputes crop up... regional cooperation grows, it also tends to 
generate a climate of mutual understanding reducing the scope 
of such disputes... Countries of the region have cooperated 
with one another bilaterally and regionally under... the 
ESCAP, the NAM and the Commonwealth. The efforts have 
not fully exploited the vast potential of regional cooperation 
that exists and the consequential benefit that will bring 
•5 1 
collectively and individually to the countries of the region. 
The message was cordially responded in the region. While the 
proposal was immediately endorsed by Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and 
Maldives, initially both India and Pakistan did not show much enthusiasm, 
though for different considerations.^^ But this draft proposal provided the 
basis for further discussion particularly during the Non-aligned Foreign 
Ministers Conference in New Delhi in February 1981. The Foreign 
Ministers of seven South Asian countries held an informal meeting on this 
issue. They decided to go ahead with the proposal and agreed to hold a 
formal meeting of Foreign Secretaries. Foreign Secretaries met in Colombo 
on 21-23 April 1981. Their three more meetings took place in Kathmandu 
(2-4 November, 1981), Islamabad (7-9 August, 1982) and Dhaka (28-30 
March 1983). Finally, at the foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi on 1-2 
31 . A Paper on the Proposal for Regional Cooperation in South Asia, Dhaka, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, November 1980. 
32 . Kalim Bahadur, "Politics of SAARC", World Focus, Vol. 22 NO. 7, July 2001, pp. 7-9. 
33 . Emjuddin Ahmad," South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: A Comparative 
Perspective", SAARC Perspective, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat, vol. 2, NO. 4, 
December 1988, p.33. 
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August 1983, the seven countries adopted the Declaration on South Asian 
Regional Cooperation (SARC) and formally launched the Integrated 
Programme of Action (IDA) in the five agreed areas of cooperation namely, 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunication, Meteorology and 
Health and Population activities. Later Transport, Postal Services, Scientific 
and Technological Cooperation, Sports, Art and Culture were added to the 
IPA. At their meeting in Male (10-11 July, 1984) and Thimpu (13-14 May, 
1985), the Foreign Ministers decided to hold summit meeting in the last 
quarter of 1985. The first summit took place in Dhaka on 7-8 December 
1985, institutionalizing the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). '^* The change in the acronym was based on the 
thinking that while SARC refers to the process of South Asian Regional 
Cooperation, SAARC marks the establishment of an association 
(organization) to promote and develop such cooperation. 
The objectives, principles and general provisions as mentioned in 
the SAARC Charter are as follows: 
OBJECTIVES: 
1. To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve 
their quality of life; 
2. To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region and to provide all individuals the 
opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potentialities; 
34 . See, "SAARC - A chronology of Important Events", in SAARC Perspective in Ibid., 
pp. 79-80. 
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3. To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries 
of South Asia; 
4. To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one 
another's problems; 
5. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, 
social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; 
6. To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; 
7. To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums 
on matters of common interest and 
8. To cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar 
aims and purposes.^^ 
PRINCIPLES: 
1. Cooperation within the framework of Association is based on respect 
for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political 
independence non-interference in the internal affairs of the other states 
and mutual benefit. 
2. Such cooperation is to complement and not to substitute bilateral as 
multilateral cooperation. 
3. Such cooperation should be consistent with bilateral and multilateral 
obligations of Member States.^^ 
35 . Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Dhaka, 8 December, 
1985, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
36 . Article II, in Ibid. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS: 
1. Decisions at all levels in SAARC are taken on the basis of unanimity. 
2. Bilateral and contentious issues are excluded from the deliberations of 
the Association.^^ 
Thus, SAARC "is an association based on the consciousness that in 
an increasingly interdependent world, the objective of peace, freedom, social 
justice and economic prosperity are best achieved in the South Asian region 
by fostering mutual understanding, good neighbourly relation and 
meaningful cooperation among the Member States which are bound by ties 
of history and culture".""' The spirit of SAARC is reflected in its objectives 
and the principles, which provides a platform for the people of South Asia to 
work together in a spirit of friendship, trust and understanding. Regional 
cooperation is, in fact, seen as a complement to the bilateral and multilateral 
relation of its member states. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SAARC 
Here institutional arrangement refers to organizational environment 
and bureaucratic structure for proper functioning of the SAARC in it's 
cooperative endeavours. Because, for any meaningful relations, 
organisations are deliberately created and restructured to achieve desired 
goals out of such relationships. Thus, "the growing complexity of modern 
life has necessitated establishment of an organization because it is based on 
37. Article X, in Ibid. 
38. SonuTrivedi, no. 25, p. 241. 
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affectivity, efficiency and optimal utility of resources when they are 
becoming scare due to the rising demand"."'^ Therefore, several 
international/regional organizations, including the SAARC, were launched 
with detailed bureaucratic structure. 
The Charter for the Association provides for the following 
institutional setup under articles III to VIIL 
SUMMIT: The highest authority of the Association rests with the Heads of 
State or Government, who meet annually at summit level. To date thirteen 
Meetings of heads of State or Government have been held: Dhaka (1985), 
Bangalore (1986), Kathmandu (1987), Islamabad (1988), Male (1990), 
Colombo (1991), Dhaka (1993), New Delhi (1995), Male (1997), Colombo 
(1998), Kathmandu (2002), Islamabad (2004) and Dhaka (2005). The 
fourteenth SAARC Summit is scheduled to be held in India in 2007. 
COUNCIL O F MINISTERS''*' : Comprising the Foreign Ministers of Member 
states, the Council is responsible for formulating policies; reviewing 
progress; deciding new areas of cooperation; establishing additional 
mechanism as deemed necessary; and deciding on other matters of general 
interest to the Association. The council meets twice a year and may also 
meet in extraordinary session by agreements of Member states. Informal 
meetings of the Council are also held on the sidelines of the United Nations 
General Assembly Sessions in New York. The Council of Ministers has held 
twenty-four Regular Session up to January 2004. 
39 . Indra Mohan Jhan, no. 28, p. 99. 
40 . Article IV, Charier of the SAARC, no.35. 
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STANDING COMMITTEE'*' : The Standing Committee comprising the 
Foreign Secretaries of Member States is entrusted with the task of overall 
monitoring and coordination of programmes and the modalities of financing, 
determining inter-sectoral priorities, mobilizing regional and external 
resources; and identifying new areas of cooperation. It may meet as often as 
deemed necessary but in practice normally meets twice a year and submits 
its reports to the council of Ministers. It has held twenty-nine Regular 
Sessions and four special session up to January 2004. 
The Standing Committee is authorised to set up Action Committees 
comprising Member States concerned with implementation of projects 
involving more than two but less than seven Member states. 
The Standing Committee is assisted by a Programming Committee, 
an ad hoc body, comprising senior officials, to scrutinize the Secretariat 
Budgets, finalise the calendar of Activities and take up any other matter 
assigned to it by the Standing Committee. 
TECHNICAL COMMITTEES'*^  : Comprising representafives from the 
Member Slates, the Technical Committees formulates programmes and 
prepare projects in their respective fields which make up the Integrated 
Programme of Action under SAARC. There are currently eleven Technical 
committees, the Chairmanship of which rotates among Member countries in 
alphabetical order every two years. 
SPECIALISED MINISTERIAL MEETINGS; Since the establishment of the 
Association a number of SAARC ministerial meetings have been held to 
41 . Ibid. 
42. Article VI, in Ibid. 
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focus attention on specific areas of common concern, and these now have 
become an integral part of the consultative structure. 
THE SECRETARIAT 
The Dhaka Charter authorized the Council of Ministers to establish 
a secretariat as a nucleus of SAARC activities.'''^ A Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed by council of Ministers on 17 November 1986 to 
establish SAARC Secretariat at Kathmandu. 
Secretary General is the chief administrative officer of the 
Secretariat. He is responsible for coordination and implementation of 
SAARC activities. He is also works as a source of communication between 
SAARC and other international organizations. 
Secretary General is appointed by the Council of Ministers from 
amongst the Member States in alphabetical order for a three year term. He 
holds the rank and status of an ambassador.'*'* The first Secretary General 
Abul Ahsan took charge on 16 January 1987, when the secretariat was 
inaugurated. 
The Secretary General is assisted by Directors of different Divisions 
assigned to them by the Secretary General, nominated by each country. They 
have the ranks of a counselor and hold office for a term of three years. 
REGIONAL CENTRES 
The five regional centres established in Member states promote 
regional cooperation in different areas assigned to them. Each centre is 
43 . Article VII, in Ibid. 
44 . Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Secretariat, Bangalore, 17 
November 1986. 
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managed by a Governing Board. The board comprises representatives of 
Member states, SAARC Secretary General and the Ministry of 
Foreign/External Affairs of the host government. The Regional Centres are 
as follow: 
1. SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (Dhaka) 
2. SAARC Tuberculosis Centre (Kathmandu) 
3. SAARC Documentation Centre (New Delhi) 
4. SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (Dhaka) 
5. SAARC Human Resource Development Centre (Islamabad) 
In addition to the above regional centres already functioning in 
various fields under the SAARC umbrella establishment of the following 
centres is under consideration: 
1. SAARC Cultural Centre in Kandy (Sri Lanka) 
2. SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre (Maldives) 
3. SAARC Information Centre 
THE FINANCES'*^ 
Member states make provision in their national budgets for 
financing activities and programmes under the SAARC framework, 
including for their assessed contributions to the Secretariat budget and those 
of the Regional Centres. 
The annual budget of the Secretariat, both for capital as well as 
current expenditure, is shared by Member States on the basis of an agreed 
formula. 
45 . Article IX, Charier of the SAARC, no. 35. 
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Thus, the institutional structure built up by SAARC has provided a 
useful platform for conceptualization and implementation of programmes of 
regional significance and for an exchange of views of experiences at various 
levels on issues of common concern to the Member States. 
EVOLUTION OF THE SAARC 
The SAARC has now completed twenty years since its 
establishment on 8 December 1985. From relatively modest beginning, 
SAARC members have been gradually expanding their cooperation to cover 
new areas of common interest. Looking at SAARC in retrospect, the 
association had passed through two distinct phases. The first phase was a 
preparatory phase, based on gradual and step-by-step approach to initiating 
regional cooperation, mostly in non-controversial and peripheral areas such 
as confidence building measures."*^ 
In the second half of its evolution SAARC moved into the 
expansionary phase, when regional cooperation was expanded both in the 
social and core economic sectors. However, member states did not vest in 
SAARC either a sufficiency of political will or adequate resources for 
carrying out these commitments to ensure the expected level of 
effectiveness.''^ 
The second SAARC Summit was held in Bangalore in 1986. This 
summit placed SAARC on a higher institutional plane with the signing of an 
agreement on the SAARC Secretariat. The Heads of the state or Government 
46 . Indra Nath Mukherji, "SAARC : Past, Present and Future", World Focus, Vol. 25, No. 6, June 
2004, pp. 7-10. 
47. Ibid. 
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welcomed the establishment of the Technical Committees on Women in 
Development and on the Prevention of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse/'' 
The third SAARC summit was held in Kathmandu in 1987. One of 
the highlights of this summit was the signing of the "'SAARC Regional 
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism'". Member states also signed an 
agreement on establishing a South Asian Food Security Reserve and 
expressed satisfaction at the launching of SAARC Audio visual Exchange 
programme/^ 
The fourth Summit held in Pakistan in 1988, addressed the wide gap 
that existed between what SAARC had so far achieved and its potential. 
Member states endorsed the establishment of the SAARC Agriculture 
Information Centre (Dhaka) and launching of the Youth Volunteers 
Programme and the SAARC Chairs, Fellowship and Scholarship Scheme. 
They also declared the year 1989 as the SAARC year for Combating Drug 
Abuse and Drug Trafficking, 1990 as the SAARC year of Girl child. The 
Heads of the State or Government agreed to launch SAARC-2000 - A Basic 
Needs Perspective. 
The most notable achievement of SAARC's Fifth Summit was 
signing of the Convention on Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
in 1990 in Maldives. The fifth summit was held against the backdrop of the 
controversy concerning Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka. The 
Summit was repeatedly postpone due to Sri Lanka's refusal to host the 
meeting. Member states also decided to observe 1991 as the SAARC Year of 
48 . SAARC Declaration, Bangalore, November 17, 1986, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
49 . SAARC fyedaralion, Kathmandu, November 4, 1987, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
50 . SAARC Declaration, Islamabad, December 3 1, 1988, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
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Shelter, 1993 as SAARC year of Disabled Person and 1992 as the SAARC 
year of Environment. They also approved the recommendation of the 
Council of Ministers regarding Special SAARC Travel Document and 
decided to launch the scheme/' 
The Sixth SAARC Summit was held in Sri Lanka in 1991. The 
heads of the State or Government decided to establish an independent South 
Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation. They endorsed the establishment 
of the Committee for Economic Cooperation and Inter-Governmental Group 
to seek agreement on an institutional framework. They also welcomed the 
recommendation on the establishment of a shelter information network to be 
called "SHELTERNEN". A SAARC Fund for Regional Projects was set up 
for identification and development of regional projects.^^ 
The signing of the framework agreement on SAARC Preferential 
Trading Agreement (SAPTA) was a landmark achievement of the Seventh 
SAARC Summit held in Dhaka in 1993. This was the first major step toward 
expanding trade among the member states. The Heads of the States and 
Government endorsed the Colombo Resolution on Children. They also 
agreed to designate 1994 as the SAARC Year of the Youth. Member States 
welcomed the initiative of the Speakers of Parliament of SAARC Countries 
in forming an Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians. They 
also endorsed the recommendation of the Council of Ministers for the 
establishment of an Inter-Governmental Group on South Asian Development 
Fund on an ad-hoc basis.^^ 
51 . SAARC Declaration, Male, November 23, 1990, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
52 . SAARC Declaration, Colombo, December 21,1991, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
53. SAARC Declaration, Dhaka, April 11, 1993 Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
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The Eighth SAARC Summit was held in New Delhi in 1995. The 
Heads of the State and Government endorsed the proposal of the Council of 
Ministers to convene a Commemorative Session of the Council on the theme 
SAARC - Vision for the Second Decade, to identify the areas on which 
SAARC should focus. They reaffirmed their commitment to the eradication 
of poverty in South Asia, preferably by the year 2002 A.D. through an 
Agenda of Action. In this context, the decided to declare 1995 as the SAARC 
Year of Poverty Eradication. They directed that all necessary steps should 
be taken to facilitate ratification by all members and operationalise SAPTA 
by the end of 1995 as mandated. To this end, they decided that the 
"Components" and "Additional Measures" identified in Article 4 and 6 
respectively of the SAPTA should be implemented. The leaders welcomed 
the establishment of the SAARC Documentation Centre in New Delhi in 
May 1994 and the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre at Dhaka in 
January this year. The leaders also endorsed the Kathmandu Resolution on 
Women and Family Health. Leaders called on the Member States to initiate 
a concrete programme aimed at eradicating illiteracy in the region. They 
decided to observe 1996 as the SAARC Year of Literacy. SAARC law, an 
association for persons of legal communities of SAARC countries, 
established in 1991 was accorded recognition as a SAARC Regional Apex 
Body. Member states endorsed the establishment of a three-window South 
Asian Development Fund with the merger of SAARC Fund for Regional 
Projects and the SAARC Regional Fund.^ '* 
54. SAARC Declaration, New Delhi, May 4, 1995, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
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In the Ninth Summit in 1997 in Maldives, the heads of the State or 
Government observed that over past decade SAARC has matured as an 
institution and the scope and volume of cooperative activities have 
expanded. With the objective of enhancing regional solidarity and 
promoting overall development within SAARC, leaders encouraged the 
development of specific projects relevant to the special individual needs of 
the three or more Member States. 1997 was declared as the SAARC year of 
Participatory Governance. The SAARC Youth Awards Scheme established in 
1996 was welcome here in this Summit. SAARC Terrorist Offences 
Monitoring Desk and the SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk were 
establish in Colombo to collate, analyze and disseminate information about 
terrorism and drug abuse. In this summit SAARC leaders set up a Group of 
Eminent Persons to review the functioning of SAARC institutions and 
provide a Perspective Plan up to the year 2020.^^ 
The Tenth summit of the SARC was held in Sri Lanka in 1998. 
Heads of the State and Government reiterated their commitment to regional 
cooperation, cultural unity, enhancing political cooperation etc. They 
emphasized the principle of sustainable development of bio-resources. The 
leaders were of the view that contact should be established to the regional 
groupings which have experience in economic cooperation and functional 
regional cooperation. The leaders of the Member states accepted the 
proposal of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh for the establishment of a 
SAARC Voluntary Fund for Disabled Persons. The leaders also decided to 
set up a Committee of Experts to conclude a Treaty by 2001 on a South Asia 
55 . SAARC Declaration, Male, May 14, 1997, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
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Free Trade Area. A coordinating group of SAARC ambassadors at the WTO 
was set up to coordinate and harmonize SAARC positions on international 
economic issues of common concern.^^ 
The postponement of Eleventh Summit of SAARC which was to be 
held in November 1999 in Kathmandu "injected an unprecedented 
uncertainty on the future of this sixteen years old organization".^^ In any 
case, there is nothing new in the postponement of SARC summit. This was 
for the fourth time it was postponed - Fifth Summit (1989), Sixth Summit 
(1991), Seventh Summit (1993) and Eleventh (1999). The Summits have 
been postponed without really considering the adverse impact it created on 
the institution of SAARC. 
Anyway, meetings and consultation were continued on the lower 
strata of the government of the Member countries. One important event was 
the restructuring of the SAARC Technical Committees. The earlier seven 
SAARC Technical committees have been restructured under the SAARC 
Integrated Programme of Action with effect form January 2000. The seven 
new Technical Committees under SIPA are (1) agriculture and Rural 
Development, (2) Social Development, (3) Transport and Communication, 
(4) Science and Technology, (5) Environment, Meteorology and Forestry, 
(6) Human Resource Development and (7) Energy.^^ 
The eleventh SAARC summit was convened in Nepal on 4-6 
January 2002. SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating the 
56 . SAARC Declaration, Colombo, July 31,1998, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
57 . Mahendra P. Lama, "SAARC : The Future Ahead", World Focus, no. 32, pp. 14-17. 
58. Bharti Chhibber, Regional Security and Regional Cooperation: A Comparative Study of ASEAN 
and SAARC, New Delhi, New Century Publication, 2004, p. 130. 
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Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution and SAARC Convention 
on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia 
were signed on January 5, 2002. Leaders called for an early realization of a 
rule based and non-discriminatory world trade regime and noted with 
serious concern the adverse impact of the shrinking Official Development 
Assistance. They reiterated their call for the early and effective 
implementation of the SAARC Environment Plan of Action as endorsed by 
the SAARC Environmental Ministers.^^ 
The Twelfth SAARC summit was held in Pakistan on January 6, 
2004. The leaders reiterated their commitment for the creation of a South 
Asian Economic Union. To develop tourism within South Asia the year 
2005 was designated as "South Asia Tourism Year". The Plan of Action of 
Poverty Alleviation was approved. They also recommended for the 
establishment of a Regional Food Bank. The year2004 was declared as the 
"SAARC Awareness Year" and chalked out a plan for easy and affordable 
health care. They welcomed the establishment of a SAARC Cultural Centre 
in Kandy, which would serve as symbol of South Asian shared culture 
heritage.^^ 
The Thirteenth SAARC Summit was convened in Bangladesh on 
12-13 November 2005. The Heads of the Government or State agreed that 
Summit provided a unique opportunity to consolidate the gains made in 
regional cooperation during its first two decades. The leaders decided to 
declare the decade of 2006-2015 as the SAARC Decade of Poverty 
59 . SAARC Declaration, Kathmandu, January 6,2002, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
60 . SAARC Declaration, Islamabad, January 6,2004, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
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Alleviation, and decided to establish a SAARC Poverty Alleviation Fund. 
They also stressed the importance of the entry into force of the SAFTA 
Agreement on the scheduled date i.e. 1 January 2006. They noted the offer 
of India to establish a South Asian University and agreed to examine this 
matter further. The leaders welcomed the decision of the Council of 
Ministers to establish a SAARC Forestry Centre in Bhutan. The leaders 
welcome the signing of the Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
in Customs Matters; Agreement on the Establishment of SAARC Arbitration 
Council; and the Limited Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. They also agreed to 
establish the SAARC Energy Centre in Islamabad, to promote development 
of energy resources. They decided to proclaim the year 2007 as the Year of 
Green South Asia devoted to a region-wide aforestation campaign. The 
leaders welcomed the observer status granted to SAARC by the United 
Nations general Assembly. They also welcomed and agreed in principle with 
the desire of the People's Republic of China and Japan to be associated as 
observer. The leaders welcomed the request by the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan for membership and invited Afghanistan as a member, subject 
to the completion of formalities. The Heads of the state or Government 
welcomed the offer of the Government of India to host the Fourteenth 
SAARC Summit in 2007.^' 
After a bumpy journey during the 20 years since its inception, 
SAARC, an ambitious, innovative grouping for cooperation in South Asia, 
finds itself at a crossroad. It felt that, though devoted to economic 
61 . SAARC Declaration, Dhaka, January 13, 2006, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
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cooperation, a South Asian regional grouping could not avoid becoming a 
forum for raising contentious political issues. As a result, from the 
beginning, political developments involving India or periodic Indo-Pakistan 
tension have dominated the working of SAARC. On a few occasions, 
internal differences among member states resulted in the cancellation or 
postponement of SAARC meetings including summit. However, the coming 
summit, scheduled in 2007 in India, will show whether it has some 
relevance or whether it is to be written off. 
ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF SAARC 
"... the objective of the Association shall be... to accelerate 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in 
dignity and to realize their full potential..." 
SAARC Charter, 1985 
South Asia is one of the poorest regions of the world. It plagued by 
high level of illiteracy, poverty and poor health conditions. On the other 
side, the potential in the region are not too bad. In fact, the region is rich in 
terms of natural resources which, if harnessed appropriately, could perhaps 
change the entire scenario. Thus, SAARC members realized the potential of 
regional associations in enhancing the regional economic human security in 
their respective regions. "Formation of regional or sub-regional cooperative 
endeavours is indeed imperative when resources are shared by the concerned 
countries and more so, when opportunities for accumulating common 
benefits are in place". '^^  
62 . O.P. Goel, India and SAARC Engagement, Vol. 2, Delhi, Isha Books, 2004, p. 408. 
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In practice SAARC has adopted the 'functional approach' to 
cooperation. To begin with areas chosen for cooperation are those where 
political concerns are least involved. Though economic growth and 
collective self-reliance were mentioned as aims and objectives in the 
Charter, in practice cooperation in the economic field was taken up much 
later by the member states: 
The countries of the region enjoy a significant share of the world 
market for number of commodities, such as tea, jute and cotton. 
Most of these countries have separately undertaken marketing and 
promotional efforts for these commodities. It is well recognized that 
joint initiative can reduce promotional cost and have greater impact 
in the export market.... In the face of growing competition from 
substitutes as well as uncertainties due to price fluctuation, such 
joint initiative will provide additional guarantee for further 
expansion of markets at remunerative prices. ^  
But these did not find a place in the final SAARC charter. However, 
SAARC deliberated and discussed on economic issues in its annual meetings^ 
even during the initial years. In the very first summit meeting leaders of the 
member countries were cautious that at the global level "sharply falling 
commodity prices, deterioration in the terms of trade, intensification of 
protectionist measures, spiraling debt burden and decline in the flow of 
external resources, specially concessional assistance had caused a serious 
setback to the economic development of the developing countries".^^ 
During the Third Summit Conference held in Kathmandu in 1987, 
collective self-reliance was reasserted as the fundamental principle in 
development. The first attempt towards moving into core areas of trade and 
economic cooperation was the commissioning by the SAARC Secretariat, a 
63 . A Paper on the Proposal for Regional Cooperation in South Asia, no. 31. 
64 . SAARC Declaration, Dhaka, December 8, 1985, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat. 
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Regional Study on Trade, Manufactures and Services. The study was 
completed in 1991 outlining a number of recommendations for promoting 
regional cooperation in the core economic areas. The council of Ministers at 
its Ninth Session in Male in July 1991 endorsed the study and decided to set 
up a high level Committee on Economic Cooperation (CEC), comprising 
Commerce Secretaries of SAARC states. 
Subsequently, at the-Sixth summit in December 1991, the Heads of 
the Government or state of SAARC approved the establishment of the Inter-
Governmental Group (IGG) to seek agreement on an institutional framework 
under which specific measures for trade liberalization amongst SAARC 
Member States could be advanced. The IGG met twice to evolve a Draft 
Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA). The New 
Delhi summit held in May 1995, formally approved the proposals for 
preferential trade worked out by the IGG and later endorsed by the SAARC 
Foreign Ministers. With all member countries having ratified the 
Agreement, it came into force in 1995 - which marks the end of the first 
decade of SAARC's existence.^^ The Agreement reflected the desire of the 
Member states to promote and sustain mutual trade and economic 
cooperation within the SAARC region through the exchange of concession. 
The basic principles underlying SAPTA are: 
a. Overall reciprocity and mutuality of advantages so as to benefit all 
Contracting States taking into account their respective level of 
economic and industrial development, the pattern of their external 
trade, and trade and tariff policies and systems; 
65 . I.N. Mukherji, "Economic Advantages of SAARC", World Focus, no. 32, pp. 10-13. 
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b. Negotiation of tariff reform step by step, improved and extended in 
successive stages through periodic reviews; 
c. Recognition of the special needs of the Least Developed Contracting 
States and agreement on concrete preferential measures in their 
favour; and 
d. Inclusion of all products manufactures and commodities in their raw, 
semi-processed and processed forms.^^ 
The SAPTA aims at promoting and sustaining mutual trade and 
economic cooperation among the member countries on the basis of 
reciprocity. Under SAPTA, product wise tariff concessions have to be 
negotiated amongst the member countries on a step-by-step basis. It is 
envisaged that both tariff and non-tariff barriers will be removed phase-wise 
selecting specific group of commodities. 
During the first round of negotiation a total of 226 products were 
offered by the member. Nearly 50 per cent of the products (106)' were 
offered by India. Total value of regional trade liberalized during the first 
round was no more than 72.5 million dollars equivalent to no more than 6 
per cent of intra-regional trade in 1993.^^ 
For the second round of trade preferences IGG met four times to 
finalise the National Schedule of Concessions (NSC). In this round of 
SAPTA negotiation, which concluded in Kathmandu on 29-30* November 
66 . SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA), Dhaka, 11 April 1993, Kathmandu, SAARC 
Secretariat. 
67 . l.N. Mukherji, "South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement: Role of India", Paper presented at 
National Seminar on "Building Regional Cooperation: India's Role", organized by Indian 
Council for South Asian Cooperation and India International Centre, New Delhi, December 11-
12, 1998. 
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1996, items for exchanged on tariff concession picked up to 1972 tariff 
lines. India agreed to give tariff concession on 911 items, Pakistan on 386 
items, Nepal on 277 tariff lines, Bangladesh on 241 tariff lines, Sri Lanka on 
/TO 
102 tariff lines, Bhutan on 47 tariff lines and Maldives on 8 tariff lines. 
The slow process of SAPTA is manifested with the fact that 
SAARC countries could finalise on 1972 tariff lines out of the 6000 tariff 
lines for tariff concession. In practical terms this round too led to modest 
trade coverage. Members seemed to be more concerned with the product 
coverage matter than trade coverage, which is vital for trade liberalization. 
The Council of Ministers at its 19"^  session in male in 1997 directed 
the IGG to conduct third round of negotiations on sectoral and across the 
board basis. It urged the removal of Non-Tariff Barriers (NBTs). Third 
round of negotiations were concluded in November 1998. Negotiation for 
SAPTA fourth round was initiated in 1999. However, due to Kargil debacle, 
it was finally held in January 2002 in Kathmandu. 
A major boost to trade within the region was provided by the bold 
initiative taken by India to unilaterally lift all Quantitative Restrictions 
maintained on Balance of Payments reasons preferentially for SAARC 
countries from August 1, 1998. Over 2000 products from the Restricted List 
have been placed on Open General License (OGL) for SAARC countries. 
India has also offered to conclude bilateral free trade agreements 
with those countries that are willing to move faster. This was expected to 
complement the SAPTA process and provide it added momentum. 
68 . R.S. Kher, SAARC : Political and Economic Aspect, New Delhi, Dominant Piibli.shers and 
Distributors, 2004, p. 38. 
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Economic cooperation has been further institutionalized with the 
commencement of the meeting of Commerce Ministers of SAARC 
countries. The First SAARC Commerce Ministers Conference was held in 
New Delhi in January 1996. This has now become an annual feature along 
with a Conference organized by the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. Intra-regional investment promotion and protection, and avoidance 
of double taxation are two such in which regional arrangements are being 
considered. Harmonisation and simplification in customs procedures in the 
subjects of another ongoing exercise. The First SAARC Meeting to discuss 
measures for Promotion and Protection of Investment was held in New 
Delhi on 29-30 September 1997. In this Meeting India has been asked to 
prepare a concept paper on setting-up a Regional Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism that would help to resolve commercial and investment disputes 
at a regional level rather than through costly International Arbitration. 
The potential of intra-regional trade in SAARC has to be examined 
in the context of the historical relations between the member countries. 
Historically, the seven countries mostly traded with non-members, that is, 
mostly with industrialized countries and Newly Industrialised Countries 
(NICs). The intra-regional trade is hardly 3% of the total trade of the 
region. Due to pressure of globalisation, the SAARC members have 
accepted the principles of free trade as a strategy of economic development. 
The member countries emphasized the need for moving up from the current 
low level of intra-regional trade and investment to higher level through 
some institutional arrangements. 
69 . See at http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/SAARC/saarc.htm. 
70 . See at http://www.banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/S_0502./htm 
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SOUTH ASIAN FREE TRADE AREA ( S A F T A ) 
SAPTA was envisaged primarily as the first step towards the 
transition to a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) leading subsequently 
towards a Custom Union, Common Market and Economic Union. In 1995, 
the Sixteenth session of the Council of Ministers agreed on the need to strive 
for the realization of SAFTA and to this end a Group of Eminent Persons 
(GEP) was constituted in the Ninth SAARC Summit held in male in 1997 to 
identify the necessary steps for progressing to a free trade area. The GEP in 
its report "SAARC Vision Beyond the 'year 2000" recommended three 
stages for establishing an economic union in South Asia. SAFTA should be 
negotiated by 1999, with implementation commencing in 2000. It should be 
placed by 2008, for least developed countries, it should be completed by 
2010. The second stage will be harmonizing of external tariffs, i.e. a 
Customs Union by 2015. The third stage will lead to establishment of 
SAARC Economic Union with harmonization of monetary and fiscal 
policies by year 2020.^' 
Other proposals of GEP include expansion of export production 
capacity of the Least Developed States. It calls for setting up of export 
oriented joint ventures in LDCs with financing from South Asia 
Development Fund and the private sector of the more developed member 
states. 
The successful completion of Uruguay Round of GATT and the 
establishment of WTO to facilitate world trade system is a trend towards 
71 . SAARC Vision Beyond the Year 2000, Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, Kathmandu, 
SAARC Secretariat. 
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globalization of world economy. Thus, "every state in South Asia runs the 
risk of being progressively marginalized if we are late in aligning ourselves 
with the system. The GEP was correct in recommending a time bound 
framework for economic integration".'^ 
The Tenth SAARC Summit held in Colombo in July 1998 decided 
to set up a Committee of Experts to draft a comprehensive treaty framework 
for creating a free trade area within the region. It also has to take into 
consideration the asymmetric in development within the region and bearing 
in the mind the need to fix realistic and achievable targets. 
The Agreement drafted by the Committee of Experts, was signed on 
January 2004 during the Twelfth SAARC Summit in Islamabad. The 
Agreement came into force on 1 January 2006. Currently, the Sensitive List 
of Products, Rules of Origin, Technical Assistance as well as Mechanism for 
Compensation of Revenue Loss for Least Developed Member States are 
under negotiation. 
Under the Trade Liberalisation Programme under SAPTA 
Scheduled for completion in ten years by 2016, the customs duties on 
products from the region will be progressively reduced. It envisages that the 
non-LDCs will reduce their tariff to 0-5 per cent by 2014 which the LDCs 
will do so by 2016. However, the non-LDCs would be required to reduce the 
tariffs to 0-5 per cent on products of LDCs by 2009. However, the products 
identified under the sensitive list by each contracting State would not be 
subject to trade liberalization. Regarding non-tariff and para-tariff measures. 
72 . C. M. Shafi Ami, "Vision of SAARC for the Twenty First Century" in Dipanker Banerjee (ed.), 
SAARC in the Twenty First Century : Towards a Cooperative Future, New Delhi, Indian 
Research Press, 2002, pp. 3-22. 
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the Contracting States are referred to notify to the SAARC Secretariat their 
incidence annually. These would reviewed by the Committee of Experts to 
examine their compatibility with relevant WTO provisions.^^ 
The above features of the Agreement on SAFTA clearly reveal its 
slow and protracted process. Nor any time limit is specified for the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers. Nor does the Agreement mention about 
the transition to either a customs union or an economic union. 
INTRA REGIONAL COOPERATION IN FINANCIAL MATTERS 
Under the framework of SAARC, Article IX of the Charter 
specifically mentions that the contribution of each members towards 
financing the acfivifies of the association shall be voluntary. For the 
successful carrying out of SARC activities it is vital to work out proper 
funding modalities. A SAARC Fund for Regional Projects (SFRP) with a 
funding of $ 5 million is in operation since 1992. Nodal development 
financing institutions of member states have contributed to this fund. In 
1995 South Asia Development Fund was established with the merging of 
SAARC Fund for Regional Development and the SAARC Regional Fund. 
FOOD SECURITY 
In tune with one of the SAARC objective an Agreement on the 
Establishment of SAARC Food Security Reserve was signed in 1987 which 
became operative from 12 August 1988. The basic purpose to establish Food 
Reserve was to eliminate acute poverty and accelerate economic growth and 
social progress.^"* 
73 . Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, Islamabad, 6 January 2004, Kathmandu: SAARC 
Secretariat. 
74. The Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Food Security Reserve, 4 November 1987, 
Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat. 
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Though the agreement 'schedule' shows an agreed total reserve of 
241.580 in metric tones by member states, in actual practice there is no 
central agency or granary to take care of it. Thus the agreement has never 
been functional. Therefore, twelfth SAARC Summit recommended the 
establishment of a Regional Food Bank. 
AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
In this sector a number of both short term and long-term 
programmes were implemented under IPA in SAARC region. The 
reconstituted Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development under the 
Chairmanship of Nepal started functioning in 2000. 
Programmes include exchange of scientific and technical 
information among member states. Seminars, workshops and short training 
courses were organized by member countries on different topics of 
agricultural research. 
India hosted the Second Meeting of the Committee in June 2005. 
The Meeting discussed on establishment of a "SAARC Quadrangle Milk 
Grid". The Meeting recommended the location of the three diagnostic 
laboratories for three priority diseases (Foot and Mouth disease. Paste des 
Petite Ruminant and HPAI), one Epidemiological Centre and a Regional 
Support Unit. 
Thirteenth SAARC Summit approved the three projects jointly 
identified with FAO that are: 
a) Control of Trans-boundary Animal Disease 
b) Enhancement of Integrated Pest Management 
c) Regional Strategy and Regional Programme for Food Security.^^ 
75 . See at, http:/www.saic_Dhaka.org. 
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TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION SECTOR 
The SAARC Committee on Economic Cooperation (CEC) has 
recognized the importance of adequate infrastructure in the field of transport 
and communication. The CEC commissioned a study on the Transport 
Infrastructure and Transit facilities in the SAARC Region to pursue the task 
assigned to it. 
The activities of the SAARC technical committee on transport include 
exchange of data and information, preparation of status papers preparation 
of compendia of Information on Roads, establishing a SAARC Highway, 
optimizing of operational efficiency in railway systems etc. The constitution 
of the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, formally inaugurated in 
1994, include the development of "shipping and other modes of 
transportation within the SAARC region" as one of its objectives. 
In order to promote cooperation in the field of telecommunication and 
postal services, the SAARC Technical Committee on Communication and a 
Technical Committee on Postal Services were established in 1983 and 
merged into one in 1993 as Technical Committee on Communication.^^ 
ENERGY SECTOR 
As early as its Fifth Session (Dhaka, 4 December 1985) the Standing 
Committee approved the recommendation of the then Technical Committee 
on Science and Technology to hold a workshop on Renewable Energy. Since 
then, various activities were held in the energy sector under the auspices of 
the Technical Committee on Science and Technology. 
76 . Ashok K. Attri, "Transport and Communication Networic of Expansion of Trade and Economic 
Cooperation" in Arif A. Waqif, Transport and Communication Development in South Asia, New 
Delhi, Friedrich-Elbert-Stiftung, 1999, pp. 21-31. 
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Subsequent, cooperation in the energy sector was brought directly 
under the purview of the SAARC IPA in January 2000 by establishing a new 
Technical Committee on Energy. Twelfth SAARC Summit, Islamabad, 2004 
recommended establishing South Asian Energy Cooperation including the 
77 
concept of an Energy Ring. 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
SAARC charter under Article 1 states, "the objectives of the 
Association shall be to strengthen cooperation among themselves in 
international forums on matters of common interests and to cooperate with 
international and regional organizations with similar aims and objectives. 
Successive SAARC Summits have acknowledge the importance of 
SAARC pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation with regional, UN and 
other international organizations in the areas of cooperation agreed to in 
SAARC. 
SAARC Secretariat has negotiated and entered into cooperative 
economic agreements or Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the 
following organizations: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
United nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP), United Nations Conference Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
the European Commission, Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), etc. 
77 . Energy see at http://www.saarc_sec.org/data/agenda/economic/energy. 
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NATURAL ECONOMIC TERRITORIES OR SUB-REGIONALISM 
Sub-regional economic cooperation in South Asia is not flourishing as 
in Southeast Asia. It is a phenomenon particularly suited to the Asian 
context, where there is a strong prediction for informal agreements rather 
than legalistic and binding treaties, and for instrumental rather than bold 
systematic change.''^ 
The World Bank showing eagerness to support ASEAN type 
cooperative ventures in South Asia has unveiled "South Asia Development 
Triangle" (SADT) with a programme Trans-boundary Development 
Cooperation encompassing most of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin 
and covering the eastern and north-eastern part of India, Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Bliutan. 
The 1997 SAARC meeting of the four foreign secretaries as mentioned 
above name the initiative South Asia Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) and 
decided not to consider it is an initiative under the SAARC. Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan and Maldives were of the view that the establishment of sub-
regional groupings could adversely affect the SAARC. At Male, the SAARC 
agreed to take these concerns into account and consider sub-regional 
cooperation only under Article 7 of the Charter which allow cooperation 
among two or more states but not necessarily all the SAARC members. 
Nepal has proposed development of inland waterways to get access to 
seaports in India and Bangladesh, Bangladesh has stressed the sub-regional 
cooperation involving the four countries. 
78 . Amos A. Jordon and Jane Khanna, "Economic Interdependence and Challenges to the Nation-
States: The Emergence of Natural Economic Territories in the Asia-Pacific", Journals of 
International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 21, Winter 1995, pp.433-462. 
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Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal Growth Quadrangle (BBIN-GQ) will 
follow a project led approach to cooperation in the core economic areas. The 
projects are to be supportive of an complementary to the national plans of 
the concerned states. This sort of an effort would be free of Indo-phobia that 
bilateral projects generally witness. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, a SAARC region-faces a plethora of problems as far as question 
of expansion of intra-regional trade is concerned. Moreover, in the region 
non-tariff barriers, such as import quotas, licensing and prohibition form 
part of efforts to protect domestic industries. These barriers are seen as the 
main obstacle in the expansion of intra-regional trade. 
However, the main obstacle to regional cooperation in South Asia is 
political. Political differences and the lack of political will on the part of the 
member states of SAARC to augment economic cooperation. In today's age 
of globalization SAARC nations cannot afford to be marginalized. It should 
also welcome potential investors to deal with the region as a whole. 
Cooperation in service sector will intensify interaction among the SAARC 
states. 
Chapter - Four 
in Comparative. ^Perspective 
CHAPTER: FOUR 
A S E A N - S A A R C REGIONS IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
International relations in the new millennium are gravitating 
towards a more complex world order where the forces of conflict and 
cooperation are simultaneously at work. While on the one hand, there is 
consensus for peace and development, on the other, strife and conflict are 
disturbing the international balance. This global reality is also impinging 
upon the Southeast Asian and South Asian scene. In Asian continent states 
have yearned and worked for both development and security since they 
attained their independence. Both the regions were beset by a number of 
problems generated by the legacies of colonialism, movements of peoples, 
traditionalism, scarcity of resources and the like.' However, being pressed 
by an emerging urgency from the externally imposed strain on them, 
countries in both the region have devised many differing strategies for 
ensuring and fulfilling the development aspirations of their people. Both 
Southeast Asia and South Asia currently have their own regional entities: 
Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This regional order was 
also a "response to the challenges and opportunities opened by globalisation, 
information communication technology, the knowledge based economy, 
deregulation and competition".'^ Thus each fashioned itself in its respective 
region for the purpose of co-operative endeavours. 
1 . Abu! Kalam, Subregiomlism in Asia : ASEAN and SAARC Experience, New Delhi, UBSPD, 
2001, p. 138. 
2 . Linda Low, "A Comparative Evaluation and Prognosis of Asia Pacific bilateral and Regional 
Trade Arrangements", See at http://www.blackwell_synergy.com/doi/full 
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Regionalism in South Asia is more a recent phenomenon that has 
been on the media and conference table, or at best found manifestation in the 
official launching of a regional entity. But Southeast Asia, with all its 
modified structuralism and economic complementarities, already has 
witnessed a decade of regional growth.^ Furthermore, in looking at ASEAN 
and SAARC comparatively, it has to be kept in mind that ASEAN countries 
were at a very preliminary level of capitalist growth themselves when they 
sought integration into the global capitalist economy. They had no interest 
of their own to protect and no terms to dictate. But in the South Asian case 
significant indigenous capitalist economic interest have grown over the 
years and they are finding it hard to adjust and harmonise themselves with 
the powerful economic interests at the global level. ASEAN had the added 
advantage over SAARC in that the member countries were smaller in size 
and their decision making systems, both political and administrative, were 
generally more centralized and efficient. 
ASEAN's Cooperative Relationships 
ASEAN began in 1967 with a political and security focus, but 
moved to an economic focus in 1976. The ASEAN preferential trade area 
was inaugurated in 1977. Having shifted from preferential trade to free trade 
under AFTA by 2002, ASEAN is touted as the most successful grouping of 
developing economies. In reality, each ASEAN states have relied on its own 
growth and trade strategy more than any ASEAN-wide effort. The member 
countries shared state-driven, import substituting industrialization before 
switching to export oriented industrialization. 
3. AbulKalam, no. l,p. 139. 
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ASEAN's growth effort or development cooperation has taken 
multiple shape and form. First of all, ASEAN sought to widen the area of its 
cooperative endeavour within and beyond Southeast Asia as well as for 
sustained economic growth of its member states/ To this end, it has adopted 
a policy of developing four pattern of relationships with non-members: 
"Dialogue Partners" with countries/regional groupings, "Consultative 
Partners" with some countries, "Observer Status" relationship, and, finally 
"Sectoral Dialogue Partner" relationship with some countries.^ 
As East Asian regionalism flourished, ASEAN has enjoyed an 
unexpected bout of attention as an economic and political body. For historic 
and political reason, it is difficult for China, Japan and Korea to form a pact 
on their own, which is fortunate for ASEAN. Equally important is ASEAN'^ 
effort toward widening the area of activity, which has been reflected in the 
region wise, growing economic organization of Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), as well as in the co-operative dialogue in the form of 
an annual meeting between ASEAN itself and the European Union (ASEM). 
There is also the security dialogue initiated by it: ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARl') involving some 18 members from within and beyond the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
The APEC, ASEM and ARF processes provide ASEAN with an 
opportunity to enlarge its interests and move together with the other 
countries in the larger Asia-Pacific region. Due to this diverse and wide area 
of operation "the political economy of East Asian regionalism has many 
4, Ibid., p. 140. 
5, ASEAN UPDATE, 1995. 
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varieties and hybrids - open and closed, coercive and consensual, and 
hierarchical and balanced in economic and political forms''.^ Though it is 
argued that ASEAN lack political will: their members are more predisposed 
to the primacy of national goals and strategies and are still struggling with 
corporate and financial sector reforms.^ But it appears that ASEAN is 
moving more rapidly. ASEAN has the potency of size, drive and political 
commitment among the Northeast Asian i.e. China, Japan and Korea. Within 
Asia, regionalism and economic cooperation have been symbolised by the 
ASEAN with a commitment effort to promote trade liberalization as well as 
to encourage a horizontal division of labour both in building production 
network and attracting investment. 
ASEAN's Experience with Growth Zone 
A signifi.cant area of intra-regional or subregional effort within 
ASEAN, lately developed, concerns what is known as "growth zone". This 
scheme is primarily aimed at deriving economic benefits through 
complementarities by exploiting the synergies that already exist. This 
subregional cooperation is of more recent origin, as developed in East and 
Southeast Asia, is viewed as localized version of regionalism". Subregional 
growth areas have been variously seen as "natural economic 
territories/zones", "transnational economic zones", "transborder economic 
neighbourhood" and "geo-economic development zones", etc. 
6. G.J. Ikenberry "The Political Economy of Asian Regionalism", East Asian Economic 
Perspectives, No. 11, 2000, pp. 35-61. 
7. Linda Low, no. 2. 
8. Abdur Rob Khan, "Subregional Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and Prospects", Paper 
presented at a Seminar on 'Subregional Cooperation in South Asia: Learning from the ASEAN', 
organized by Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 31 May, 1998. 
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The oldest of these initiatives, dubbed the southern growth triangle 
- the so-called IMS-GT, which has been relatively more successful than 
others, involves the Indonesian province of Riau, the Malaysian state of 
Johor, and Singapore. There is also the northern growth triangle - the IMT-
GT, which links the northern tip of Sumatra with the northern peninsular 
Malaysia and southern Thailand. It is thus a controlled experiment in 
regional cooperation or a new approach to regional development strategy 
made operational from below. It appears as a response to 'borderless' global 
economy as it is a means of enhancing competitiveness.^ As the ASEAN and 
East Asian experiences would tell us, subregionalism is a cross border 
arrangement between and among areas of different nation-states, "bound by 
proximity, to promote direct investment and trade, so as to take advantage of 
different factor endowments in each area".'° Thus, in its basic form it 
exploits complementarities to gain a competitive edge in export promotion. 
The idea is to exploit the economic complementarities for efficient 
development of a common natural resources and/or production of goods 
targeted mainly at the global market. 
I'hc success of ASEAN, as a grouping, has been well descried by 
Michael Leifer in an authoritative work on the way in which ASEAN had 
originated. Based on the twin streams of legal-rational and social-cultural 
approach, the ASEAN followed a 'common adherence to conventional 
international norms'." Furthermore, the underlying principle of state 
9. M.H. Kabir, "Subregional Cooperation in Soutl: Asia", BUS Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 2-3, 
1998. 
10. T.T. Ser, "Regionalism, Subregionalism and Regionalisation", in Lim Chong Yah (ed.), 
Economic Policy Management in Singapore, Singapore, Addision-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1996, p. 420. 
11. Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, London, Routledge, 1989, p. 24. 
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behaviour toward each other was to be founded upon the 'respect for justice 
and the rule of law in relationship among the countries of the region".'^ 
However there is a view that the success of ASEAN rested upon its ability to 
utilize both the approaches in combination. In addition to this the 
uniqueness of ASEAN has been underscored by the use of principle of 
consensus - both musyawarah or consultation and mufakat or consensus, 
were used as the principle rules of the decision making process. 
In the case of Southeast Asia, the original five members of ASEAN, 
from its inception in August 1967, have recognized an approach that has 
always been more inclusive and holistic. Such a view, in the early years of 
ASEAN's emergence, was significant because member states had to contend 
with problems relating to the insurgencies, ethnic tension - the particularly 
with relation to socio-economic inequalities. From the late sixties till the 
early nineties there was no doubt that economic development has been one 
of the pillars of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Espousing a model of export 
driven economies, with closed domestic markets and no room for import 
substitution, these economies achieved a high degree of growth. This has 
been a crucial factor for the cohesiveness of the ASEAN. 
Financial Crisis and ASEAN 
The 1997 financial crisis has had an impact that is asserting itself 
even today. As a result of this, members had become more inward looking in 
the process of trying to deal with both their economic recovery as well as 
12. Ibid, 
13. Tabias Nischalke, "Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post-Cold War Diplomacy and the idea of 
Regional Community", The Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. I, 2002, p. 93. 
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maintaining political stability.''* Moreover, there was also the emergence of 
bilateral tension and weakening of intra-ASEAN ties. There has been some 
criticism that aftermath of crisis, the ASEAN had been unable to provide 'a 
united front in dealing with the challenges of globalisation'.'^ Thus this 
financial crisis led a debate on the globalisation - between the groups who 
advocated greater globalisation as a part of the efforts to build deeper 
economic ties with the west, such as Singapore and Philippines and those 
who felt that some countries were left far more affected than the rest -
Indonesia was of this opinion. These divergent views among the members 
led to the strain within the regional organization such as the ASEAN, APEC 
and the furtherance of AFTA. 
The zeal of ASEAN as a regional entity can be seen to the fact that 
the region has begun to address these issues and also find space for 
maneuvering within the given set of circumstances. The issue was raised at 
the APEC Ministerial meeting in October 2003 at Bangkok, which set up the 
Economic and Technical Cooperation. They also look into economic 
development and set in place measures to address the problems relating to it. 
One such measure was the furthering of the ASEAN Plus rhrcc process -
which began as an initiative to address macro-economic risk management, 
with an emphasis on strengthening the banking and financial sector, and 
reform of international finance structure.'^ The Northeast Asian Three 
14. Kusuma Suitwongse, "A New world Order in East Asia?", Asia Pacific Review, vol. 10, No. 2, 
November 2003, p. 44. 
15. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, London, Routledge, 
2001, p.6. 
16. Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN Ten Plus Three: An Evolving East Asian community?". Pacific 
Forum - Comparative Connections, 4"' Quarter, January 2001, see at 
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/004Qchina_asean.html. 
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(China, Japan and South Korea) want ASEAN involvement in any 
agreement because they are not content with an agreement among 
themselves due to their historical and political baggage. More specific issues 
and challenges • for ASEAN Plus Three are how it will move from its 
financial strength, which underpinned its currency swaps and monetary 
integration, to formalizing a trade arrangement.'^ Equally challenging is the 
question of where ASEAN Plus Three leadership will reside - in Japan, 
China, ASEAN Ten or some co-joined effort to identify opportunities in the 
1 O 
context of the emerging international political economy. 
ASEAN Brotherhood 
In the ASEAN region, as elsewhere, the primary responsibility of 
the governments is still to their own nations, and not to the region as a 
whole. Yet, national leaders concerned themselves with regional vision. This 
is not because of an intrinsic commitment to the region as such but because 
political stability and economic welfare of each state depends in part on 
continuing stability and welfare in the neighbouring states. It seems that 
they are aware that political upheaval and economic decline in one state or 
in its part can threaten the well-being and security of the other states in the 
region.' Moreover, development or growth by part may eventually 
contribute to both national growth as well as regional stability. Today the 
more developed members of ASEAN are helping the new members through 
enhanced trade and investment. Thus, intra-ASEAN capacity building is 
ASEAN's main aim. They understood that to maintain ASEAN's clout in 
17, Linda Low, no. 2. 
18, Ibid. 
19, Abul Kalam, no. 1, pp. 118-119, 
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the international forums, it is imperative that old and new members do not 
have 'development gap'. On the other hand, since its inception ASEAN 
member states have considered ethnic and religious separatism as internal 
affairs of a state, thus ASEAN has to keep out of it. However, with the 
growing interdependent nature of society, lines between national and 
transnational issues are blurring. So there are suggestions of ASEAN's role 
in the national matters of the member states termed as 'flexible 
engagement'. Though majority of member states did not want to deviate 
from well established norms in principles of ASEAN 
To sum up one can say that ASEAN ways is based on a number of 
pillars including consensus through long process of consultation, 
informality, non-interference in the internal affairs and non-use offeree. In 
the post-Cold War period as members realized, it is difficult to keep external 
powers from interfering in the region, they devised the way of 'constructive 
engagement'. Over the years ASEAN Ways is regarded as having 
contributed to stable relations among members. Most of these factors are not 
unique to Southeast Asia, but how they have been adapted by members is 
what makes all the differences. 
The State of Cooperation in South Asia 
The people of South Asian region, like other regions are also 
attempting to share their experiences in addressing their common problem 
through South Asian Associations for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The 
seven nations that comprise SAARC are bounded by geographical 
contiguity, common culture and ethnic and religious ties. 
20. Bharti Chhibber, Regional Security and Regional Cooperation : A Comparative Study of ASEAN 
and SAARC, New Delhi, New Century Publication, 2004, p. 281. 
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Thirteen summits a host of cooperation programmes, regional 
conventions on a variety of issues ranging from terrorism, narcotics, 
initiation of a free trade area, agreement on social charter and most recently 
opening its permanent membership for Afghanistan and observer status for 
China and Japan, SAARC has witnessed an eventual adolescence. But "all 
through SAARC's history the conspicuous absence of a genuine climate of 
political trust is seen".'^' 
South Asia has invited more negative appraisal than positive 
appreciation by academicians and policy makers with regard to regional 
cooperation. This is because "several differed summits, limited intra-
regional trade, continued Indo-Pakistan tensions, incomplete national 
integration process, reversal of democratic process in most countries, 
perceived role of extra-regional actors and the continued threat of terrorism 
and intra-regional security threats demonstrate the multiple challenges yet 
awaiting regional agreement and responses". Hence regional cooperation 
in South Asia is loaded with possibilities and challenges. 
The expectations from the SAARC since the initial phase have not 
been very high ~ "it can easily flounder under the strain of contradiction thai 
abound in the region". For some, the region remains a fragmented entity, 
characterized by 'desegregated levels of power potential, strategic 
dissonance and political complexities".'^'' The functioning of SAARC has led 
2 ]. Syed Ali Mujtaba, Soundings on South Asia, New Delhi, New Dawn Press, 2005, p. 199. 
22. Madhavi Bhasin, "South Asian Cooperation: Myth and Realities", India Quarterly, Vol. LXII, 
NO. 1, January-March, 2006, pp. 21-43. 
23. Times of India, 10 December 1987. 
24. Nancy Jetly, "Transformation of Conflictual Dynamics into Dynamics of Peace and 
Development in SAARC Region", Paper presented in the 'International Seminar on SAARC-
2000 and Beyond', India International Centre, New Delhi, 22-24 March 1997. 
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to such disappointments that L.K. Lai suggests: "Since so little seems to be 
going right for SAAR right now, disbanding it amicably may appear a 
tempting option. After all, why has an organization that does not ensure 
regional security, has not grown into an economic group, and has no 
potential of evolving into a forum for bilateral dialogue between member 
countries".•^^ 
South Asia : An Undefined Region 
The term South Asia is of recent origin and the region defies a 
clear-cut demarcation. Peter Lyon has called South Asia a 'region without 
regionalism'. Sanjay Baru considers the notion of South Asia itself as a 
dubious geo-political construct of recent origin.^ '^ The area possesses 
'geographical contiguity' if Mayanmar and Afghanistan are included, and 
'geographical compactness' if left out. The area of South Asia however, is 
not quite so clear cut, not only are the systemic and foreign policy 
orientation of its constituents asymmetrical but even its geography leads 
debate in calling it a region.^' Michael Brecher has used the term 'Southern 
Asia' to describe the region, which comprises of 18 countries. Bhabani 
Sengupta considers Iran a South Asian power; and for Perry Thornton, 
Afghanistan is a South Asia states. Due to these divergences in delimiting 
South Asia, it is considered to be inherently flawed as a geo-strategic 
28 
construct. 
25. L.K. Lai, "South Asian Sphere - Nowhere to Go", Himal January 2003, See at 
http://www.himalmag.com/2003/january/southasiasphere,html. 
26. Sanjay Baru, "Indian Neighbourhood: Economic and Cultural, not Physical", Times of India, 5 
February 2000. 
27 . See, Parthasarthy Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi, Manohar, 1989. 
28. Kapil Kak, "Geo-strategic Realities of South Asia", World Focus, Vol. 22, No. 9, September 
2001, p. 5-8. 
138 
Political Economy of Regionalization: ASEAN and SAARC 
Objectives 
In Security 
In Economic 
Cooperation 
In Promoting Growth 
Degree/Nature of 
Power of Regional 
Organizations 
Institutional 
Structures 
Source : Ananya Muk 
ASEAN 
To prevent superpower 
interference 
To maintain peace in the region 
To facilitate regional trade 
To foster vertical and horizontal 
integrated production processes 
amongst member countries; each 
member specialized in 
producing a certain component 
of the final product 
Because of the historical success 
of centralized decision-making 
in East Asia, member states 
believe in the power and 
legitimacy of centralized 
agencies 
The "ethos of regionalism is 
very strong for reasons of ethnic 
homogeneity, small size, 
inadequacy of resources and a 
perceived vulnerability to 
superpower intervention 
Formation of the Asian 
Industrial project (AlP) which 
allocates different industrial 
projects to different member 
states - in order to prevent 
competition between member 
states and foster preferential 
trading ASEAN Industrial Joint 
Ventures (AIJV), which has 
called mote for private-sector 
involvement relative to the AIP, 
ASEAN chambers of Commerce 
(ACC) coordinate activities of 
private sectors of members 
states 
lerjee Reed, "Reeionalization in S 
SAARC 
Smaller States: Prevent hegemonic 
behaviour by India 
India: to establish its hegemony 
and mobilize collective behaviour 
for increasing its strength in forums 
like the GATT and the WTO 
SAARC was not supposed to 
interfere in any bilateral issues 
Not clear 
Such vertical and horizontal 
integration not possible because of 
the similarity of skills and 
resources amongst member 
countries. 
Because of the history of state 
formation in the region (which 
consisted in the separation of India 
into India and Pakistan, and then 
the division of Pakistan into 
Pakistan and Bangladesh - each 
time with a war - the "ethos" of 
separatism is very strong in the 
region. A number of secessionist 
conflicts continues in this region -
the Sri Lankan conflict, the Indo-
Pakistani disagreements over 
Kashmir, the terrorist separatism 
movement in Punjab, etc. 
After twenty years since its 
formation SAARC has put in place 
the South Asian Preferential Trade 
Agreement (SAPTA) and South 
Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) 
More emphasis on private-sector 
competition 
No coordinating mechanisms 
outh Asia: Theory and Praxis", 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, summer 1997, p. 249. 
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However, it is important here to discern that regions are artificial 
construction; there are no pre-conceived regions. So the flexibility of the 
notion of South Asia is not abnormal, regions grow and change dimensions 
over a span of time and with increasing exchanges'.^^ Each region 
constructed either on economic, political or cultural basis is prone to have 
different functions and its functionality is specific and therefore necessarily 
too different.^° Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that South Asia 
is a region and SAARC is a regional organization. SAARC is one regional 
organization in the large region of South Asia and does not claim exclusivity 
of South Asian regional representation. Forces of globalisation are creating 
overlapping regional identities and therefore the EU is still expanding its 
membership. Likewise China, Mayanmar, Afghanistan and Iran are 
increasingly identifying themselves with South Asian concerns and interests. 
Thus softness and elasticity of regional borders should not give rise to 
doubts over South Asia's regional claims. 
Economic Cooperation in South Asia 
With the trade and investment being guided by trans-national 
factors, economic regionalism has emerged as the driving force, for 
sustaining economic networking around the globe. In this background, lack 
of cooperation in South Asia is attributed to the poor rate of economic 
development and absence of economic complementarities among the states 
of the region. Srinivasan, using a gravity model, has concluded that most of 
the pre-conditions needed to enhance the probability of a successful free 
29. Madhvi Bhasin, no. 22. 
30. See Anil Kumar Sing, India's Security Concerns in the Indian Ocean Region, Deiiii, Har Anand 
Publication, 2003. 
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trade agreement were not present in South Asia. These are: high pre-
arrangement tariff; high level of trade before any arrangement; the existence 
of complementary rather than competitive trade; and differences in 
economic structures based on competitiveness. Further, the economic 
features of South Asian economic interaction do not exhibit an encouraging 
picture: (a) restrictive trade policies; (b) lack of information; (c) resource 
constraint and thus dependence on external aid, which in turn, is tried to 
imports from aid donors; (d) non-availability of exportable surpluses of 
desired specifications; (e) high cost of production; (f) inadequate transit 
facilities and transport network; (g) imbalance of trade; (h) lack of 
standardization of documentation and complexity of procedures.•'^ 
I'he Indo-ccnlric nature of SAARC is often considered to be the 
stumbling block in the promotion of regionalism. India accounts for three 
quarter of landmass, population and gross domestic product. Since India 
shares its border with most of the countries of the region, the success of the 
SAARC rest on the role and initiative that India takes in fostering closer ties 
with its neighbours. But the primary reason behind this chequered relation is 
that the other stales in the region have not accepted India's supremacy. The 
smaller states therefore face a peculiar dilemma on the one hand, they need 
India's support to resist foreign economic encroachment into South Asia, 
and on the other hand, they are convinced that the required support from 
India would be available only at the cost of accepting India's economic 
31. Kelagama Samana "A New Direction for SAARC: An Economic Perspective", South Asian 
Survey, Vol. 9, No. 2. 
32. Kelagama Samana, "SAPTA and its Future" in Nancy Jetly and Eric Gonsalves, eds., Dynamics 
of South Asia : Regional Cooperation and SAARC, New Delhi, Sage Publication, 1999, p. 176. 
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dominance. This however, is a situation similar to Japan in the context of 
ASEAN. Two basic differences between the SAARC and the ASEAN must 
be pointed out in this context. First, India could not, and still can not, 
provide capital, technology and market access as Japan did. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, one must take into account the extent to which 
regions reflect "ethos" of regionalism. ASEAN's member states are more 
homogenous, in particular ethnologically; South Asian states on the other 
hand, have been founded on the basis of ethnic differences.^'' 
Despite major economic challenges, economic cooperation in South 
Asia still has gained momentum. The countries of the region have realized 
that economic sustainability is assured through collective efforts. In the 
course of various SAARC summits a great amount of economic will has 
been shown, despite political differences. It is being dreamt that SAARC 
could become a vehicle to integrate the regional economy where India's 
coal, Pakistan's cotton, and Bangladesh's jute can become the bedrock of 
the economic cooperation.^^ 
The economic impediments faced by South Asia arc grave but 
sincere collective attempts are underway to ride the global economic high 
tide. Trade complementarities are being created through joint venture in the 
region. Bangladesh's achievement in population control and rural credit, Sri 
Lanka's breakthrough in education and recent economic reforms by India 
and Pakistan provide useful lesson in regional development. Trade in South 
Asia has grown from US $ 1.2 billion in 1980s to $ 7 billion in 2004. The 
33. Ananya Mukherjee Reed, "Regionalisation in South Asia: Theory and Praxis", Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 70, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 235-251. 
34. Ibid. 
35. SyedAliMujtaba, no. 21,p. 200. 
142 
projected figures for South Asian GDP growth in 2004-05 was 7.2 per cent 
making it the second fastest growing region in the world after China. The 
regional exports are likely to grow at a robust rate of 12 per cent. ' As a 
result of liberalization policies, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have 
also increased. In recent years, South Asia has emerged as one of the most 
dynamic regions of the world economic system. South Asia has maintained 
an average growth rate of above 5.5 percent over the past two decades and 
has demonstrated its potential for emerging as a significant economic entity 
in the world of economic space.'''' 
Bilateralism and SAARC 
SAARC, the forum to bring the seven nations of South Asia from 
conflict to cooperation has covered considerable ground since its inception 
in 1985. Bilateral Free Trade Areas (FTAs) has led to expansion of trade 
flows, and initiation of SAFTA holds much promise. The India-Sri Lanka 
FTA saw India's exports to the island nation jump from $ 500 million in 
2000-01 to $ 1.3 billion in 2003-04. Recently Pakistan and Bangladesh have 
also started negotiation for a bilateral FTA to be initiated soon. The canvas 
of economic cooperation is now wide-ranging covering areas such as 
investment promotion and protection, avoidance of double taxation, 
harmonization in customs procedures and documentation to name but a 
T O 
few. SAFTA is expected to help in evolving a horizontal specialization 
across the region to enable most optimal utilization of the synergies between 
member countries for theirmutual advantages. The economic potential of 
36. Madhvi Bhasin, no. 22, p. 30. 
37. Ibid. 
38. l.K. Gujral, Special Address on "Building a South Asian Century" at SAARC Economic 
Cooperation conference, 2004. See at http://www.ficci.com/flcci.index.htm 
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Post Liberalization Investment Policies of SAARC Countries 
BANGLADESH 
allows up to 100 percent foreign ownership of equity. There is no 
restriction on investment except for five reserved sectors. 
INDIA 
allows up to 51 percent foreign ownership of equity. In some cases, 75 
per cent and 100 per cent may also be allowed. 
SRI LANKA 
seems to have attracted the most Indian investment towards joint 
ventures. At the end of 1995, there were 30 Indian Joint Ventures (JVs) 
of which 13 were under operation. Most importantly, about 50 percent 
of those operations are engaged in manufacturing and service sectors, 
all of which seem to be growth industries. Total investment amounts to 
Rs. 770 million ($ 30 m). 
IN NEPAL 
foreign investors are allowed a majority stake in medium industries 
(asset limit Rs. 10 million to 50 million) and can invest up to 100 
percent in large enterprises (exceeding Rs. 50m). Foreign investment is 
welcome in every sector except in the manufacture of cigarettes, 
defence and alcohol. 
PAKISTAN 
has also adopted a liberal investment policy with legal safeguards for 
guaranteed repatriation of foreign capital. However, her policy 
regarding India is still on the defensive. Other countries have free 
access to its markets while there are restrictions on India. 
Source : Assocham, Bulletin, SAARC Files, September 1995, pp. 19-27. 
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the region has led to the launching of sub-regional (South Asian Growth 
Quadrilateral) and trans-regional (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation - BIMSTEC) economic 
ventures, though these partnerships are still in the embryonic stage. 
However, despite an impressive track record, a more meaningful 
cooperation among the South Asian countries still remains a distant dream. 
Since the beginning, SAARC has been plagued by tensions from within, 
which could be attributed to multiple factors. The prominent one being the 
colonial legacy which bore heavily on the newly independent states. The 
'legal of British imperialism and its impact on state formation in South Asia 
have produced an almost permanent set of relations that pre-empt regional 
economic cooperation'.'^ As a result, since its inception in 1985, SAARC 
remained, for a long time, a somewhat defunct political organization. 
Because, since the development of their national identities in the course of 
defining their sovereignty, social, political and economic problems started 
surfacing in these countries. A general thread running in the entire region 
was the Indian involvement. All countries were over awed due to India's 
unique position in South Asia. India occupies more than 70 per cent of Ihc 
region. It contribution to the total GDP is 73 per cent. India accounts for 59 
per cent of region's imports and 67 per cent of its export.''^ 
The concept of SAARC, therefore became inextricably woven into 
the matrix of bilateral relations. However, there remained inherent weakness 
in SAARC policy as its Article 10 (General Provision) prohibits discussion 
39. Ananya Mukherjee Reed, no. 33. 
40. Syed Ali Mujtaba, no. 21, p. 204. 
145 
of bilateral and contentious issue; as opposite to the ASEAN policy of 
'behind the scene consultation' and 'presenting ASEAN as an economic 
association' despite dealing their bilateral and multilateral differences in the 
initial years/' This clause was set to ally apprehensions that the forum may 
not be used as an anti-Indian platform, and also of suspicion that SAARC as 
a bloc may not be used by India to promote its own leadership. These 
attitudes were partly encouraged by the powers external to the region and 
feeling that 'sleeping with an elephant' is not comfortable/^ 
The unsolved problem of international land and maritime 
boundaries, resource sharing, ethno-religious conflict, refugees' problem, 
security concern was some common problems in South Asia. Frequent 
border skirmishes between India and Bangladesh, the ongoing debate 
between Nepal and Bhutan over the refugee issue, the irritant in relations 
between India and Nepal over the open border, general disputes and other 
sporadic events have constrained the growth of regional cooperation. 
India-Bangladesh relations centers on water sharing, delimitation of 
land boundary, maritime assets and propriety of Talpatty Island, Trade and 
transit interests and power project come in way of India Nepal relations. 
India and Sri Lanka may have narrowed their differences over Tamil issues, 
but remained at odds over the fishermen problem, Tamil refugees and 
ownership of Kachatheevu Island.''•^ 
41 Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, "Statement on Experiences of ASEAN and Prospects of ASEAN-
SAARC Cooperation", in Kant Kishore Bhargavai, et al., eds, Shaping South Asia's future . 
Role of Regional Cooperation, New Delhi, Vikas Publisliing House, 1995, p. 99. 
42 MS Rajan, Recent Essays on India's Foreign Policy, Delhi, Kalinga Publication, 199'', p. 191. 
43 Syed Ali Mujtaba, no 21, p. 205. 
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The economic imbalances of South Asian countries hamper smooth 
functioning of SAARC. India's resources base and economic potentialities 
leads to apprehension that once the trade barriers are removed, Indian goods 
would swamp the market of smaller countries of the region. However, it is 
deep mistrust between India and Pakistan, particularly over Kashmir and its 
corollary as cross border terrorism, which has greatly undermined the 
growth of SAARC as regional body. 
It is well known that bilateral tensions among the South Asian 
countries are the formidable barrier to the growth of SAARC. Hitherto, it is 
realized that SAARC may not achieve its desired goal without harmonizing 
the bilateral irritants. A consensus is emerging that bilateral problem among 
the SAARC countries should be discussed by widcnjng thc^  scope of 
SAARC. To make SAARC functional, the forum could be utilized to solve 
bilateral tensions which are causing impediments to SAARC's growth.'*'' 
The then Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga gave vent 
to this thought as underscoring the need for discussing political issues, 
bilaterally or multilaterally, as they pose serious impediment towards 
building a climulc of cooperation in the region. She insisted that SAARC 
must sit together even without either one - India or Pakistan - if a case of 
postponement arise due to non-participation of any one of the above.''^ Mrs. 
Kumaratunga emphasized that without getting contentions issues out of the 
way, or substantially diluting their impact, a whole-hearted commitment to 
the lofty goals of SAARC would remain a pipedream.'*^ 
44. Ibid. 
45. President Chandriica Kumarathanga's address at tlie JO* SAARC Summit in Colombo, July 31, 
1998 
46 Ibid 
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NATURE OF SAARC 
Is 
A functional approach to 
regionalism; 
An extension of national 
efforts for development 
and a shared endeavour 
for proceeding towards 
collective self-reliance; 
A cooperative venture on 
limited areas, the benefits 
of which may be largely 
intangible in the short 
run. 
Is not 
A panacea to all the 
problems that faces the 
region; 
A creation of any external 
push; a form of 'ganging 
up' against any individual 
member; , 
An opportunity to pursue 
anyone's parochial 
national interests, not an 
instrument of domination 
of one by another; 
An avenue for any 
external influence, either 
political or economic or 
otherwise. 
Can be 
A forum for wide ranging 
areas of cooperation 
transcending the so called 
'sanitized' areas; 
A platform for tension 
diffusion and crisis 
management; 
A catalyst for regional 
peace harmony and 
development and mutual 
equality and trust. 
Source : Ranabir Samaddar, Whose Asia is it Anyway? Region and Nations in South Asia, 
Kolkata, Pearl Publishers, 1996, p. 66. 
SAARC mad some attempt to reduce regional tensions by offering 
its forum to discuss ethnic strife in Sri Lanka and moderate the Indo-Pak 
differences. SAARC discussed the regional action plan concerning 
Himalayan river water resources and succeed in making India and Pakistan 
avoid double taxation on bilateral trade and also help them to initiate 
cultural exchanges. However, these achievements are minuscule compared 
to the differences that persist among the nations on bilateral issues. 
Given the fact that South Asian countries belong to the group of 
developing and least developed countries, economic cooperation may take 
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time to start off but cannot be labeled failure. But this depends on forward 
movement in the evolving intra-regional world order and further it has to 
evaluate why it has failed to break the barriers of nation states and why it is 
unable to evolve an integrated regional personality as yet. The general 
perception is that bilateral tensions remains SAARC's Achilles heel and 
unless it is not ironed out, SAARC would remain a forum of periodic 
meeting of the head of the states. 
Sub-regionalism in South Asia 
Unhappy with the slow paced progress of SAARC, the idea of sub-
regional grouping in the eastern region of South Asia is being pronounced. 
The lead is taken by the Indian Chamber of Commerce which is vociferously 
selling the concept of sub-regionalism within South Asia. This comprises 
India's eastern states and northeast region along with Nepal, Bhutan, 
Bangladesh and Mayanmar and dubbed as South Asian Growth Quadrangle 
(SAGQ). 
As to the response from those countries not proposed as member 
beneficiaries of the growth mechanism, Pakistan has already expressed its 
deep reservation about it. Islamabad is opposed in principle to the concept of 
sub-regional grouping within the framework of SAARC. According to her it 
is being developed with the ulterior motive to weaken South Asian 
cooperation. The perception is thus strong in Pakistan that SAGQ is just "a 
play by New Delhi to destroy SAARC and firm up its grip over the 
region"."*' 
47. Amanullah, "Controversies dog regional Ideas", Holiday, 9 May 1997. 
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Colombo, which maintains "excellent relations" with India and 
tends to perceive Indo-Sri Lankan relations "at its zenith", nevertheless 
categorically stated, "we feel it is perfectly all right to enter into any 
bilateral agreements by four SAARC members, but it could undermine the 
regional forum"/^ Chandrika, therefore, supported the view of the Pakistani 
and Maldivian leaders that, the establishment of sub-regional groupings 
could adversely affect the regional forum. 
Of the external actors, China seems inclined to feel that there can 
hardly be any cooperation on Brahmaputra basin, without China being 
included in it. But China is not unmindful about it, as the Chinese 
ambassador in Dhaka is quoted saying: we are closely watching the 
development. We do not truly understand it".'*^ 
Even Nepal, presumably an early convert to the idea and is known 
to have offered initial "Approach Paper" has raised questions about the 
transparency in the subregional forum. As a SAARC observer in Kathmandu 
said, "If the subregion is to go ahead without bruising the sensitivities of our 
neighbours, there is a need for absolute transparency. Or else it would 
undermine the spirit of cooperation we have painstakingly harnessed 
through SAARC".^^ 
If we dash entire political gimmick then what we see that there are 
very impressive static for the natural reserve in this region. The entire region 
is a storehouse of abundant natural resources and untapped natural beauty. A 
48. Sugeeswara Senadhira, "Chandrika to voice opposition to subregional groupings", The daily 
Star, 13 May 1997. 
49. Amanullah, no. 47. 
50. Ibid. 
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large chunk of South Asia's natural wealth, be it coal, iron ore, bauxite, 
limestone, oil, natural gas, bamboo, agricultural product, lies in this region. 
It is being increasingly realized that given the right initiative, the region 
could complete more astoundingly than in the framework of S A ARC. 
The eastern and northeastern states of India, if seen in isolation, 
constitute one of the poorest regions in the world. There is little private 
investment and indigenous entrepreneurial spirit remains shifted in the 
region. On the contrary, if the same region is viewed in totality, then it is 
found to be richly endowed with natural resources. Given the right kind of 
infrastructure, investment, government initiative and information network, 
these states have high potential in terms of all round development. If the 
neighbouring countries, Nepal, Bangladesh, Mayamnar and Bhutan were to 
economically linked with these states, the subregion can emerge as a 
formidable economic hub within South Asia.^' 
The Indian Chamber of Commerce has put forward its suggestions 
before the Indian Government to draw out the advantages of the region and 
reap its bounties. It has proposed to declare the northeast region a special 
economic zone and to integrate this subregion with the proposed Asian 
Highway. 
However, there are many bottlenecks in the development of such 
regional groupings. Unless a broad consensus emerges within respective 
government to harmonise their policies, this concept of subregional 
grouping may take time to evolve. At the level of public opinion, conflict of 
interest in all the countries of the subregion has to be harmonized and the 
51. SyedAliMujtaba, no. 21,p. 112. 
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people must feel convinced. In similar fashion, the bond of nature and 
environment is such that the public sentiment can be won over in favour of 
cooperative understanding. This argument may be that none of the smaller 
South Asian countries can truly prosper separately from India, though each 
of them can in some measure, drag India down. 
Conflicting Political Structures 
It is generally argued that issues of cooperation are held hostage to 
the primacy of political forces in the region. Issues of 'low polities', which 
add positive momentum to cooperative efforts elsewhere, are politicized in 
South Asia complicating the process of cooperation. Political structures of 
South Asian countries are at variance, which is considered to complicate the 
consensus making process. Despite a shared past, the region lacks the 
cohesiveness provided by a common political system or an ideology. 
Fostering cooperation among nations is a political task and thus 
cannot be depoliticised. Regional cooperation has been traditionally driven 
by political forces around the globe. While economic institutions may have 
provided the core mechanism, as in the EU, the essential motivation was the 
political.^'' But political forces in South Asia are in a state of flux responding 
to multiple national, regional and global challenges; consequently, trends of 
cooperation are experiencing fluctuations. South Asian nations are 
'experimenting with dirigist variety of regionalism, where distribution of 
52. AbdulKalam.no. l,p. 184. 
53. Gowhar Rizvi, South Asia in a Changing International Scenario, New Delhi, Sage Publication, 
1993. 
54. E. Gonsalves, "South Asia and Emerging World Order" in Sankar and Somen, eds.. Emerging 
South Asian Order: Hopes and Concerns, Calcutta, Media South Asia, 1995. 
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gains carries an added significance'.^^ Such cooperation necessitates greater 
political direction than other varieties, creating an ever-closer link between 
political and non-political factors. Once the clouds of political turmoil 
recede, cooperation in the region will gain a natural momentum. In the 
interim, the solution is not dissociating cooperation from political regulation 
but the simultaneous nurturing of cooperation and political will so that one 
reinforce the other.^^ 
The regression of democratic forces in the region is cited as a major 
political constraint that complicates the task of cooperation. No doubt 
democratization in South Asia is bound to have important implication for 
the future of regional cooperation. This will be so in terms of growth of 
political stability and economic viability of SAARC countries and also 
impact on inter-state relation within the region.^^ But the theory of 
'democratic peace' is overenthusiastically applied in South Asia as the 
divergence in nature of political institutions is a cited as a major hurdle in 
fostering cooperation. Most of the critics overlook the fact that SAARC was 
proposed by a military regime in Bangladesh, Pakistan was headed by a 
military dictator; Bhutan was a royal monarchy and Nepal was under 
Panchayati rule in 1985 when the first concrete step in the direction of 
regional cooperation was inaugurated.^^ None of these political institutions 
represented popular will in the conventional sense nor did any institutional 
convergence exist among them. 
55. Madhvi Bhasin, no. 22. 
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57. Citha D. Maass, "South Asia Drawn between Conflict and Cooperation", in Nancy Jetly and 
Erich Gonsalves, eds., no. 32. 
58. Madhvi Bhasin, no. 22. 
153 
One positive aspect of regional process in South Asia is that it is to 
some extent unaffected with the domestic politics of the nations in the 
region. In other words, nature and form of cooperation in South Asia has not 
witnessed any great transformation or interruption owing to changes in 
domestic politics. Routine policy shift are visible, but no dictatorial regime 
has ever threatened to withdraw from the regional organization or question 
the rationale of cooperation.^^ Regional summits may be postponed, but the 
process of regional cooperation has not been reversed in response to any 
non-democratic regime change in the regional states. Though, most of the 
impact is generated and maintained at the rhetorical level. Democracy is to 
be encouraged and promoted in South Asia but particular varieties can not 
be imposed on the countries. But one must keep in mind that the democratic 
fervour in South Asia offers hope not so much in terms of dramatic changes 
in the existing pattern of inter-state relations as in terms of improved 
political climate and incremental generation of mutual good-will.^° 
SAARC - Recapitulation 
The basic premise on which SAARC was founded is somehow 
showing signs of validation. While shaping the SAARC initiative during 
early 1980s, it was assumed that by activating cooperative cultural identities 
and economic interests, political conflicts and tensions in South Asia could 
be moderated, if not completely eliminated. Not that SAARC has got firmly 
entrenched into the economic and sociocultural cooperative ventures in the 
manner evident in North America (NAFTA), Europe (EU), Southeast Asia 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid. 
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(ASEAN) or Asia-Pacific (APEC). And neither have political conflicts in 
South Asia, such as between India and Pakistan, been resolved or reduced 
significantly. But there are unmistakable signs of promise to South Asian 
regional affairs. SAARC stands at a critical stage of its evolution where, 
given the right push, it can overcome past constraints and barriers to emerge 
as a dynamic factor in the peace and prosperity of more than a billion South 
Asians. 
Regional cooperation in South Asia encounters problems and 
promises. It is imperative to state that all challenges confronting the process 
are not myth or over-hyped delusion. Many are real obstacles which have 
slowed the pace of regional cooperation and checked harmonious regional 
understanding to flourish. The difficulties hardly constitute an 
insurmountable barrier and the general impasses in South Asian scenario is 
mercifully not an immutable phenomenon.^' 
For recognizing genuine challenges confronting cooperation, the 
distinctiveness of the process in the region should not be viewed as a 
problem. Cooperation in South Asia is being fostered under the rubric of 
regionalism; and, more so under post-1990 trend of 'new regionalism'. 
Cooperation has taken a particular region-specific course rather than the 
widely proclaimed global version of harmonizing inter-state relations. 
Cooperation has to be tailored to regional realities and forces; and hence 
particular challenges and responses to cooperation are obvious and should 
not be viewed as deviation from a rigidly constructed cooperative theory.^^ 
61. Rajin Mahan, "The Nature of South Asian Region - Assonant Affinities, Dissonant Diversities" 
.. in S.N. Kaushik, et al., (eds.)., India and South Asia, New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 1991, 
pp. 26-27. 
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However, in an age of economic striving and cooperative security, 
certainly a sustained growth for South Asia is the most desired goal. The 
question arises: how to attain this goal? The objectives of regional peace 
and/or subregional cooperation would remain illusive unless pursued by an 
appropriate strategy of management. Before working towards regional 
growth each country should, first of all, strive towards attaining its national 
consensus. For, efforts towards regional integration or economic growth can 
hardly occur in a political void.^'' 
Indeed, there can be no growth without national consensus, and 
launching of any amount of "growth" mechanism without a national 
consensus could only be more divisive, detrimental to the very cause for 
which such mechanism is proposed. As to the structure of cooperation, the 
provision for Action Committee and a project-wise approach, as is provided 
in the SAARC Charter (Article 7) seems to provide the right yardstick. It 
does allow the scope for seeking a framework for lower level economic 
integration. The concerned governments should not be acting as stumbling 
block to lower level economic growth, which tends to have a spillover 
effects that may incorporate entire region in different segment. 
The logic of cooperation in South Asia, whether at the regional or 
subregional level, depends on diplomacy in its right earnest and calls for 
statesmanship. It also requires a climate of steady good will and sustained 
confidence internally and that, too, needs to be pursued simultaneously with 
all the countries in the region - something that very often is not taken into 
63. Hans H. Indorf, Impediments to regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among 
ASEAN Member States, Singapore, Institute of Soutiieast Asian Studies, 1984, p. 9. 
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account.^ '* Regrettably, impulsive patterns of politics and amblyopic 
decisions by the concerned leadership continue to shatter the hope of 
cooperation. 
It would be a diabolic to keep the peace process hostage in South 
Asia till India becomes invincible or Pakistan vanquishes India. History 
suggests that both countries have no other option than to reconcile to the 
existing realities and put a stop to the unhealthy competition of hating each 
other. The need is to roll down the sleeves, and work out a long-term 
regional peace plan with the support of other regional entities and great 
powers.^^ 
A logical step would be to establish a culture of peace and stability 
first and then start a meaningful dialogue at the bilateral and multilateral 
level to sort out the regional differences. The removal of political 
differences is the first and foremost requirement for moving towards a 
meaningful regional cooperation. The second aspect should be to highlight 
the importance of economic development, human security and other facets 
of unity by recognizing the common regional identity. Then there is need to 
evolve the concept of regional security and agree to respect each others 
territorial sovereignty.^^ 
Looked at it from the conceptual point of view, it may be asserted 
that every prudent South Asian having sense of history and faith in common 
destiny cannot but be supportive of regional cooperation and integration. No 
one can be so blind as to overlook the immensurable prospects that such 
64. Abul Kalam, no. I, p. 188. 
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cooperative and growth ventures to the teeming millions of hapless South 
Asian people. 
In order that the regional process may evolve fruitfully as a process 
and to apply the necessary art to see to its consummation, the concerned 
nations and the South Asian people as a whole need both dynamism and 
mutual accommodation. Leaders are there everywhere in South Asia, some 
elected some inherited. But there is a famine in South Asia of leadership 
with vision and perspective, and there is also the missing link of the art and 
management. But that is not impossible to overcome if there is leadership 
with a perspective and vision, with an insight about the national interests to 
be pursued and a foresight about the future dividend that would benefit all 
people in the region.''^ 
All this requires toning down of religious and national identity and 
acceptance of over arching pan-south Asian identity. The simple logic is, as 
an individual each nation remains vulnerable but in combination they make 
a formidable force. Regional cooperation in South Asia conceivably, with its 
potential attributes of modified structuralism, as has been experienced in 
East and Southeast Asia, cold well have served as an economic magnet to 
bring the people together in a bottom up approach of production and growth. 
Similarly, regionalism at upper level could have followed the federalism of 
the EU order to bring the states closer to each other. Both would have 
contributed to the integration process from two different but convergent 
levels.^^ Thus functionalism and federalism combining at the upper level of 
67. AbulKalam, no. l ,p. 191. 
68. Ibid. 
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SAARC entity and modified structuralism integrating at a lower level would 
have combined to help the subcontinent move away from the baggage of 
history so as to recreate new consciousness based on interdependent 
development. 
It seems thai with the dawn of new century, the frozen relationship 
among the South Asian countries has started melting. It remains to be seen 
how fast it may take closer to the vision of a South Asian Union. As this 
moment, pessimism and hope simultaneously thrive as soundings on South 
Asia. 
Chapter - Five 
Conclusion and Suggestions 
CHAPTER: F I V E 
CONCLUSION A N D SUGGESTIONS 
In the present study an effort has been made to analyse the concept 
of region, regional cooperation, sub-regional development and tried to gain a 
theoretical understanding of these concepts. With this background this work 
further examines the inter-relationship between regional association and 
regional economic development in Southeast Asia and South Asia through a 
comparative study of ASEAN and SAARC. In this regard present study has 
comparatively analysed intra-regional as well as extra-regional forces 
behind regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and South Asia. 
The end of 20"^  century is marked by profound changes in the 
structure of international relations. The revolution in science and technology 
has resulted in the shortening of distance. The rise of 'issue areas' has 
further led to an age of stronger international interdependence. The response 
of states to these developments can be seen in the process of internal and 
external adjustment in all spheres - economic, political and military. The 
dimension of external adjustment is manifested in the process of regional 
association, which is gaining ground steadily since the Second World War 
Today, with the end of Cold War, this movement towards regional 
cooperation seems to have gained new impetus. The end of bipolar 
confrontation has led to a reduction in tension and ideological strife, paving 
the way for a rapid expansion of inter-state ties. 
Both intra-regional and extra-regional factors contributed to the 
creation and evolution of ASEAN and SAARC. SAARC owes its origin to 
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the far-sighted initiative of the late President of Bangladesh, Zia-ur-Rehman 
against the 1980s Afghan crisis. It was in realization that cooperation at the 
regional level is vital for preserving peace and stability which in turn is 
important for economic and social development of the regional states. It was 
also in reaction to the beneficial effects of regional arrangements in other 
parts of the world that SAARC was formed. 
Established in Bangkok in 1967, ASEAN was conceived as an 
organization for economic, social and cultural cooperation. ASEAN 
emerged after the cessation of hostilities between Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Thus one of the most important goals of regional cooperation for the 
ASEAN states was to expand and institutionalized this process of 
reconciliation. 
Common security concerns arose as the ASEAN original five 
become more and more vulnerable to the externally supported threat of 
internal subversion by communism. This was further fuelled by lack of 
internal economic development. In this sense, formation of ASEAN can be 
seen as an effort to reduce the vulnerability of fragile domestic political 
systems as well as reduce the meddling of external powers in internal 
affairs. The idea was also not to divert precious national resources from 
economic development to inter-mural fighting. 
SAARC has adopted functional approach to cooperation. To begin 
with areas chosen for cooperation are those where political concerns are 
least involved. Though economic growth and collective self-reliance are 
mentioned as aims and objectives in the SAARC Charter, cooperation in the 
economic field was taken up much later by the member states. ASEAN, on 
161 
the other hand from the very beginning not only decided to cooperate in 
economic matters but also decided the issues in other fields to be dealt with. 
However, in operational terms, till the 1976 Bali Summit, ASEAN did not 
collaborate much in the economic sphere. 
Different economic perceptions and approaches, level of economic 
development of member states led to slow growth of economic cooperation 
in ASEAN in the initial years. Indonesia preferred import substitution as 
part of its economic development, whereas Singapore went in for export 
oriented industrial development. Another reason why there exist little 
complementarities among ASEAN economies is the fact that except far 
Thailand all ASEAN states are former colonies whose economies were 
fashioned in such a way as to meet the requirement of the colonial powers 
till independence. The same is the case with SAARC members. 
Economic crisis created by the 1973 oil shock seems to have 
reinforced the view among the ASEAN states that economic cooperation 
offered greater chances of increasing the countries' political influence. The 
unexpectedly swift communist victories in Indo-China in 1975 proved to be 
a turning point for ASEAN. 
In 1976 at the first ASEAN Heads of State Summit, Concord and 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation were signed. It was another step towards 
building a regional identity and solidarity. The Concord called upon member 
states to take joint approach on economic issues in international multilateral 
fora. With the growing uncertainty in the international economic market and 
greater economic integration movements, ASEAN concluded an agreement 
in 1992 for the establishment of a Free Trade Area (AFTA). It is to be 
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actualized through Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) 
arrangement. 
The end of cold War and the advent of democracy in Nepal, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan brought a new political class which was more open 
to cooperation. Moreover, by that time SAARC states had already embarked 
on a programme of economic liberalization. At the international level, 
proliferation of regional economic arrangement also acted as a catalyst. 
With all the member countries having ratified the SAPTA agreement it came 
into force in 1995, which has been replaced by SAFTA by 1^ ' January 2006. 
Modest nature of concession was exchanged during the first two 
rounds of SAPTA. Most of the products on which countries have offered 
duty reductions are either not at all traded among the member states or show 
limited trading. This is the same problem that ASEAN faced during the 
initial year of PTA. The performance of SAFTA is yet to be evaluated. This 
is because of implementation hurdles through which it is passing through. 
While these efforts might be slow and modest, it is important that 
these steps are taken given the differences that the regional states have. 
Intra-SAARC exports in total SAARC exports have risen from 3.16 per cent 
in 1990 to 4.8 per cent in 2001 and 4 per cent in 2004. Another vital point is 
to create an integrated mega-sector of trade and services in the region. 
In Southeast Asia, iq 1995 economy grew on an average of 6.71 per 
cent. Things changed fast with the Southeast Asian economic crises. 
However, politically and economically ASEAN is still a regional grouping 
of top rank, notwithstanding its problems. In fact, the domino effect of the 
1997 East Asian financial crisis highlighted the inter-dependent nature of 
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these states and acted as a catalyst in advancing their cooperation efforts. It 
provided the necessary impetus and above all political will to deepen 
economic cooperation in the form of initiatives like formation of ASEAN 
Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea) and ASEAN Economic 
Community by 2020. The ASEAN Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) calls for 
maintaining regional macro-economic and financial stability by 
strengthening the ASEAN surveillance process. 
Finally, AFTA is also making progress. By 2004 original 
signatories have brought down their tariffs to 99.60 per cent of the product 
included in the AFTA to the 0-5 per cent level. Trade among ASEAN 
members have become more complementarities during last two decades of 
the industrialization in ASEAN states. 
Proceeding further, at the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali, the lenders 
have agreed to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2020. 
It was envisaged that AEC will be single market and production base with 
free flow of goods, services, investment, capital and skilled labour. Thus, 
due to stiff competition specially from emerging Chinese market economy, 
ASEAN members decided to work towards increasing their common market 
attractiveness to foreign investors. ASEAN-6 states recognized the 
economic and political benefits of expanding the association to the whole of 
Southeast Asia. It is not only increases the Association's credibility and 
effectiveness to deal with regional issues but also increases ASEAN's 
political and economic standing in the international forum. At the same time 
the ASEAN leaders were worried about the possibility of two-tier regional 
forum coming into effect. Therefore, original members of ASEAN 
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understand that it is imperative that old and new members do not have 
'development gap'. 
The most impressive aspect of ASEAN cooperation, be it in the 
field of economics or politics, is their common approach in dealing with 
external states or groupings irrespective of different perceptions at times. 
ASEAN Dialogue Partners meeting with Australia, Canada, EEC, Japan, 
New Zealand and the US led to cooperation in economic matters. China is 
also rapidly expanding its trade and investment links with ASEAN. 
SAARC Secretariat has also negotiated and entered into cooperative 
economic agreements with United Nations Development programme 
(UNDP), United Nations Social and Economic Commission, far Asia and 
the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the European Commission, Canadian 
International Development (CIDA) and SAARC-Japan Special fund. 
In the Asian context, there is strong preference for informal 
agreements and an incremental approach rather than legally binding treaties. 
Sub-regional economic cooperation appropriately fits into this context. At 
the fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992 the "growth triangle" 
approach was endorsed as a parallel and supportive mechanism for regional 
economic cooperation. IMS-GT, IMT-GT and the Golden Quadrangle NET 
are examples of this approach. 
The World Bank showing eagerness to support ASEAN type 
cooperative ventures in South Asia has unveiled "South Asian Development 
Triangle (SADT). It encompasses most of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna 
basin covering the Eastern of Northeastern parts of India, Bangladesh, Nepal 
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and Bhutan. Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Maldives feared that establishment of 
sub-regional cooperation could adversely affect the SAARC At Male, the 
SAARC agreed to consider sub-regional cooperation only under Article 7 of 
the Charter which allows cooperation among two or more states. 
Bilaterally, India and Sri Lanka signed a Free-Trade Agreement in 
1998. Nepal and Bhutan already have preferential trading arrangements with 
India. Bangladesh is also keen to have such an arrangement. Bilaterally 
Singapore has Free Trade Agreement with extra regional states like, Japan, 
Mexico and New Zealand known as broad band agreements, these bilateral 
agreements are not just about trade liberalization. In keeping with changing 
times they encompass a number of trade and investment facilitation 
measures and economic cooperation initiatives. However, as with SARC 
region, ASEAN members too have some reservation regarding these free 
trade agreements. 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) highlights the new wave of 
'open regionalism' coming into vogue in the post-Cold War period. Open 
regionalism means that the state of a particular region should reduce 
impediments to economic transaction within the region, without creating any 
new artificial trade impediments between their organization and other extra-
regional economies, thus avoiding new form of discrimination. 
The main obstacle to regional cooperation in South Asia is political. 
Political differences and lack of political will on the part of member states 
of SAARC to augment economic cooperation is unlike the ASEAN region. 
ASEAN members too have their own shares of political differences and 
some of them are still unresolved - still members are cooperating in the 
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economic field. They realize the international standing that ASEAN as an 
organization has given them. 
SAARC states can go the ASEAN way by learning from positive 
results of ASEAN cooperation and avoiding their mistakes. The ASEAN 
states are increasingly trading and investing in one another. Cooperation in 
the service sector will intensify interaction among the SAARC states as it 
happened with the ASEAN. With the expanding activities and programmes 
of the SAARC, it is imperative that member states should enhance their 
annual financial contribution but collaboration with extra-regional 
associations and states should also be encouraged. South Asian states should 
welcome foreign investors dealing with the region as a whole. 
In order to improve the functioning of SAARC, the earlier 11 
Technical Committees have been restructured to 7 under the SAARC 
Integrated Programme of Action (SIPA) with effect from January 2000. 
Further shortcoming in the functioning of technical committees like frequent 
postponements of their meetings, duplication of their fields of work, no 
coordination in the working of regional and national level committees and 
lack of participation of professional experts in the meetings have to be 
removed to make them more effective and useful. SAARC already has 
elaborate institutional structure, need is for its effective utilization and 
proper utilization of programmes. 
Regional cooperation in the developing states does not necessarily 
lead to or aim at political or economic union but rather the effective 
functioning of an intergovernmental organization with specific purposes. 
The goal is not to create a supranational authority. Regional cooperation is 
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only an adjustment for mutual benefits based national interests. In the 
context of developing states regional cooperation is essentially comes under 
the framework of 'collective self-reliance' through economic cooperation, 
which is sometimes called 'developmental regionalism' or 'indigenous 
conflict management'. Regional cooperation can either be functional which 
stresses on piecemeal development of non-political cooperation in the 
economic, ecological, social or cultural sectors or be security oriented. 
Both the ASEAN-Bangkok Declaration, 1967 and the SAARC 
Charter, 1985 make it clear that the association concerned is an 
intergovernmental one, not a supranational one. Neither involves a pooling 
of any part of the sovereignty of the member countries. ASEAN gives 
importance to the process leading to a result rather than only be concerned 
about the end. It has adopted the twin approach of mufakat i.e. a decision to 
be arrived unanimously and musfawarah i.e. decision be reached through 
largely informal discussion and consultations without coercion. This process 
might be slow but it helps in confidence building and conflicts management 
and allows members with divergent perceptions to come together. 
ASEAN countries have been stressing values and beliefs on a 
number of issues contradicting western views like democracy, human rights. 
In late 1990s ASEAN family took a position on Myanmar. America and 
many European states severely criticized Myanmar and even trying with the 
idea of imposing sanctions on Myanmar due to its human rights violations 
and lack of democracy. But ASEAN made it quite clear that it will be not a 
part of any such action and would further engage Myanmar. 
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With the growing nature of security, economy and environment, line 
between national issues and extra or trans-national issues is blurring. So, 
there was suggestion of ASEAN's role in the national matters of the member 
states termed as the "flexible engagement". Majority of member did not 
want to deviate from the well-established norms and principles of ASEAN. 
Non-interference in the internal affairs of each other is one of the cardinal 
principles of ASEAN. 
ASEAN has further adopted 'Asian way' of regional cooperation in 
ARE. Instead of concentrating on formal legalistic structures, it works 
towards a consensus building, informal approach to reach the desired goals. 
Its aim was to create a mechanism flexible enough to accommodate 
divergent opinions. SAARC provides a forum to the regional states to 
interact frequently which itself is a big point given the conflicts and 
different perceptions that exist among the member states. ASEAN was 
accused of being an association limited to the ruling elite to legitimize their 
regimes. Later a determined campaign was undertaken to make the people of 
Southeast Asia aware of ASEAN, its aims and its advantages. 
However, in the SAARC region involving common man in the 
implementation of programmes is a distant thing with people not even 
informed about SAARC properly. SAARC did not take small steps in this 
direction. SAARC has extended recognition to the SAARC Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. Association of SAARC Speakers and 
Parliamentarians is another such group. Citizen's commission for South 
Asia met for the first time in Kathmandu in December 2000. The main 
objectives of the Commission were to increase public awareness regarding 
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South Asian cooperation and the need to intensify the same. On similar lines 
the Indo-Pak People's Forum organized a joint Convention for Peace and 
Democracy in April 2000 at Bangalore. In Kathmandu in January 2004 
journalist from SAARC states pledged to work for free flow of information 
and free movement of media personnel in the region. 
In the final, the ASEAN way is all about containing and managing 
conflicts. It is a process of interaction, consultation and cooperation that has 
evolved over the years to develop national and international regional 
resilience. In the post-Cold War period as member realized, it is difficult to 
keep external powers from interfering in the region; they devised the way of 
'constructive engagement'. ASEAN-PMC and the ARF are the culmination 
of this mode of thinking. 
Over the years, ASEAN way is regarded as having contributed to 
stable relations among members. However non-intervention did not mean a 
sense of indifferences towards each other. Hence, ASEAN has been 
successful in defusing conflicts among member states if not solving them. 
Mutual confidence and habit of consultation developed over the years have 
helped the members to exercise self-restraint at crucial junctures so as not to 
harm the Association. 
SAARC took a step-by-step approach. During the first decade of its 
existence SAARC identified many areas of cooperation including 
agriculture, forestry, health, population, meteorology, rural development, 
telecommunication, transport, science and technology, postal services, 
sports, art, culture, drag trafficking and tourism. SAARC is not designed as 
a conflict resolving mechanism, as Charter specially rules out bilateral and 
contentious issues. 
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Pakistan's attitude shows its frustration in gaining parity with India 
in military and economic field. Moreover, post-Cold War period has 
provided India with opportunities to move to larger arena of the Asia-Pacific 
region. It is also time for people to people contact, the civil society in India 
and Pakistan has to be more assertive in quest of stable relations between the 
two states. Finally, perhaps it is also time that SAARC should gradually 
introduce political issues in its agenda through the amendment of the 
Charter. But, it has to be done in a slow and phased manner given the 
divergent views and perceptions of the member states in this regard. 
Introduction of political dialogue would not only facilitate communication 
among members but could also lead to less external interference in the 
regional affairs as regional states would be more interested in solving their 
problems themselves. Regional cooperation is not panacea for the many 
social, economic, environmental, political and military problems that we 
face today. But it can definitely play a substantial role in preventing 
deteriorating conditions especially in the developing countries of the world. 
SUGGESTIONS 
It is widely known that regionalism is innovative concept of 
international relations, and South Asia has vital stakes in the development of 
regional cooperation and economic growth. There is little doubt that the 
South Asia does have immense potential to develop into a dynamic growth 
zone, as a 'borderless' economic territory. As already stated geographical 
proximity, bond of history, kinship relationships in culture and ethnicity are 
all present to "pull".' Current pattern of international market economy, 
1. Abul Kalam, Subregionalism in Asia: ASEAN and SAARC Experiences, New Delhi, UPSPD, 
2001, p. 203. 
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globalisation, regionalisation, trading blocs and cartels have already 
marginalizing effects on South Asian economies. Naturally they should 
"pushed" to draw closer to each other.^ The important thing is to leave the 
baggage of history behind and repair the more recent mistakes. 
At the political and policy level, physical and cultural proximity 
should be fully exploited. The idea should be to build a spirit of confidence 
and trust among leadership and the segment of the people, especially the 
businessmen and bureaucrats. These two segments of South Asian societies, 
which can appraise and evaluate the immense possibilities that exist and 
may fully realize them, if enough attention is given to the end. To be 
specific, consistent with the more recent global trend, there should be a 
psychological proximity involving the concerned people, a mindset that will 
bring the souls together.^ 
One of the major or practical concerns that should be addressed is 
related to 'hardware' network, i.e. the building of physical infrastructure, 
highways, roads railways and air communications, linking all the designated 
areas. Concurrently, efforts should also be made towards the building of 
'software' links, i.e. strengthening legal and institutional framework, 
enabling free flow of capital, technology, goods, services and movement of 
people, as has been the case in Southeast Asia. In this case again, mutual 
trust and confidence building would deem critical, as lack of trust or mutual 
jealousies may torpedo the entire efforts towards growth endeavour."* 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
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India as the region's asymmetrical power must provide leadership in 
shaping regionalism. Symmetrical harmony, rather than marginalisation, 
perceived or real, should be the guiding principle. Envisioning, 
conceptualization, determining the civilizational destiny of the entire stock 
of South Asian people and beyond, shaping of organizational structures 
linking cooperation at both regional and sub-regional levels, 'hardware'/ 
'software' development, investment and private sector participation - all 
these require India's leadership. Leadership in all this means that India 
should not only contribute its due to framing of ideas, concepts and vision, it 
should also provide leadership in the blueprint of action programme, making 
significant concessions and then ask for reciprocal concessions consistent 
with the principle of mutuality. 
In a world that is engulfed swiftly in schemes of regionalisation and 
globalisation it would be foolish for any South Asian country to have a 'go 
alone' policy or to keep its door shut for movement of goods and/or people. 
India with its stronger economy and technological base, especially its 
vibrant private sectors, may perhaps take stronger lead in both investments 
in the industrial sector and .technology transfer. The international funding 
agencies, like the ADB and the World Bank, may have a role in all this. 
Succinctly, a number of concrete proposals may put forward for 
consideration of the concerned policy makers if the regionalism has to take 
root and shape itself into a wide network so as to offer the right benefits to 
all the member states of the SAARC. 
From the positive point of view the leadership of the region^: 
5. Ibid. p. 209. 
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1. should develop an appropriate vision and accordingly chart or map a 
common destiny, following the pattern of ASEAN; 
2. work out common strategy, consistent with the blueprint of action; 
3. the motto of cooperation should be to build a 'borderless economy'; 
4. the spirit of multilateralism should pervade the regional efforts; 
5. the international funding agency may allowed to play a catalytic role in 
'hardware' or infrastructure development; 
6. the governments concerned should initiate 'software' or legal 
institutional measures, providing sufficient incentives so that the 
potential investors feel attracted to contribute to growth dynamism; 
7. the private sector, whether national, regional or multinational, should 
be invited to play its due role in the shaping of the growth mechanism; 
8. the government should thus act as a facilitator, coordinating the role of 
the international funding agencies and allowing the private sector to 
make investment and help in the transfer of technology; 
9. the mobility of people across borders should also be facilitated but may 
be regulated, as in the ASEAN region, by replicable convenient 
mechanism such as introduction of 'smart cards' so as to avoid illegal 
migration or cross-border intrusion; 
10. the border of the member states should symbolize peace, cooperation 
and growth so that 'borderless economy' can take deeper root across 
conventional state borders; 
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11. stability and good governance are sine qua non for advancing growth 
dynamism, and this include consensus building nationally, sub-
regionally and regionally. Hence they must ensure that they win the 
confidence of the investors, both domestic and foreign; and, 
12. the service sectors, such as energy/power generation, water 
augmentation and supplies, tourism, etc. should be treated as priority 
sectors for enhancing regional growth and hence common effort should 
be pooled to their development for common end. 
In other words, 'a win-win approach' should pervade the entire spirit of 
cooperation at the regional level. 
Apart from positive initiatives, it is also possible to bring forward the 
need to point out certain acts, perceived or real, which may serve as negative 
incentives and hence must be eschewed. They include the following^' : 
1. political confrontation and conflict, insurgency and counter 
insurgency are major hindrances to regional evolution and hence they 
must be minimized, controlled or eliminated before any substantial 
development can be envisaged; 
2. the common borders should not be targeted for any kind of violent act 
by the state security forces and must be made as tension free as 
possible if meaningful cooperation is to contribute to the perceived 
growth; 
3. no single actor, including an asymmetrical power like India, should 
make an overt or even covert effort to bypass or obstruct the 
6. Ibid. p. 211. 
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legitimate right of other regional actor to the membership of other 
regional cooperative entities such as lORARC; and, 
4. no single actor should acquire a monopoly of rights in service/ 
infrastructure sector in any of the concerned countries which would 
be perceived to mean exclusion of others. 
Thus the approach should not be one of zero-sum game, i.e. gain of 
one at the expense of others or the striving of 'a winner takes it all' if the 
regional cooperative entity is to take any shape to serve the teeming million 
people of South Asia. In other words, there should be an element of 
mutuality guiding policies of the concerned players based on positive sum 
game that would benefit all the participants. 
There must be collective and coordinated efforts towards modified 
structuralism at the regional and subregional level, i.e. allowing the non-
governmental players to play their due part in promoting cooperative 
growth. That means greater emphasis on a bottom-up, rather than top-down 
approach towards economic cooperation and growth activity in 'borderless' 
fashion involving the local or lower level functionaries of the states. But, as 
in ASEAN, the structure of cooperation should be placed in right 
perspective, with a systematic thrust on building of a conceptual framework 
encompassing growth and contributing towards 'social software' and 
'hardware', keeping the interest of the community of people uppermost in 
mind. This mean that there should also be cooperative harmony, involving 
SAGQ, SAARC, lORARC, as well as cooperation with other actors and 
entities of the Asia-Pacific region, even beyond. This also means that there 
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should be a community or people oriented approach of cooperation, rather 
than the currently envisaged territorial approach. 
If the SAARC is to replicate the ASEAN or East Asian experiences of 
interdependent development, it is vital then to develop a new "strategic 
mindset" in the whole region with a redefinition of national interest and the 
consequent strategy and tactics to attain them. In other words, if the geo-
economic model of regional growth is to take shape or modified 
structuralism is to gain ground in South Asia, there should be persuasive 
efforts to drastically modify the region's current policy vision, the 
parameters in strategic thinking that are used in order to achieve it. There 
must be persuasive efforts to get away or overcome the legacies of region's 
most recent troubled historical context. For the whole geometry of the new 
growth model is borderless, as is currently understand, ranging at cross-
border levels or beyond existing political borders, "reaching out" as far as 
economic complementarities or factors input would permit them within a 
"space-economy". For conflict-ridden South Asia, perceived by the US 
President Bill Clinton as "the most dangerous place on earth" this is the way 
forward. 
However, the vision must not be lost, the vision of a South Asian 
togetherness that was lost in bewilderness in the process of colonial rule and 
subsequent partition of the historical entity that was the common heritage of 
all South Asians. Politics and a politicized approach to regain the lost 
identity should be minimized. That, in essence, means that current policy 
priorities, strategies and tactics of each of the national actors of the South 
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Asia have to change and new beginnings must be made in the right, desired 
direction. 
As far the role perception, mutuality should serve as the guiding 
principle in bringing the regional players together in graduating their current 
relations to one of economic mature partner, but the onus is on India as the 
region's great power to provide the leadership need. The vision of 
regionalism and cooperative security must not be lost. Existing strategic 
priorities need to be recast, so should be the mental mould of the regional 
leadership. 
The reopening of old roads and rail routes between Pakista^ n^ and India 
and between Bangladesh and India is in the right direction, so is the desire 
lor a functional and effective transit system linking the countries of the 
region. Priority must be placed on new, modern infrastructure that would 
facilitate cross-border business and investment, enhance tourism and people-
to-people contacts, fully exploit the existing complementarities, and create 
new synergies that would contribute to greater level of economic interaction. 
To the above ends, the government of the region should act largely as 
facilitator, but, as in East and Southeast Asian countries the private sector 
should be encouraged to play the pivotal role as an engine of growth. 
Similarly, the interested international players and/or funding agencies as 
well as the MNCs should also be encouraged to combine with the 
national/regional private sector players so that the people of the region may 
truly benefit from enhanced cooperation and economic interaction. Of 
course there should not be any growth initiative at the expense of the 
ecology and environment of the region. 
178 
Given the regional political environment, no one can be under any 
illusion about the present difficulties in South Asia. But, there is, 
nevertheless, a growing realization today that the people in the region 
simply cannot live and develop efficiently by partitioning themselves from 
one another. In each member countries, policy-maker are now beginning to 
hold the view that the external policies of the SAARC countries will be 
effective only if they succeeds first in developing cooperation with their 
immediate neighbours and subsequently with other countries in Asia. As 
South Asia continues to be increasingly marginalized in world politics, there 
is also a growing realization that SAARC countries will benefit more 
through collective self-reliance than through being neglect of one another. 
In this sense, SAARC is both the symbol of this hope and a tool for 
achieving these ends. South Asia is no doubt at the cross-roads of conflicts 
and cooperation. While SAARC does not seem to face any danger of 
implosion, it is not solidly grounded. There is good reason for hope, but no 
cause for undue optimism. As SAARC's expanding agenda heralds a new 
age of promise, what is needed now is more practical idealism, which can be 
discussed under the following broad headings.'' 
Overcoming Hurdles in Socio-Political Fields 
Unfortunately, at present, the centrifugal tendencies due to political 
factors impinge negatively on forces that promote regional cooperation. 
Some examples in this regard are: conflict and problems in the south Asian 
7. As part of its programme for the promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia, the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung organized, in May 1994 a conference on "Shaping South Asia's Future; Role of 
Regional Cooperation" in Kathmandu. The following suggestions are based on the 
recommendations of the 'Working Group' for different areas. 
179 
region; different perception on foreign policy matters and lack of political 
cooperation at regional level; difficulties in defining and ensuring equitable 
benefits from cooperation for all countries in the regions paucity of financial 
resources and lack of, or weakness of, institutional mechanism for funding 
and undertaking cooperation programmes. 
How can these hurdles be overcome? What kind of cooperation is 
possible and desirable under these circumstances? For this following 
Q 
recommendation can be put forward : 
1. South Asian nations needed to jointly evolve a vision of the region 
which would transcend parochial interests in pursuance of urgent 
developmental goals and for meeting the needs and aspirations of the 
people of the region. It recommended that the traditional approach 
towards politics in the region, based mainly on rhetoric and emotions, 
needed to be replaced by one guided by logic and greater appreciation 
of the realities of the region; 
2. political will needs to be built up from within by building institutions 
and mechanism at people's level starting from grass-root. A sense of 
regional solidarity needs to be created wherein members of the region 
are seen as assets in a cooperative endeavour and not as adversaries 
locked in confrontations between nations, groups and localities. 
Parochial national interests should be transcended in pursuance of a 
8. Members of the Working Group on "Overcoming Hurdles in Socio-Political Fields": 
The Chairperson was A. Moin Khan (Bangladesh); The Resource Person was Mervyn de Silva 
(Sri Lanka); The Rapporteurs were H.M. Ganasekara (Sri Lanka) and Nancy Jetly (India); the 
Discussant were Muchkund Dubey (India); Sridhar Khatri (Nepal), M. Lohani (Nepal), A.K.H. 
Morshed (Bangladesh), Bimal Prasad (India), Kinga Singye (Bhutan), Abdul Sattar (Pakistan), 
H.L. Shrestha (Nepal) and B.B. Thapa (Nepal). 
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shared vision of South Asia as a whole. The right environment needs 
to be created so that SAARC can play a pivotal role in establishing a 
new South Asian order; 
3. SAARC summits should be held regularly every year in accordance 
with the SAARC Charter. There should be more frequent meetings at 
the level of Foreign Ministers/Foreign Secretaries/Planning Bodies 
and these should be made purposeful and productive; 
4. appropriate mechanism for confidence building and conflict 
resolution may be established on the basis of mutual respect and in a 
spirit of give and take, bearing in mind the needs and aspirations of 
the people of South Asia; 
5. for strengthening peoplc-to-pcopic contact, the meetings, visits and 
exchange at all levels, i.e. academicians, business leaders, media 
personnel, political leaders, teachers, youths, women and their 
organizations should be promoted; 
6. the Secretary-General of SAARC should strengthen his contacts with 
governmental and non-governmental organizations in South Asian 
countries engaged in identification of ways and means to accelerate 
regional cooperation in South Asia. He may bring feasible ideas to the 
notice of member states of the SAARC. 
Implementation of the above suggestions would contribute 
considerably to the consolidation and strengthening of South Asian regional 
cooperation. Also initiatives should be taken, as and when required, for 
setting up Action Committee both at governmental and non-governmental 
levels for promoting sub-regional cooperation. 
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Role of Media 
At present there is little public information and awareness generation 
in South Asian countries about regional cooperation. Information on 
Technical Committees and their activities do not make front page news. 
There is an urgent need to widely disseminate knowledge about the issues 
and contents of regional cooperation through a well thought-out programme 
of public information. Media alone can help the masses in developing 
regional consciousness. For this following steps can be taken^ : 
1. establishing a South Asian Media Commission to study the condition of 
the media and propose appropriate steps for their advancement in the 
region. The terms of reference of such a commission would be 
formulated and provided to the SAARC Secretariat and SAARC 
governments through appropriate means; 
2. strengthening voluntary multi-media organizations such as the South 
Asia Media Association through individual and institutional 
membership so as to increase networking and cooperation; 
3. forging direct exchange linkages among media institutions and 
organizations with the aim of improving facilities for exchange of 
personal and sharing of experiences. 
4. developing a syndicate service of the dissemination of news analyses 
and features by offering a wide range of materials derived from the 
media in the South Asian countries; 
Members of the Working Group on "Role of Media" : 
The Chairperson was S.N. Hashim (Bangladesh); The Resource Person was Mahfuz Anam 
(Bangladesh); the Rapporteurs were V. Gunewardena (Sri Lanka) and M. Rauf (Pakistan); the 
Discussant were Badrul Ahsan (Bangladesh), K.K, Bhargava (India), Kinley Dorji (Bhuttan), 
Javed Jabbar (Pakistan), A. Kadirgama (Sri Lanka), Ram Pradhan (Nepal) and Chanchal Sarkar 
(India). 
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5. media groups in the respective countries interacting regularly with one 
another and, when necessary, mobilizing opinion for concerted action 
on matters of common concern; 
6. correcting the low level of public awareness about neighbours on the 
part of print and electronic media. The concerned journalist and 
persons should be better informed about the region and suitably trained 
professionally; 
7. minimizing the present dependence on extra-regional news agencies 
and correspondents for coverage of the region by developing intra-
regional syndicated services; 
8. encouraging a collaborative approach in regard to a new corporate 
initiative to establish a satellite TV channel that represents all of South 
Asia; 
9. exploring the possibility of commissioning radio and television 
programmes other than SAVE and showing them to South Asian 
audiences. The commissioning, selection and production of such 
programmes should be facilitated by a professional group; 
10. governments of SAARC countries should amend media unfriendly 
legislation in South Asian countries so as to increase public access to 
information, remove the irksome constraints of the framework of 
speech, expression, publication and information. 
Thus the role of media is crucial for a proper understanding about the 
usefulness - indeed indispensability - of regional cooperation and its 
character as a process that is at the same time dynamic and goal oriented 
with long-term and short-term goals. 
183 
Capacity-Building tlirough Institutional Mechanism 
At present there is no contributive consensus on the subject. Some 
useful work has been done in this context. There are some regional funds 
and institutions which have operational responsibilities in specific functional 
areas such as SFRF, SAIC, STE, SDS and SCCI. An assessment of their 
functioning shows that they need a proper overhauling and readjustment 
which can be brought by following ways' : 
1. the role of Secretary-General and the staffing of the SAARC 
Secretariat must be reviewed as an essential element of capacity 
building through institutional mechanism. As the Secretary-General 
and the SARC Secretariat have been entrusted by the Member states 
with the task of furthering regional cooperation, the Secretary-
General should be empowered to become the central authority to 
recommend, implement, monitor and review the activities of SAARC; 
2. Directors in the Secretariat should be appointed by the Secretary-
General, one from each member states. They should be permanent 
members of the staff and should be recruited on the basis of merit and 
open competition. Such an arrangement would enable them to be 
independent and effective in carrying out their function; 
3. the Secretary-General might call for reports from existing SAARC 
institutions regarding (a) their current activities (b) their future 
programmes. These institutions should be strengthened and monitored 
10. Members of the Working Group on "Capacity Building through Institutional Mechanism": The 
Chairperson was Ahmed Saieem (Maldives); The Resource Person were A.K. David (Sri Lanka) 
and Saman Kalegama (Sri Lanka); The Discussant were Abdul Ahsan (Bangladesh), B. Bhadra 
(Nepal), Sabur Ghayur (Pakistan), A.G. Mohamed (Maldives), K. Mamgyel (Bhutan), J.P. Rana 
(Nepal) and A. Narain Thapa (Nepal). 
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and reviewed on a regular basis. No additional SAARC institutions 
should be established in areas where institutions of other 
organizations are already functioning in South Asian region to which 
SAARC member states have full access; 
4. the whole structure of the SAARC institutions, including Technical 
Committees, should be re-examined with a view to making them more 
effective in furthering regional cooperation. Such a review should 
recommend their rationalization, reinforcement and restructuring, 
where necessary, as well as the creation of any new institutions to 
meet any felt regional need; 
5. as SAARC has already institutionalized mechanism such as Meeting 
of Planners, which have taken place on a periodic basis since 1983 
and Committee on Economic Cooperation set up in 1991, these 
should be fully utilized so as to yield optimal results. The two bodies 
might meet at least once every year, preferably at a level not below 
that of Permanent Secretaries. 
By this way, the institutions, if properly designed and utilized, can 
promote dynamics in cooperation. A cautious approach of innovation, of 
utilizing the present facilities in an optimal manner and creating new ones 
only when necessary to meet the proven needs is, therefore, required. 
Institutional mechanism involving professional bodies and non-
governmental organizations can be important for capacity building in the 
field of South Asian regional cooperation. 
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Involvement of Labour and Non-Governmental Organisations 
Governmental negotiations by themselves and ad-hoc decision taken 
by officials and ratified by Ministers will not result in any substantial 
progress in South Asian regional cooperation. A wide and dense web of 
interaction must be spun by all segments of society in South Asian 
countries, particularly by NGOs and the private sector. Their participation in 
intra-SAARC functional cooperation needs to be encouraged. Because, 
often, the NGOs are in a better position to work with the community at a 
large and elicit support from the informal sector. They are a tangible 
expression of the will of the public opinion. Thus, SAARC will be able to 
draw upon the knowledge and experience of NGOs and they, in tern, will be 
kept fully informed of the SAARC perspective. Involvement of labour and 
NGOs can be materialized by the following ways" : 
1. NGO initiatives, such as the Association of Management 
Development Institutions of South Asia (AMDISA), South Asian 
Federation of Accountants (SAFA), the South Asian Association for 
People's Initiatives, the South Asian Women's Network on Health, 
South Asian NGOs on environment, and many other such network, 
have been providing fora for sharing experiences and helping in 
developing perspective on common problems of the region. SAARC, 
as an official body for regional cooperation, might enhance this 
process; 
11. Members of the Working Group o 'Involvement of Labour and Non-Governmental 
Organisations": 
The Chairperson was Ram Sharan Mahat (Nepal); The Resource Person was Khalid Shams 
(Bangladesh); the Rapporteurs were Dev Raj Dahal (Nepal) and A.K. Dasgupta (India); the 
Discussants were Asim Ahmed (Maldives), Karamat Ali (Pakistan), P. Amarasinghe (Sri 
Lanka), K. Khanal (Nepal), Ranjana Kumari (India) and Praveen Sinha (India). 
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2. Hitherto, SAARC has not addressed adequately the question of 
easing of barriers that impede people-to-people contacts and 
cooperation. Despite all odds, working people and their organizations 
have shown remarkable keenness to establish cooperation through 
organizational, educational, and mobilisational activities aimed at 
enhancing experiences, skills, and perspectives. The governments and 
SAARC organisations must recognize these efforts and create 
necessary institutional mechanism and environment conducive to 
further deepening, expanding and strengthening of cooperation 
through direct involvement of the people in the region; 
3. though the NGOs and labour organizations have been creating 
opportunities for coming together and cooperating among themselves, 
their effort do not result in optimal benefits, in the absence of 
appropriate infrastructural facilities and institutional support. The 
deficiencies in this regard ought to be removed with the help of 
SAARC; 
4. Comprehensive information on the activities and programmes of 
NGOs in different countries, the achievement made by them and the 
problems faced by them may be compiled. This information should be 
monitored and disseminate widely with a view to enable them to 
profit from each other's experiences; 
5. opportunities for bringing together the NGOs of different countries 
working on specific issues for discussion and for sharing of 
experiences may be provided by SAARC in an increasing manner; 
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6. a separate cell may be set up in the SAARC Secretariat for promoting 
cooperation among NGOs and the labour organizations operating in 
the member states. Increased cooperation among these bodies would 
create opportunities for people to people contact and bring about 
enhanced cooperation, thereby reducing ethnic and communal 
tensions and animates; 
7. SAARC might convene a tripartite meeting, bringing together the 
government, labour representatives, and the representatives of 
employers far discussion on common labour standard in the member-
slates, keeping in view the socio-culture and economic diversities 
existing in these states; 
8. an appropriate forum under the SAARC might work out and adopt a 
common stand on ameliorating the difficulties faced by the workers 
of this region working in countries outside the region; 
9. in view of requirements of global competitiveness, the skills and the 
capabilities of the workers of the South Asia need progressive 
improvement and upgradation for which all concerned parties, 
including governments, employers, and trade unions, should make 
concerted efforts. 
Thus NGOs can be effective in the South Asian region in imparting 
momentum to effort at grass root level and also far the enlistment of popular 
participation that would provide the much needed impetus to regional 
cooperation. Increased interaction between regionally oriented NGOs and 
the official SAARC process could be mutually beneficial and advance 
significantly the process of regional cooperation. 
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Developing Opportunities of Socio-Economic Cooperation 
Socio-economic development of South Asian region was adversely 
affected by the large volume of resources which countries spend on 
maintaining internal law and order and on defence. Socio-economic 
concerns received inadequate attention at official level because national 
governments treated the SAARC primarily as an instrument of foreign 
policy dialogue conducted through their respective Ministers of External 
Affairs. Considerable analytical work has been accomplished in the 
framework of SAARC in regard to possibilities of cooperation in the 
important areas of poverty alleviation, environment and women in 
development. However, faster progress on the substantive front is necessary, 
which can be possibly achieved through adopting following path : 
1. national economic and social development ministries may set up 
SAARC cells which could interact and coordinate their regional 
approaches for economic and social development; 
2. gender and environmental concerns needed to be internalized, 
integrated and incorporated in all regional economic and social 
development activities. While women's concerns should include those 
of the girl child, environmental concerns should include sanitary and 
habitat aspects particularly affecting the poor; 
12. Members of the Working Group on "Developing Opportunities of Socio-Economic 
Cooperation": 
The Chairperson was Begum Shahnaz Wazir Ali (Pakistan); The Resource Person was Khadeeja 
Ahmad (Maldives); the Rapporteurs was Arif Waquif (India); the Discussants were Aneesa 
Ahmed (Maldives), Susheela Kaushik (India), M. Rana (Nepal), Shahnaz Rashid (Pakistan), K. 
Rosa (Sri lanka), G. Samarsinghe (Sri Lanka, India) and J. Tuladhar (Nepal). 
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3. regional programmes for increasing awareness and sensitization with 
respect of unemployment, poverty, women's and environmental issues 
may be evolved and implemented; 
4. for evolving and monitoring programmes for women's development at 
the official level, the SAARC Technical Committee on Women should 
function as an advocacy/pressure group. 
5. unemployment and poverty concerns should inform all regional 
activities. Employment generation, poverty alleviation, and women's 
eco-friendly development strategies at the regional level should be 
developed and harmonized by a group of development/planning 
experts. They should help ensure more equitable access to economic 
and social services, resources and opportunities to the poor and the 
socio-economically disadvantaged, particularly through fostering social 
mobilization and empowerment of the poor, the women, etc.; 
6. existing SAARC mechanism SAPTA, SAFTA, SFRP, etc. should be 
utilized to promote intra-regional trade, exports to third countries and 
joint investments, primarily to increase income and employment 
generation opportunities, particularly for the poor, the traditional 
artisans, women, etc.; 
7. regional educational training and retraining resources should and 
pooled to benefit from^ regional economics of scales in these areas. 
Exchange of students, teachers/trainers, researchers, etc. should be 
facilitated. For this, the concerned apex national institutions should be 
encouraged to network and coordinate these regional activities; 
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8. South Asian countries should evolve common regional stances for 
international conferences on socio-economic issues, like the World 
Summit on Development, the International Conference on Population 
Development, World Women's Conference, etc.; 
9. a SAARC Fund for social development should be established early, 
with a view to developing, funding and implementing regional 
programmes on socio-economic development, and. to facilitate 
applicability of such programmes wherever feasible in the region. 
Thus, as in evident from the above, there are several opportunities of 
cooperation in socio-economic fields which are awaiting exploitation. The 
expeditious implementation of ongoing programmes of cooperation in these 
areas will help considerably the South Asian countries in overcoming socio-
economic problems faced by them. 
Fostering Economic and Financial Cooperation 
Regional cooperation in different parts of the world has made a 
decisive contribution to economic growth and integration of geographically 
proximate constituent states into groupings. Intra-SAARC trade expansion 
and economic cooperation should also be able to contribute to the economic 
prosperity of South Asian countries and bring these countries closer 
together. Various initiatives have been taken by SAARC for promoting 
economic and financial cooperation. But there are several initiatives to be 
taken to rejenuvate the SAARC process by adopting following measures. 
13. Members of the Working Group on "Fostering Economic and Financial Cooperation" : 
The Chairperson was Rohan Abeygunasekera (Sri Lanka); The Resource Person was Gopi Arora 
(India); the Rapporteurs were S.S. Colombage (Sri lanka) and A. Khan (Pakistan); the 
Discussants were B.K. Chaudhary (Nepal), K.C. Damodaran (India), S.M. Inam (Pakistan), D.R. 
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1. a group of eminent South Asian economists should examine the 
possibility of evolving and adopting a common stand vis-a-vis the 
structural adjustment programmes of the IMF/World Bank. In 
particular, they should examine the impact of such programmes on the 
socio-economic conditions of the societies in the region and suggest 
ways and means to cope with these problems; 
2. the harmonization of exchange rate policies in the region might be 
considered in order to eliminate or mitigate the adverse effects of 
arbitrary exchange rate adjustments; 
3. there is a need for a SAARC Export-Import Bank to assist the exporters 
in the region to export within the region as well as outside the region. 
SAARC institution may be established in the areas of development 
finance and insurance/reinsurance to facilitate investment by the 
private sectors of the region. Furthermore, the branch of commercial 
banks and insurance companies of one country be opened in other 
member countries and financial cooperation should be expanded 
through joint ventures in banking and insurance; 
4. In view of the unsatisfactory and slow progress made so far by SAPTA 
and unpredictable future of SAFTA and the rapid changes in economic 
policies of countries of the region, the subject of tariffs needs to be 
approached at a much higher plane; 
5. the stronger and larger economies of the region should take the 
initiative by unilaterally reducing the tariffs in favour of the least 
Panday (Nepal), Latiful Rehman (Bangladesh), Farooq Sobhan (Bangladesh) and V. Virmani 
(India). 
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developed countries in the region with a view to increase their exports. 
Furthermore, arrangements should be made at the subregional/bilatcral 
level to accelerate the process of trade liberalization so as to enhance 
intra-regional trade; 
6. Export Processing Zone (EPZ) be established in the bordering are as of 
the countries of the region; 
7. the potential for collaborating in forming joint ventures for 
manufacturing industrial components which would ensure a 
competitive edge in the international market might be exploited; 
8. there should be cooperation in the areas of infrastructural development 
relating to road and rail transport. Movement of sealed train could be 
introduced in the region with a view to facilitate intra-regional trade; 
9. the existing customs and immigration formalities in the region should 
be reviewed and means devised to simplify them in order to facilitate 
trade and tourism in the region. Visa requirements for business travel, 
tourist and students should be relaxed. 
The decision to set up the SAARC committee on economic 
Cooperation in 1991 and the establishment of the SAARC chamber of 
commerce and Industry in 1993, inter alia, provide important 
instrumentalities at governmental and non-governmental level respectively 
for implementing most of the above recommendations. Bui need of hour is 
to give free hand to these organization to come out with an independent plan 
of action to boost regional cooperation. 
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Role of Political Parties and Parliamentarians 
Lack of political wills is one important factor that is responsible for 
slow progress in regional cooperation. The greatest challenge lies in the 
sphere of generating necessary political will as it is the crucial ingredient far 
bridging the gap between governmental efforts for strengthening regional 
cooperation and the masses. SAARC merits much more political support 
than it is receiving at present. It needs to be backed by political will in full 
measure. Solution of problems bequeathed by history cannot and should not 
be a precondition for regional cooperation. SAARC, so far, has concentrated 
on inter-governmental interaction. It now needs to extend its reach to the 
people of the region, representatives of the institutions and other political 
bodies. In order to bring political parties and parliamentarian in the 
mainstream regional cooperation, it can be suggested that''*: 
1. individual members in each national parliament might form a group 
devoted to regional cooperation; 
2. parliamentary groups from all the seven SAARC countries might form 
a regional forum. A group from any one country might lake the 
initiative to convene a meeting of all national groups to work out the 
modalities of the forum; 
3. the forum might meet once or more often each year and make 
recommendations on issues of regional concern. The annual SAARC 
14. Members of the Working Group-on "Role of Political Parties and Parliamentarians" : 
The Chairperson was S. Syed Shahabuddin (India); The Resource Person was P.C. Lohani 
(Nepal); the Rapporteurs were Lok Raj Baral (Nepal) and Sandeep Waslekar (India); the 
Discussant, were D.N. Dhungena (Nepal), Freeda Husan (Bangladesh), Ross Masood Hasan 
(Pakistan), V. Kanesaiingam (Sri Lanka), M. Moonesinghe (Sri Lanka), Afaque Khan Shahid 
(Pakistan) and I.H. Zaki (Maldives). 
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summits might take into account some or all of the recommendations 
made by the regional parliamentary forum without being necessarily 
bound by such recommendation; 
4. the forum might set up specialized consultative committees to address 
specific issues such as trade, environment, political systems, human 
rights, social reforms, and any other subjects that it might find 
worthwhile; 
5. a parallel initiative might be taken by recognized national political 
parties in each country. The parties might arrange periodical regional 
meetings to address issues of common concern; 
6. besides parties and parliamentarians, other constitutional institutions 
such as Chief Election Commissioners, Auditor Generals, Chief 
Justices of the Supreme Court and Human Rights Commissioners might 
meet on a periodical basis for exchange of information and ideas; 
7. besides the regional steps outlined above, each parliament should hold 
periodical discussion on regional cooperation. Committees of 
parliaments dealing with foreign affairs may do the same. This applies 
to select, standing or consultative committees, depending upon the 
constitutional framework in each country. Members of parliament 
would have to be equipped to address regional cooperation issues in 
various fora. The SAARC Secretariat might be requested to prepare 
and disseminate an information bulletin for the benefit of 
parliamentarians; 
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8. once political parties and parliamentarians get actively involved in the 
regional cooperation process, their front organizations such as student, 
youth, labour and women's wing might also be drawn into it. 
The Association of SAARC speakers and Parliamentarians was 
formally launched in November 1992 with its own Charter incorporating 
modest objectives. Some meetings have been held but without any visible 
and tangible progress. SAARC promises to be an active and effective 
agency if it can capitalize on political will and if it is guided by political 
realism. Both political will and political realism will grow fast if the above 
recommendations are implemented expeditiously. 
Role of Academia in Regional Cooperation''' 
Academicians have a greater role to play in the regional cooperation 
and integration in South Asia. They should contribute, in the following 
manner, to awareness generation in South Asia about the cost of non-
cooperation and benefits of cooperation: 
1. South Asian academics must learn from experiences of the European 
Community and of ASEAN in regional cooperation and integration and 
try to replicate it in South Asia; 
2. closer interaction should be organized between Research Scholars and 
Academic Institutions in SAARC. A South Asian Chapter of Research 
and Information System of Non-aligned may be set up; 
3. academics should undertake study and research about complex 
relationship between regional process and global integration; 
15. K.K. Bhargava, et al., eds., Shaping South Asia's Future : Role of Regional Cooperation, New 
Delhi, Vikas Publication, 1995, p. 160. 
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4. a study should be undertaken on the present industrialization policies of 
South Asian countries and changes that may be brought about in regard 
to these. 
5. the scholars in SAARC countries should study carefully the experienced 
of some successful models such as the EU and ASEAN, with a view to 
draw conclusion about the suitability of adopting their methodologies 
and taking into account realities of South Asian region and genius of its 
people; 
6. there is need to have on a permanent basis a think tank for SAARC. 
Academic institutions have a vital role to play in making SAARC 
stronger and more capable of achieving these goals. 
Thus, the academicians in the South Asian region need to joint hands 
with the enlightened scholars in the developing world with a view to 
creating pressures that will motivate the politicians to new international 
actions. 
lUtimatelyi, success of endeavours depends on devising appropriate 
processes of cooperation that will help people in South Asia in realizing 
fully the prospects and potentials of cooperation. It is important to distil 
wisdom from knowledge, which has proliferated and is expanding in South 
Asia. It is necessary to go beyond the acquisition of knowledge about 
regional cooperation methods and capture wisdom of involving various 
concerned segments of society so as to secure a good future for South 
Asians. For this it is important that the whole-hearted engagement of 
officials, political leaders and parliamentarians, private sector and NGOs, 
labour organizations, academia and media should be secured in support of 
pursuit of objectives of SAARC. 
Sippcndlcas 
APPENDIX! 
THE ASEAN DECLARATION 
(Bangkok Declaration) 
Bangkok, 8 August 1967 
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/ Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, 
the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the 
Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Thailand: 
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of 
South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of 
regional solidarity and cooperation; 
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby 
contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region; 
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, 
freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good 
understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries of 
the region already bound together by ties of history and culture; 
CONSIDERING that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for 
strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful 
and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their 
stability g|nd gpf'i'n^y frnm pvfnmnl intni'frii-m •• in miy Panh nr mani^pgtatinn in nrHpr to 
preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their 
peoples; 
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed 
concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or 
indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or 
prejudice the orderly processes of their national development; 
Do HEREBY DECLARE: 
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the 
countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). 
SECOND that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be: 
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1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in 
the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in 
order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of 
South-East Asian Nations; 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and 
the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to 
the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common 
interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative 
fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research 
facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture 
and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of 
international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and 
communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and 
regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for 
even closer cooperation among themselves. 
THIRD, that to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be 
established: 
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred 
to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be 
convened as required. 
(b) A Standing committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the 
host country or his representative and having as its members the accredited 
Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work of the 
Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers. 
(c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials 
on specific subjects. 
(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the 
Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special 
Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other 
committees as may hereafter be established. 
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FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East 
Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes. 
FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East 
Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts 
and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom 
and prosperity. 
DONE in Bangkok on the Eighth Day of August in the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred 
and Sixty-Seven. 
For the Bepublic o( Indonesia : 
' S 
ADAM MALIK 
Presidium Mbiistei lor Political 
Minister lor Foreign AllaifS 
For the Bepuhlic ol Singapore : 
S. BAJABATVAM 
Minister o( Foreign Aliairs 
For Malaysia : 
/ 
{..^fW'*'* • '" ^ J 
TDH ABDUL BAZAK 
Deputy Prrme Minister, 
Minister ol Delence and 
Minister ol Kationai Development 
For the Bepuhlic ol the Philippines : 
For the Kingdom ol Thailand : 
' • k • • — 
THAVAT KHOMAV 
Minister of Foreign ACIairs 
VABCISO BAMOS 
Secretary ol Foreign Aliairs 
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APPENDIX-II 
DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD II 
( B A L I C O N C O R D l i 1976) 
The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Prime Minister of the Union of 
Myanmar, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Singapore, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Prime 
Minister of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; 
RECALLING the Declaration of ASEAN Concord adopted in this historic place of Bali, 
Indonesia in 1976, the Leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
expressed satisfaction with the overall progress made in the region; 
NOTING in particular the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries in Southeast Asia, the 
deepening of regional economic integration and the impending accession to the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) by States outside Southeast Asia; 
CONSCIOUS of the need to further consolidate and enhance the achievements of ASEAN 
as a dynamic, resilient, and cohesive regional association for the well being of its member 
states and people as well as the need to further strengthen the Association's guidelines in 
achieving a more coherent and clearer path for cooperation between and among them; 
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Declaration 
(Bangkok, 1967), the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali, 1976), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok, 1995); 
COGNIZANT that the future of ASEAN cooperation is guided by the ASEAN Vision 
2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999-2004), and its succeeding Plans of Action, the 
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (lAI), and the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN 
(RIA); 
CONFIRMING further that ASEAN Member Countries share primary responsibility for 
strengthening the economic and social stability in the region and ensuring their peaceful 
and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their 
stability and security from external interference in any form or manner in order to 
preserve their national interest in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their 
peoples; 
REAFFIRMING the fundamental importance of adhering to the principle of non-
interference and consensus in ASEAN cooperation; 
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REITERATING that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is an 
effective code of conduct for relations among governments and peoples; 
RECOGNIZING that sustainable economic development requires a secure political 
environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic 
cooperation and political solidarity; 
COGNIZANT of the interdependence of the ASEAN economies and the need for ASEAN 
member countries to adopt "Prosper Thy Neighbour" policies in order to ensure the long-
term vibrancy and prosperity of the ASEAN region; 
REITERATING the importance of rules-based multilateral trading system that is equitable 
and that contributes towards the pursuit of development; 
REAFFIRMING that ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in 
partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed 
to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony; 
Do HEREBY DECLARE THAT: 
1. An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political 
and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are 
closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, 
stability and shared prosperity in the region; 
2. ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration 
among its member states and among their peoples and to promote regional peace and 
stability, security, development- and prosperity with a view to realizing an ASEAN 
Community that is open, dynamic and resilient; 
3. ASEAN shall respond to the new dynamics within the respective ASEAN Member 
Countries and shall urgently and effectively address the challenge of translating ASEAN 
cultural diversities and different economic levels into equitable development opportunity 
and prosperity, in an environment of solidarity, regional resilience and harmony; 
4. ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political 
issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as 
environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defense 
cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and 
principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes through peaceful means; 
5. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is the key code of 
conduct governing relations between states and a diplomatic instrument for the promotion 
of peace and stability in the region; 
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6. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shall remain the primary forum in enhancing 
political and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in 
building peace and stability in the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further 
advancing the stages of cooperation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia 
Pacific region; 
7. ASEAN is committed to deepening and broadening its internal economic integration 
and linkages with the world economy to realize,an ASEAN Economic Community 
through a bold, pragmatic and unified strategy; 
8. ASEAN shall further build on the momentum already gained in the ASEAN+3 process 
so as to further draw synergies through broader and deeper cooperation in various areas; 
9. ASEAN shall build upon opportunities for mutually beneficial regional integration 
arising from its existing initiatives.and those with partners, through enhanced trade and 
investment links as well as through lAI process and the RIA; 
10. ASEAN shall continue to foster a community of caring societies and promote a 
common regional identity; 
Do HEREBY ADOPT: 
The framework to achieve a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN 
Community: 
A. ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY (ASC) 
l.The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN's political and 
security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace 
with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious 
environment. The ASEAN Security Community members shall rely exclusively on 
peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security 
as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common 
vision and objectives. 
2. The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member 
countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defense arrangements and taking 
into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, 
subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, 
economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather 
than to a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy. 
3. ASEAN shall continue to promote regional solidarity and cooperation. Member 
Countries shall exercise their rights to lead their national existence free from outside 
interference in their internal affairs. 
203 
4. The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles 
of international law and uphold ASEAN's principles of non-interference, consensus-
based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, 
the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences 
and disputes. 
5. Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be 
addressed regionally in holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime 
cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the 
evolution of the ASEAN Security Community. 
6. Existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on ZOPFAN, the TAC, 
and the SEANWFZ Treaty shall continue to play a pivotal role in the area of confidence 
building measures, preventive diplomacy and the approaches to conflict resolution. 
7. The High Council of the TAC shall be the important component in the ASEAN 
Security Community since it reflects ASEAN's commitment to resolve all differences, 
disputes and conflicts peacefully. 
8. The ASEAN Security Community shall contribute to further promoting peace and 
security in the wider Asia Pacific region and reflect ASEAN's determination to move 
forward at a pace comfortable to all. In this regard, the ARF shall remain the main forum 
for regional security dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force. 
9. The ASEAN Security Community is open and outward looking in respect of actively 
engaging ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners to promote peace and stability in the 
region, and shall build on the ARF to facilitate consultation and cooperation between 
ASEAN and its friends and Partners on regional security matters. 
10. The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and 
mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities 
to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational 
crimes; and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remains free of all 
weapons of mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity 
and responsibility of being the primary driving force of the ARF. 
11. The ASEAN Security Community shall explore enhanced cooperation with the 
United Nations as well as other international and regional bodies for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
12. ASEAN shall explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish 
modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which include, inter alia, the following 
elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-
conflict peace building. 
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B. ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC) 
1. The ASEAN Economic Community is the realisation of the end-goal of economic 
integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, to create a stable, prosperous and 
highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, 
services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and 
reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020. 
2. The ASEAN Economic Community is based on a convergence of interests among 
ASEAN members to deepen and broaden economic integration efforts through existing 
and new initiatives with clear timelines. 
3. The ASEAN Economic Community shall establish ASEAN as a single market and 
production base, turning the diversity that characterises the region into opportunities for 
business complementation making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of 
the global supply chain. ASEAN's strategy shall consist of the integration of ASEAN and 
enhancing ASEAN's economic competitiveness. In moving towards the ASEAN 
Economic Community, ASEAN shall, inter alia, institute new mechanisms and measures 
to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives including the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) 
and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); accelerate regional integration in the priority 
sectors; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents; and 
strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including the improvement of the 
existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ensure expeditious and legally 
binding resolution of any economic disputes. As a first step towards the realization of the 
ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall implement the recommendations of the 
High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration as annexed. 
4. The ASEAN Economic Community shall ensure that deepening and broadening 
integration of ASEAN shall be accompanied by technical and development cooperation 
in order to address the development divide and accelerate the economic integration of 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam through lAI and RIA so that the benefits 
of ASEAN integration are shared and enable all ASEAN Member Countries to move 
forward in a unified manner. 
5. The realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of 
both liberalization and cooperation measures. There is a need to enhance cooperation and 
integration activities in other areas. These will involve, among others, human resources 
development and capacity building; recognition of educational qualifications; closer 
consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; 
enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; development of electronic 
transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries across the region to promote 
regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement. 
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C. ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY (ASCC) 
1. The ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, in consonance witli the goal set by ASEAN 
Vision 2020, envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community 
of caring societies. 
2. In line with the programme of action set by the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, 
the Community shall foster cooperation in social development aimed at raising the 
standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population, and shall seek the 
active involvement of all sectors of society, in particular women, youth, and local 
communities. 
3. ASEAN shall ensure that its work force shall be prepared for, and benefit from, 
economic integration by investing more resources for basic and higher education, 
training, science and technology development, job creation, and social protection. The 
development and enhancement of human resources is a key strategy for employment 
generation, alleviating poverty and socio-economic disparities, and ensuring economic 
growth with equity. ASEAN shall continue existing efforts to promote regional mobility 
and mutual recognition of professional credentials, talents, and skills development. 
4. ASEAN shall further intensify cooperation in the area of public health, including in the 
prevention and control of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and SARS, and support 
joint regional actions to increase access to affordable medicines. The security of the 
Community is enhanced when poverty and diseases are held in check, and the peoples of 
ASEAN are assured of adequate health care. 
5. The Community shall nurture talent and promote interaction among ASEAN scholars, 
writers, artists and media practitioners to help preserve and promote ASEAN's diverse 
cultural heritage while fostering regional identity as well as cultivating people's 
awareness of ASEAN. 
6. The Community shall intensify cooperation in addressing problems associated with 
population growth, unemployment, environmental degradation and transboundary 
pollution as well as disaster management in the region to enable individual members to 
fully realize their development potentials and to enhance the mutual ASEAN spirit. 
We hereby pledge to our peoples our resolve and commitment to bring the ASEAN 
Community into reality and, for this purpose, task the concerned Ministers to implement 
this Declaration. 
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Done In Sali, Indonesia, on the Seventh Day of October in the Year Two 
Ttiousanti and Three. 
For Qrtjrtei Oarussalam 
rr> 
HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH 
Sultan of Brunei DaruBsalam 
For the Kingdom of Cambodia 
SAMDECffHUN SEN 
Prime Minister 
For the Republic of Indonesia 
MEGAWprri SOEKARNOPUTRI 
For the Lao People's Democratic 
J ^ Republic 
BOUNNHANG VORACHITH 
Prime Minister 
For Malaysia 
DR. MAHATHIR. BIN MOHAMAD 
Prime Minister 
For the Uhion.of Myanmar 
GENERAL KHTN NYUNT 
Prima Minister 
For the Republic of the Philippines For thei^el^jblic of Singapore 
GLQ^A MACAPMA'L-ARROYO GOE[l CHC 
President y Prime Wthister 
For the Kingdom of Thalia For the Socialist Republic of 3/tet:i^am 
, ^ ^ ^ 
DR. THAKSIN SHmAWATRA 
Prime Minister 
PHAN VAN KHAI 
Prime Minister 
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APPENDIX-III 
CHARTER OF THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL 
COOPERATION ( S A A R C ) 
We, the Heads of State or Government of BANGLADESH, BHUTAN, INDIA, 
MALDIVES, NEPAL, PAKISTAN and SRI LANKA; 
1. Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through strict 
adherence to the principles of the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER and NON-
ALIGNMENT, particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes; 
2. Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the objectives of peace, 
freedom, social justice and economic prosperity are best achieved in the SOUTH ASIAN 
region by fostering mutual understanding, good neighbourly relations and meaningful 
cooperation among the Member States which are bound by ties of history and culture; 
3. Aware of the common problems, interests and aspirations of the peoples of SOUTH 
ASIA and the need for joint action and enhanced cooperation within their respective 
political and economic systems and cultural traditions; 
4. Convinced that regional cooperation among the countries of SOUTH ASIA is 
mutually beneficial, desirable and necessary for promoting the welfare and improving the 
quality of life of the peoples of the region; 
5. Convinced further that economic, social and technical cooperation among the 
countries of SOUTH ASIA would contribute significantly to national and collective self-
reliance; 
6. Recognising that increased cooperation, contacts and exchanges among the countries 
of the region will contribute to the promotion of friendship and understanding among 
their peoples; 
7. Recalling the DECLARATION signed by their Foreign Ministers in NEW DELHI on 
August 2, 1983 and noting the progress achieved in regional cooperation; 
8. Reaffirming their determination to promote such cooperation within an institutional 
framework; 
Do HEREBY AGREE to establish an organisation to be known as SOUTH ASIAN 
ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION hereinafter referred to as the 
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ASSOCIATION, with the following objectives, principles, institutional and financial 
arrangements: 
Article I 
OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the ASSOCIATION shall be: 
a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of SOUTH ASIA and to improve 
their quality of h'fe; 
b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in 
dignity and to realise their full potentials; 
c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries 
of SOUTH ASIA; 
d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one 
another's problems; 
e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, 
social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; 
f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; 
g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on 
matters of common interests; and 
h) to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar 
aims and purposes. 
Article II 
P R I N O I ' I . K S 
1. Cooperation within the framework of the ASSOCIATION shall be 
based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity, political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other States and mutual benefit. 
2. Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation but shall complement them. 
3. Such cooperation shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral 
obligations. 
Article III 
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MEETINGS OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT 
The Heads of State or Government shall meet once a year or more often as 
and when considered necessary by the Member States. 
Article IV 
COUNCIL O F M I N I S T E R S 
1. A Council of Ministers consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States shall 
be established with the following functions: 
a) formulation of the policies of the ASSOCIATION; 
b) review of the progress of cooperation under the ASSOCIATION; 
c) decision on new areas of cooperation; 
d) establishment of additional mechanism under the ASSOCIATION as 
deemed necessary; 
e) decision on other matters of general interest to the ASSOCIATION. 
2. The Council of Ministers shall meet twice a year. Extraordinary session of the Council 
may be held by agreement among the Member States. 
Article V 
STANDING COMMITTEE 
1. The Standing Committee comprising the Foreign Secretaries shall have the following 
functions: 
a) overall monitoring and coordination of programme of cooperation; 
b) approval of projects and programmes, and the modalities of their 
financing; 
c) determination of inter-sectoral priorities; 
d) mobilisation of regional and external resources; 
e) identification of new areas of cooperation based on appropriate studies. 
2. The Standing Committee shall meet as often as deemed necessary. 
3. The Standing Committee shall submit periodic reports to the Council of Ministers and 
make reference to it as and when necessary for decisions on policy matters. 
Article VI 
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TECHNICAL COMMITTEES 
1. Technical Committees comprising representatives of Member States shall be 
responsible for the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the programmes in 
their respective areas of cooperation. 
2. They shall have the following terms of reference: 
a) determination of the potential and the scope of regional cooperation in 
agreed areas; 
b) formulation of programmes and preparation of projects; 
c) determination of financial implications of sectoral programmes; 
d) formulation of recommendations regarding apportionment of costs; 
e) implementation and coordination of sectoral programmes; 
f) monitoring of progress in implementation. 
3. The Technical Committees shall submit periodic reports to the Standing Committee. 
4. The Chairmanship of the Technical Committees shall normally rotate among Member 
States in alphabetical order every two years. 
5. The Technical Committees may, inter-alia, use the following mechanisms and 
modalities, if and when considered necessary: 
a) meetings of heads of national technical agencies; 
b) meetings of experts in specific fields; 
c) contact amongst recognised centres of excellence in the region. 
Article Vll 
ACTION COMMITTEES 
The Standing Committee may set up Action Committees comprising 
Member States concerned with implementation of projects involving more 
than two but not all Member States. 
Article VIII 
SECRETARIAT 
There shall be a Secretariat of the ASSOCIATION. 
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Article IX 
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
l.The contribution of each Member State towards financing of the 
activities of the ASSOCIATION shall be voluntary. 
2. Each Technical Committee shall make recommendations for the 
apportionment of costs of implementing the programmes proposed by it. 
3. In case sufficient financial resources cannot be mobilised within the 
region for funding activities of the ASSOCIATION, external financing 
from appropriate sources may be mobilised with the approval of or by the 
Standing Committee. 
Article X 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1 .Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity. 
2. Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the 
deliberations. 
I N F A I T H W H E R E O F We Have Set Our Hands And Seals Hereunto. DONE In DHAKA, 
B A N G L A D E S H , On This The Eighth Day Of December Of The Year One Thousand Nine Hundred 
Eighty Five. 
Hussain Muhammad Ershad 
PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH 
Jigme Singye Wangchuk 
KING OF BHUTAN 
Rajiv Gandhi 
PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA 
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom 
PRESIDENT OF THE REBUPLIC OF MALDIVES 
Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev 
KING OF NEPAL 
Muhammad Zia-ui-Haq 
PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN 
Junius Richard Jayewardene 
PRESIDENT OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA 
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APPENDIX-IV 
AGREEMENT ON SOUTH ASIAN FREE TRADE AREA 
( S A F T A ) 
The Governments of the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 
Member States comprising the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the Kingdom of 
Bhutan, the Republic of India, the Republic of Maldives, the Kingdom of Nepal, the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 
hereinafter referred to as "Contracting States" 
Motivated by the commitment to strengthen intra-SAARC economic cooperation to 
maximise the realization of the region's potential for trade and development for the 
benefit of their people, in a spirit of mutual accommodation, with full respect for the 
principles of sovereign equality, independence and territorial integrity of all States; 
Noting that the Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) 
signed in Dhaka on the 11th of April 1993 provides for the adoption of various 
instruments of trade liberalization on a preferential basis; 
Convinced that preferential trading arrangements among SAARC Member States will act 
as a stimulus to the strengthening of national and SAARC economic resilience, and the 
development of the national economies of the Contracting States by expanding 
investment and production opportunities, trade, and foreign exchange earnings as well as 
the development of economic ^nd technological cooperation; 
Aware that a number of regions are entering into such arrangements to enhance trade 
through the free movement of goods; 
Recognizing that Least Developed Countries in the region need to be accorded special 
and differential treatment commensurate with their development needs; and 
Recognizing that it is necessary to progress beyond a Preferential Trading Arrangement 
to move towards higher levels of trade and economic cooperation in the region by 
removing barriers to cross-border flow of goods; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article - 1 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this Agreement: 
1. Concessions mean tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff concessions agreed under the Trade 
Liberalisation Programme; 
2. Direct Trade Measures mean measures conducive to promoting mutual trade of 
Contracting States such as long and medium-term contracts containing import and 2 
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supply commitments in respect of specific products, buy-back arrangements, state trading 
operations, and government and public procurement; 
3. Least Developed Contracting State refers to a Contracting State which is designated 
as a "Least Developed Country" by the United Nations; 
4. Margin of Preference means percentage of tariff by which tariffs are reduced on 
products imported from one Contracting State to another as a result of preferential 
treatment. 
5. Non-Tariff Measures include any measure, regulation, or practice, other than "tariffs" 
and "para-tariffs". 
6. Para-Tariffs mean border charges and fees, other than "tariffs", on foreign trade 
transactions of a tariff- like effect which are levied solely on imports, but not those 
indirect taxes and charges, which are levied in the same manner on like domestic 
products. Import charges corresponding to specific services rendered are not considered 
as para-tariff measures; 
7. Products mean all products including manufactures and commodities in their raw, 
semi-processed and processed forms; 
8. SAPTA means Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement signed in 
Dhaka on the 11th of April 1993; 
9. Serious injury means a significant impairment of the domestic industry of like or 
directly competitive products due to a surge in preferential imports causing substantial 
losses in terms of earnings, production or employment unsustainable in the short term; 
10. Tariffs mean customs duties included in the national tariff schedules of the 
Contracting States; 
11. Threat of serious injury means a situation in which a substantial increase of 
preferential imports is of a nature to cause "serious injury" to domestic producers, and 
that such injury, although not yet existing, is clearly imminent. A determination of threat 
of serious injury shall be based on facts and not on mere allegation, conjecture, or remote 
or hypothetical possibility. 
Article - 2 
Establishment 
The Contracting States hereby establish the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) to 
promote and enhance mutual trade and economic cooperation among the Contracting 
States, through exchanging concessions in accordance with this Agreement. 
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Article - 3 
Objectives and Principles 
1. The Objectives of this Agreement are to promote and enhance mutual trade and 
economic cooperation among Contracting States by, inter-alia: 
a) eliminating barriers to trade in, and facilitating the cross-border movement of 
goods between the territories of the Contracting States; 
b) promoting conditions of fair competition in the free trade area, and ensuring 
equitable benefits to all Contracting States, taking into account their respective levels and 
pattern of economic development; 
c) creating effective mechanism for the implementation and application of this 
Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and 
d) establishing a framework for further regional cooperation to expand and 
enhance the mutual benefits of this Agreement. 
2. SAFTA shall be governed in accordance with the following principles: 
a) SAFTA will be governed by the provisions of this Agreement and also by the 
rules, regulations, decisions, understandings and protocols to be agreed upon within its 
framework by the Contracting States; 
b) The Contracting States affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect 
to each other under Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
and other Treaties/Agreements to which such Contracting States are signatories; 
c) SAFTA shall be based and applied on the principles of overall reciprocity and 
mutuality of advantages in such a way as to benefit equitably all Contracting States, 
taking into account their respective levels of economic and industrial development, the 
pattern of their external trade and tariff policies and systems; 
d) SAFTA shall involve the free movement of goods, between countries through, 
inter alia, the elimination of tariffs, para tariffs and non-tariff restrictions on the 
movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures; 
e) SAFTA shall entail adoption of trade facilitation and other measures, and the 
progressive harmonization of legislations by the Contracting States in the relevant areas; 
and 
f) The special needs of the Least Developed Contracting States shall be clearly 
recognized by adopting concrete preferential measures in their favour on a non-reciprocal 
basis. 
Article - 4 
Instruments 
The SAFTA Agreement will be implemented through the following instruments:-
1. Trade Liberalisation Programme 
2. Rules of Origin 
3. Institutional Arrangements 
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4. Consultations and Dispute Settlement Procedures 
5. Safeguard Measures 
6. Any other instrument that may be agreed upon. 
Article - 5 
National Treatment 
Each Contracting State shall accord national treatment to the products of other 
Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of Article III of GATT 1994. 
Article - 6 
Components 
SAFTA may, inter-alia, consist of arrangements relating to: 
a) tariffs; 
b) para-tariffs; 
c) non-tariff measures; 
d) direct trade measures. 
Article - 7 
Trade Liberalisation Programme 
1. Contracting States agree to the following schedule of tariff reductions: 
a) The tariff reduction by the Non-Least Developed Contracting States from 
existing tariff rates to 20% shall be done within a time frame of 2 years, from the date of 
coming into force of the Agreement. Contracting States are encouraged to adopt 
reductions in equal annual installments. If actual tariff rates after the coming into force of 
the Agreement are below 20%, there shall be an annual reduction on a Margin of 
Preference basis of 10% on actual tariff rates for each of the two years. 
b) The tariff reduction by the Least Developed Contracting States from existing 
tariff rates will be to 30% within the time frame of 2 years from the date of coming into 
force of the Agreement. If actual tariff rates on the date of coming into force of the 
Agreement are below 30%, there will be an annual reduction on a Margin of Preference 
basis of 5 % on actual tariff rates for each of the two years. 
c) The subsequent tariff reduction by Non-Least Developed Contracting States 
from 20% or below to 0-5% shall be done within a second time frame of 5 years, 
beginning from the third year from the date of coming into force of the Agreement. 
However, the period of subsequent tariff reduction by Sri Lanka shall be six years. 
Contracting States are encouraged to adopt reductions in equal annual installments, but 
not less than 15% annually. 
d) The subsequent tariff reduction by the Least Developed Contracting States 
from 30% or below to 0-5% shall be done within a second time frame of 8 years 
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beginning from the third year from the date of coming into force of the Agreement. The 
Least Developed Contracting States are encouraged to adopt reductions in equal annual 
installments, not less than 10% annually. 
2. The above schedules of tariff reductions will not prevent Contracting States from 
immediately reducing their tariffs to 0-5% or from following an accelerated schedule of 
tariff reduction. 
3. a) Contracting States may nqt apply the Trade Liberalisation Programme as in 
paragraph 1 above, to the tariff lines included in the Sensitive Lists which shall be 
negotiated by the Contracting States (for LDCs and Non-LDCs) and incorporated in this 
Agreement as an integral part. The number of products in the Sensitive Lists shall be 
subject to maximum ceiling to be mutually agreed among the Contracting States with 
flexibility to Least Developed Contracting States to seek derogation in respect of the 
products of their export interest; and 
b) The Sensitive List shall be reviewed after every four years or earlier as may be 
decided by SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC), established under Article 10, with a view 
to reducing the number of items in the Sensitive List. 
4. The Contracting States shall notify the SAARC Secretariat all non-tariff and paratariff 
measures to their trade on an annual basis. The notified measures shall be reviewed by 
the Committee of Experts, established under Article 10, in its regular meetings to 
examine their compatibility with relevant WTO provisions. The Committee of Experts 
shall recommend the elimination n or implementation of the measure in the least trade 
restrictive manner in order to facilitate intra-SAARC tradei. 
5. Contracting Parties shall eliminate all quantitative restrictions, except otherwise 
permitted under GATT 1994, in respect of products included in the Trade Liberalisation 
Programme. 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Non- Least 
Developed Contracting States shall reduce their tariff to 0-5% for the products of Least 
Developed Contracting States within a timeframe of three years beginning from the date 
of coming into force of the Agreement. 
Article - 8 
Additional Measures 
Contracting States agree to consider, in addition to the measures set out in Article 7, the 
adoption of trade facilitation and other measures to support and complement SAFTA for 
mutual benefit. These may include, among others: -
a) harmonization of standards, reciprocal recognition of tests and accreditation of 
testing laboratories of Contracting States and certification of products; 
b) simplification and harmonization of customs clearance procedure; 
c) harmonization of national customs classification based on HS coding system; 
d) Customs cooperation to resolve dispute at customs entry points; 
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e) simplification and harmonization of import licensing and registration 
procedures; 
f) simplification of banking procedures for import financing; 
g) transit facilities for efficient intra-SAARC trade, especially for the land-locked 
Contracting States; 
h) removal of barriers to intra-SAARC investments; 
i) macroeconomic consultations; 
j) rules for fair competition and the promotion of venture capital; 
k) development of communication systems and transport infrastructure; 
1) making exceptions to their foreign exchange restrictions, if any, relating 
to payments for products under the SAFTA scheme, as well as repatriation of 
such payments without prejudice to their rights under Article XVIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the relevant provisions of 
Articles of Treaty of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and 
m) Simplification of procedures for business visas. 
Article - 9 
Extension of Negotiated Concessions 
Concessions agreed to, other than those made exclusively to the Least Developed 
Contracting States, shall be extended unconditionally to all Contracting States. 
Article -10 
Institutional Arrangements 
1. The Contracting States hereby establish the SAFTA Ministerial Council (hereinafter 
referred to as SMC). 
2. The SMC shall be the highest decision-making body of SAFTA and shall be 
responsible for the administration and implementation of this Agreement and all 
decisions and arrangements made within its legal framework. 
3. The SMC shall consist of the Ministers of Commerce/Trade of the Contracting States. 
4. The SMC shall meet at least once every year or more often as and when considered 
necessary by the Contracting States. Each Contracting State shall chair the SMC for a 
period of one year on rotational basis in alphabetical order. 
5. The SMC shall be supported by a Committee of Experts (hereinafter referred to as 
COE), with one nominee from each Contracting State at the level of a Senior Economic 
Official, with expertise in trade matters. 
6. The COE shall monitor, review and facilitate implementafion of the provisions of this 
Agreement and undertake any task assigned to it by the SMC. The COE shall submit its 
report to SMC every six months. 
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7. The COE will also act as Dispute Settlement Body under this Agreement. 
8. The COE shall meet at least once every six months or more often as and when 
considered necessary by the Contracting States. Each Contracting State shall chair the 
COE for a period of one year on rotational basis in alphabetical order. 
9. The SAARC Secretariat shall provide secretarial support to the SMC and COE in the 
discharge of their functions. 
10. The SMC and COE will adopt their own rules of procedure. 
Article-11 
Special and Differential Treatment for the Least Developed Contracting States 
In addition to other provisions of this Agreement, all Contracting States shall provide 
special and more favorable treatment exclusively to the Least Developed Contracting 
States as set out in the following sub-paragraphs: 
a) The Contracting States shall give special regard to the situation of the Least 
Developed Contracting States when considering the application of anti-dumping and/or 
countervailing measures. In this regard, the Contracting States shall provide an 
opportunity to Least Developed Contracting States for consultations. The Contracting 
States shall, to the extent practical, favourably consider accepting price undertakings 
offered by exporters from Least Developed Contracting States. These constructive 
remedies shall be available until the trade liberalisation programme has been completed 
by all Contracting States. 
b) Greater flexibility in continuation of quantitative or other restrictions 
provisionally and without discrimination in critical circumstances by the Least Developed 
Contracting States on imports from other Contracting States. 
c) Contracting States shall also consider, where practical, taking direct trade 
measures with a view to enhancing sustainable exports from Least Developed 
Contracting States, such as long and medium-term contracts containing import and 
supply commitments in respect of specific products, buy-back arrangements, slate trading 
operations, and government and public procurement. 
d) Special consideration shall be given by Contracting States to requests from 
Least Developed Contracting States for technical assistance and cooperation 
arrangements designed to assist them in expanding their trade with other Contracting 
States and in taking advantage of the potential benefits of SAFTA. A list of possible areas 
for such technical assistance shall be negotiated by the Contracting States and 
incorporated in this Agreement as an integral part. 
e) The Contracting States recognize that the Least Developed Contracting States 
may face loss of customs revenue due to the implementation of the Trade Liberalisation 
Programme under this Agreement. Until alternative domestic arrangements are 
formulated to address this situation, the Contracting States agree to establish an 
appropriate mechanism to compensate the Least Developed Contracting States for their 
219 
loss of customs revenue. This mechanism and its rules and regulations shall be 
established prior to the commencement of the Trade Liberalisation Programme (TLP). 
Article- 12 
Special Provision for Maldives 
Notwithstanding the potential or actual graduation of Maldives from the status of a Least 
Developed Country, it shall be accorded in this Agreement and in any subsequent 
contractual undertakings thereof treatment no less favourable than that provided for the 
Least Developed Contracting States. 
Article - 1 3 
Non-application 
Notwithstanding the measures as set out in this Agreement its provisions shall not apply 
in relation to preferences already granted or to be granted by any Contracting State to 
other Contracting States outside the framework of this Agreement, and to third countries 
through bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral trade agreements and similar arrangements. 
Article -14 
General Exceptions 
a) Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting State from 
taking action and adopting measures which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
national security. 
b) Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the similar conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on intraregional trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting State from 
taking action and adopting measures which it considers necessary for the protection of: 
(i) public morals; 
(ii) human, animal or plant life and health; and 
(iii) articles of artistic, historic and archaeological value. 
Article - 1 5 
Balance of Payments Measures 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement, any Contracting State facing 
serious balance of payments difficulties may suspend provisionally the concessions 
extended under this Agreement. 
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2. Any such measure taken pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be immediately 
notified to the Committee of Experts. 
3. The Committee of Experts shall periodically review the measures taken pursuant to 
paragraph 1 of this Article. 
4. Any Contracting State which takes action pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall 
afford, upon request from any other Contracting State, adequate opportunities for 
consultations with a view to preserving the stability of concessions under SAFTA. 
5. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the Contracting States concerned 
within 30 days of the beginning of such consultations, to be extended by another 30 days 
through mutual consent, the matter may be referred to the Committee of Experts. 
6. Any such measures taken pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be phased out 
soon after the Committee of Experts comes to the conclusion that the balance of 
payments situation of the Contracting State concerned has improved. 
Article-16 
Safeguard Measures 
1. If any product, which is the subject of a concession under this Agreement, is imported 
into the territory of a Contracting State in such a manner or in such quantities as to cause, 
or threaten to cause, serious injury to producers of like or directly competitive products in 
the importing Contracting State, the importing Contracting State may, pursuant to an 
investigation by the competent authorities of that Contracting State conducted in 
accordance with the provisions set out in this Article, suspend temporarily the 
concessions granted under the provisions of this Agreement. The examination of the 
impact on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all other 
relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic 
industry of the product and a causal relationship must be clearly established between 
"serious injury" and imports from within the SAARC region, to the exclusion of all such 
other factors. 
2. Such suspension shall only be for such time and to the extent as may be necessary to 
prevent or remedy such injury and in no case, will such suspension be for duration of 
more than 3 years. 
3. No safeguard measure shall be applied again by a Contracting State to the import of a 
product which has been subject to such a measure during the period of implementation of 
Trade Liberalization Programme by the Contracting States, for a period of time equal to 
that during which such measure had been previously applied, provided that the period of 
non-application is at least two years. 
4. All investigation procedures for resorting to safeguard measures under this Article 
shall be consistent with Article XIX of GATT 1994 and WTO Agreement on Safeguards 
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5. Safeguard action under this Article shall be non-discriminatory and applicable to the 
product imported from all other Contracting States subject to the provisions of paragraph 
8 of this Article. 
6. When safeguard provisions are used in accordance with this Article, the Contracting 
State invoking such measures shall immediately notify the exporting Contracting State(s) 
and the Committee of Experts. 
7. In critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult 
to repair, a Contracting State may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a 
preliminary determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused 
or are threatening to cause serious injury. The duration of the provisional measure shall 
not exceed 200 days, during this period the pertinent requirements of this Article shall be 
met. 
8. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Article, safeguard measures under this 
article shall not be applied against a product originating in a Least Developed Contracting 
State as long as its share of imports of the product concerned in the importing 
Contracting State does not exceed 5 per cent, provided Least Developed Contracting 
States with less than 5% import share collectively account for not more than 15% of total 
imports of the product concerned. 
Article - 1 7 
Maintenance of the Value of Concessions 
Any of the concessions agreed upon under this Agreement shall not be diminished or 
nullified, by the application of any measures restricting trade by the Contracting States, 
except under the provisions of other articles of this Agreement. 
Article - 1 8 
Rules of Origin 
Rules of Origin shall be negotiated by the Contracting States and incorporated in this 
Agreement as an integral part. 
Article - 1 9 
Consultations 
1. Each Contracting State shall accord sympathetic consideration to and will afford 
adequate opportunity for consultations regarding representations made by another 
Contracting State with respect to any matter affecting the operation n of this Agreement. 
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2. The Committee of Experts may, at the request of a Contracting State, consult with any 
Contracting State in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a 
satisfactory solution through consultations under paragraph 1. 
Article - 20 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
1. Any dispute that may arise among the Contracting States regarding the interpretation 
and application of the provisions of this Agreement or any instrument adopted within its 
framework concerning the rights and obligations of the Contracting States will be 
amicably settled among the parties concerned through a process initiated by a request for 
bilateral consultations. 
2. Any Contracting State may request consultations in accordance with paragraph 1 of 
this Article with other Contracting State in writing stating the reasons for the request 
including identification of the measures at issue. All such requests should be notified to 
the Committee of Experts, through the SAARC Secretariat with an indication of the legal 
basis for the complaint. 
3. If a request for consultations is made pursuant to this Article, the Contracting State to 
which the request is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the request 
within 15 days after the dale of its receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faith 
within a period of no more than 30 days after the date of receipt of the request, with a 
view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. 
4. If the Contracting State does not respond within 15 days after the date of receipt of the 
request, or does not enter into consultations within a period of no more than 30 days, or a 
period otherwise mutually agreed, after the date of receipt of the request, then the 
Contracting State that requested the holding of consultations may proceed to request the 
Committee of Experts to settle the dispute in accordance with working procedures to be 
drawn up by the Committee. 
5. Consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of any 
Contracting State in any further proceedings. 
6. If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 30 days after the date of receipt of the 
request for consultations, to be extended by a further period of 30 days through mutual 
consent, the complaining Contracting State may request the Committee of Experts to 
settle the dispute. The complaining Contracting State may request the Committee of 
Experts to settle the dispute during the 60-day period if the consulting Contracting States 
jointly consider that consultations have failed to settle the dispute. 
7. The Committee of Experts shall promptly investigate the matter referred to it and make 
recommendations on the matter within a period of 60 days from the date of referral. 
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8. The Committee of Experts may request a specialist from a Contracting State not party 
to the dispute selected from a panel of specialists to be established by the Committee 
within one year from the date of entry into force of the Agreement for peer review of the 
matter referred to it. Such review shall be submitted to the Committee within a period of 
30 days from the date of referral of the matter to the specialist. 
9. Any Contracting State, which is a party to the dispute, may appeal the 
recommendations of the Committee of Experts to the SMC. The SMC shall review the 
matter within the period of 60 days from date of submission of request for appeal. The 
SMC may uphold, modify or reverse the recommendations of the Committee of Experts. 
10. Where the Committee of Experts or SMC concludes that the measure subject to 
dispute is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Agreement, it shall recommend 
that the Contracting State concerned bring the measure into conformity with this 
Agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the Committee of Experts or SMC may 
suggest ways in which the Contracting State concerned could implement the 
recommendations. 
11. The Contracting State to which the Committee's or SMC's recommendations are 
addressed shall within 30 days from the date of adoption of the recommendations by the 
Committee or SMC, inform the Committee of Experts of its intentions regarding 
implementation of the recommendations. Should the said Contracting State fail to 
implement the recommendations within 90 days from the date of adoption of the 
recommendations by the Committee, the Committee of Experts may authorize other 
interested Contracting States to withdraw concessions having trade effects equivalent to 
those of the measure in dispute. 
Article - 21 
Withdrawal 
1. Any Contracting State may withdraw from this Agreement at any time after its entry 
into force. Such withdrawal shall be effective on expiry of six months from the date on 
which a written notice thereof is received by the Secretary-General of SAARC, the 
depositary of this Agreement. That Contracting State shall simultaneously inform the 
Committee of Experts of the action it has taken. 
2. The rights and obligations of a Contracting State which has withdrawn from this 
Agreement shall cease to apply as of that effective date. 
3. Following the withdrawal by any Contracting State, the Committee shall meet within 
days to consider action subsequent to withdrawal. 
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Article - 22 
Entry into Force 
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on 1st January 2006 upon completion of 
formalities, including ratification by all Contracting States and issuance of a notification 
thereof by the SAARC Secretariat. This Agreement shall supercede the Agreement on 
SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA). 
2. Notwithstanding the supercession of SAPTA by this Agreement, the concessions 
granted under the SAPTA Framework shall remain available to the Contracting States 
until the completion of the Trade Liberalisation Programme. 
Article - 23 
Reservations 
This Agreement shall not be signed with reservations, nor will reservations be admitted at 
the time of notification to the SAARC Secretariat of the completion of formalities. 
Article - 24 
Amendments 
This Agreement may be amended by consensus in the SAFTA Ministerial Council. Any 
such amendment will become effective upon the deposit of instruments of acceptance 
with the Secretary General of SAARC by all Contracting States. 
Article - 25 
Depository 
This Agreement will be deposited with the Secretary General of SAARC, who will 
promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Contracting State. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized thereto by their 
respective Governments have signed this Agreement. 
DONE in ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN, On This The Sixth Day Of the Year Two 
Thousand Four, In Nine Originals In The English Language All Texts Being Equally 
Authentic. 
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M. MORSHED KHAN 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
People's Republic of Bangladesh 
NADO RINCHHEN 
Officiating Minister for 
Foreign Affairs 
Kingdom of Bhutan 
YASHWANT SINHA 
Minister of External Affairs 
Republic of India 
FATHULLA JAMEEL 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Republic of Maldives 
DR. BHEKH B. THAPA 
Ambassador-at-large 
for Foreign Affairs 
His Majesty's Government of Nepal 
KHURSHID M. KASURI 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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